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ABSTRACT 
CP.Snow's work may usefully be treated as a whole, 
despite the var^y of forms i n which i t appears. 
As such, i t contains a comprehensive set of related 
theories relevant to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and founded 
on Snov/'s view of the ind i v i d u a l , and centreing on 
the relationship between personal and t heoretical 
p o l i t i c s o This thesis presents a reconstioiction of 
Snovr's basic theories of the individual condition 
and the processes of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . Personal 
p o l i t i c s describes the immediate interaction of 
individuals i n situations of acknowledgedly limited 
c o n f l i c t ; theoretical p o l i t i c s refers t o any theory 
of the mode of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . These categories 
overlap but do not coincide with, Snow's own 
categories of "open" and "closed" p o l i t i c s , and 
Snow's thoughts and attitudes to his own dichotomy 
are discussed. The crucial action of the individual 
i s that of niaking decisions, and a p a r a l l e l i s seen 
in. s o c i a l organisation, where the mode of a c t i v i t y i s 
persuasion, the effective resolution i s through 
compromise and the tools of i n s i s t and reason. V/hile 
Snow's writings othervjise represent a congruent system 
of ideas there i s an apparent gap betvreen his analysis 
and his hopes f o r (the future, which i s resolved i n terms 
of his own theories, and his contribution i s found to 
provide a certain type of p o l i t i c a l education. 
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The material contained i n this thesis has not 
previously been submitted for a h i ^ e r degree 
of any nature or f o r publication of any kind. 
The c o p y r i ^ t of this thesis rests with 
the author. No quotation from i t should 
be published without his pr i o r written 
consent and information derived from i t 
should be aclaiowledged. 
PREFACE 
A major current i n the flow o f CP. Snow's thought i s 
the i n t e r p l a y 6f b e l i e f and i l l u s i o n , of action, intention, 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and reaction, and i t was with t h i s i n mind 
that the t i t l e 'Personal and Theoretical P o l i t i e s ' was 
formulated. 
Snow's writings, and the novel form i n general, have 
not received much attention from students of politicso The 
majority of commentators have segregated his novels from his 
other work and discussed one or the other. Undoubtedly, there 
are grounds f o r doing j u s t t h i s , but the unfortunate result i s 
that, to my knowledge, there i s no comprehensive overview of 
Snow's system of ideas. Added to t h i s are the problems of . 
abstracting such a system~from work the bulk of which has taken 
the form of f i c t i o n . While scholars of l i t e r a t u r e have been 
vociferous i n t h e i r c r i t i c i s m and appraisal of his work, t h e i r 
major contribution has quite naturally been primarily from the 
standpoint of a r t and not social science. Social scientists, 
r e f l e c t i n g on Snow's lectures, have mentioned the novels - but 
usually only i n passing. Snow's i s the problem of the marginal 
man who belongs to so many groups that no one of them can evaluate 
the t o t a l i t y of his work. This thesis i s no ezception. 
While I have been ^ l e to draw on commentators from both camps, 
most of the references are to Snow's own writings, and my concern 
has been to present a cogent and f i r m fouiidation f o r any future, 
perhaps more sectional, analysis of Snow's theories. 
I am indebted to a number of people for help over the past 
two years, of whom I should mention the archivist of Leicester 
v i 
University, the s t a f f of Durham University Library, Jim Wiley, 
Lord Snow and especially Dro Richard Chapman f o r his 
encouragement and advice. Any mistakes or misapprehensions are, 
however, e n t i r e l y my own repponsibility. 
Chapter One 
BIOGRAPHY 
There i s a legend which frames the conceptual genesis of 
Snow's series of novels, the'strangprs and Brothers^sequence. 
At the beginning there was a flash of inspiration: i t was January 
1st, 1935, and Snow was out walking near Marseilles, when he "had 
the idea out of the blue."^ He saw the framework of the series, 
the means he would use to structure i t , how he could use i t to 
speak with his own voiceo At the time he was "unhappy and most 
2 
things had gone wrong with my l i f e . " This sounds l i k e a f a i l u r e 
t a l k i n g , the possessor of an a r t i s t i c s p i r i t too sensitive f o r 
the hustle of the social world - yet nothing could be farther 
from the t r u t h . Snow was t h i r t y years old. From humble beginn-
ings he had risen high - a Fellowship at Cambridge, a Doctorate 
i n Physics, a participant i n the s c i e n t i f i c revolution and an 
author, with three books i n p r i n t . 
Charles Percy Snow was bom i n Leicester, October 15th, 1905o 
His father was a clerk i n a shoe factory and a church organist -
a rather dreamy man, one gathers.^ His grandfather was an artisan 
who had ri s e n to the position of overseer of a tram depot. I t 
was he who taught Snow to work out mental decimal problems by the 
4 
age of eight, and gave him a s t a r t with his reading. Snow re-
membered, much l a t e r : " I was bom poor, but i n fact we were a 
5 
bookish family." 
At the cost of three guineas a term, Snow attended the 
Alderman Newton Grrammar School i n Leicester. I t was a school: 
"which had, i n a longish history, not once t h o u ^ t of producing 
a scholarship candidate."^ Snow's poverty gave him a determination 
to succeed, and the means was, i n the beginning, academic. He 
worked as a laboratory assistant i n the school while he studied 
f o r a scholarship examination, going to University College, 
Leicester, where he studied chemistry, and became president of 
7 
the Students' Union. His determination was developing and 
also his ambition: he wanted to be a novelist. He wrote his 
f i r s t novel at the age of twenty-one, while at Leicester. I t 
was a semi-autobiographical piece which he gave to a g i r l at the 
g 
college. I t has never been printed. 
The following year, 1927, Snow was awarded the college's f i r s t 
London (external) F i r s t Class i n Honours Chemistry, and went on 
7 
to research an M.Sc. i n Physics. Subsequently he won a research 
scholarship to Cambridge, where he worked on molecular physics -
the study of the arrangement of particles of matter. 
This was at the time of the Twentieth Century Golden Age of 
Physics, and Cambridge was one of the f o c i of the age, perhaps the 
most important. I n Cambridge, Gtfttingen and Copenhagen, giants 
of the s c i e n t i f i c world, such as Rutherford, Franck and Bohr led 
the s c i e n t i f i c revolution. Electrons and neutrons were discoveredo 
The atom was f i n a l l y s p l i t . I t was a v i c t o r y f o r science, similar 
i n i t s symbolic significance to the f i r s t moonwalk, yet i n i t s 
re a l gains, and coming to a world r e l a t i v e l y untouched by techno-
logy, at a time when science created a brotherhood which could 
r i s e above the national issue, i t was f a r more earthshaking. 
People, especially s c i e n t i s t s , would never see the world i n the 
same l i g h t as before. 
Snow, i n his speeches, never ceases to impress upon his 
audience the wonder and excitement which infected him during his 
time at the Cavendish laboratories i n Cambridge,^ In 1930, on 
the r e s u l t of his Ph.D., he became a Fellow of Christ's College, 
Cambridge, and continued his work on spectroscopy. Professor J.D. 
Bemal was with him: " I worked with Snow at Cambridge i n the most 
ex c i t i n g yeai" of 1932 when the neutron was discovered and Scrutiny 
founded. He was a b r i l l i a n t physical chemist, whose work on 
photo-ehemistry i n the s o l i d state could easily have opened up 
f o r him a new f i e l d of research."^° 
Other figures whose names are prominent i n the s c i e n t i f i c 
h i s t o r y were at Cambridge at that time: Dirac, Blackett ( l a t e r to 
follow Snow in t o the House of Lords), Kapitsa, Hardy, Chadwick, 
Keynes, Snow was a member of the e l i t e physics club, the Kapitsa 
Club: he was among the f i r s t to hear of the discovery of the 
11 12 neutron. He became f r i e n d l y w i t h G.H, Hardy who, with 
Littlewood, established a procediire which dominated mathematics 
f o r a generation. 
Contemporary widely-acclaimed i n t e l l e c t u a l s included Bertrand 
Russell (also at Cambridge),and Einstein's Theory of R e l a t i v i t y 
was known of ( i f not understood) at the time. The Vienna school 
of psychoanalysis was under way. And there were a group of 
novelists - Dorothy Richardson, V i r g i n i a Woolf, James Joyce, and 
poets - T.S. E l i o t and Ezra Pound - who were r i s i n g stars, whose 
supporters claimed f o r them the t i t l e " i n t e l l e c t u a l " , Rutherford 
and the others were somehow confined, i n the public image, to 
t h e i r white coats and laboratories. Their fame .was circumscribed 
by the boundaries of science. News of what they had done leaked 
through, of course, but science had never been dominant i n our 
culture; these men were pioneers, but pioneers i n an area so 
esoteric that the p l a i n , simple man could not begin to \mderstand 
them,, whereas E l i o t and Joyce used words, rather than mathematical 
symbols. I f the p l a i n , simple man was l e f t behind hy both these 
developments, the l i t e r a r y cognoscenti knew which was superior. 
G.H. Hardy complained: "Have you noticed how the word ' i n t e l l e c t u a l ' 
i s used nowadays? There seems to be a new d e f i n i t i o n which 
doesn't include Rutherford or Eddington or Dirac or me. I t does 
13 
seem rather odd, don't y'know." 
Snow was making the t r a n s i t i o n from s c i e n t i s t to novelist 
at t h i s time. He did not lose his s c i e n t i s t friends, and t h e i r 
isolated, misunderstood position was a subject which l a t e r would 
be prominent i n his w r i t i n g . 
I n 1932 Death Under S a i l , a competent detective-story, was 
published. I n 1933 a less successful, Wellsian, science f i c t i o n 
novel called New Lives f o r Old appeared anonymously, and the 
following year saw the publication of The Search, generally 
recognised as Snow's f i r s t serious novel. He did no more 
s c i e n t i f i c research a f t e r that. 
Part of the object of The Search was to introduce the species 
' s c i e n t i s t ' to the novel-reading public, to describe how he i s l i k e 
everyone else, and the ways i n which he i s d i f f e r e n t . Snow has 
been making th i s point repeatedly since then, introducing and 
14 
examining the s c i e n t i s t i n l a t e r novels and lectures. Intelligence, 
determination and consistency are the three q u a l i t i e s Snow has 
exhibited i n his own personal search, the search f o r a key which 
w i l l open the doors between men. 
Yet the following New Year's day found him depressed - u n t i l 
his v i s i o n came upon him. The vision might have been the answer 
to his depressed state - assuming the cause of his depression was, 
l e t us say, mental confusion; or perhaps his vision was an escape 
from his depression - a project into which he could throw himself. 
There are suggestions that Snow was unhappy i n love i n his younger 
15 
l i f e , to which the novel sequence lends oblique credence. 
I t seems l i k e l y that the novel series tided him over emotionally 
u n t i l he found a measure of personal happiness. 
Otherwise, he was not i d l e . He was teaching: editing the 
Cambridge Library of Modem Science, w r i t i n g f o r periodicals -
often attempting to describe, i n simple language, the benefits 
which applied science could bring - and, from 1938-40, he edited 
the Cambridge magazine of popular science - Discovery. Robert 
Greacon observes: "One i s always staggered by the capacity f o r 
both work and purposive relaxation i n Snow's heroes," remarking 
that perhaps they organise t h e i r time better than the rest of us.^^ 
This capacity i s evident i n the story of Snow's own l i f e . 
I n the l a t e 1930s he wrote Strangers and Brothers, now known, 
and hereafter referred to as, George Passant. He was not sat i s -
f i e d with i t - he l a i d i t to one side, while he wrote The Bonscience 
of the Rich - eventually e d i t i n g and abbreviating Passant consider-
17 
ably. The publisher. Sir Beoffrey Faber, was interested i n 
Snow's idea, and he arranged to-publish the whole series. Faber 
18 
published Passant i n 1940. 
With the onset of war Snow's l i f e changed. From 1939 he 
worked f o r the Royal Society, selecting s c i e n t i f i c personnel for 
war-time projects. The war does not seem to have taken him by 
19 
surprise and the position was natural to him - that of a 
tran s l a t o r between s c i e n t i s t s and administrators. I n 1940 the 
project was taken over by the Government and Snow became chief of 
s c i e n t i f i c prsonnel i n the Ministry o f Labour. 
Bernalwrote: " I f the Germans had been able to f i n d a man of 
the same calibre to make as good use of t h e i r scientists, the 
20 
v i c t o r y would have been a f a r nearer thing." The Germans seemed 
to be aware of t h i s : Snow's name was l i s t e d among others to be 
21 
rounded up a f t e r the invasion of B r i t a i n . He was awarded the 
C.B.E. i n the January 1943 Honours Lis t s . 
As a Fellow of Cambridge, Snow had experienced and noted the 
22 
closed p o l i t i c s , and the inter-personal p o l i t i c s of committees. 
As a high o f f i c i a l , he was able, indeed contpelled, to see more of 
man-in-committee. The int r i c a c y , the r e a l i t y beneath p o l i t i c a l 
hypocrisy, intrigued him. His work during the war l e f t him no 
time to write novels, but he kept notebooks at the time and made 
23 plans. When the war ended Snow became a part-time C i v i l 
Service Commissioner with spedlal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s c i e n t i f i c 
personnel, and wrojo the ultimate closed-politics novel, The 
Masters, i n f i v e months. He held the novel back from publication, 
feap-iig that his in t e r e s t ( i n the series) i n p o l i t i c s might be 
over-emphasised i n the l i g h t o f the novel, 
I n 1947 he wrote the more conventional The L^ght and the Dark. 
which received a more encouraging press than Passant. I n 1949 
Time of Hope was published, and received a s l i ^ t l y better welcome 
25 
s t i l l . He argued with his publishers over the production of 
the series at that time, and through Harold Macmdllan he came to 
an arrangement with that p o l i t i c i a n ' s family firm. 
Another acquaintance of that period was Leonard Russell, the 
editor of the Sundav Times. " I began by regarding /Snow_/ aa a 
s c i e n t i s t who wrote books f o r a hobby - but what a mistake! ^He_/ 
revealed /himself J as an incredibly well-read c r i t i c of f i c t i o n . 
/He_y brooded unfavourably on the moment-T?y-mement story, the 
26 
V i r g i n i a Woolf novel of s e n s i t i v i t y and plotted i t s overthrow," 
Snow l a t e r impressed Russell to the extent that the editor 
offered him a regular fiction-reviewing column i n the Sunday Times. 
So, to Scientist and Administrator and Small-Time Novelist, 
Snow added C r i t i c to the description of his functions. From a 
position of power Snow led the attack against e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
novels and t h e i r prominent place i n cultivated l i t e r a r y opinion. 
"The moment-by-moment vision looked to i t s pioneers as though 
i t might reveal s t a r t l i n g t r u t h s , but i t has turned out a r i d . 
I t s characteristic works have sacrificed mind and emotion -
27 
which, i n any l i t e r a r y form, i s altogether too b i g a s a c r i f i c e , " 
I t was not merely a sense of aesthetics which determined Snow's 
outcry, but his b e l i e f that a r t should mirror l i f e , and that the 
r e a l i t y portrayed i n the current e x i s t e n t i a l mode was chimereal 
28 and i n v a l i d , I t s death-orientation also disgruntled him. 
With the continuation of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t form of w r i t i n g 
Snow foresaw the extinction of the novel as a serious a r t form.^^ 
He attracted both support and opposition w i t h his views. 
He brought to the attention of the public, and the l i t e r a r y 
world (two separate pol§s by Snow's account) the existence of 
writ e r s where they could meet halfway. Snow was t r y i n g to 
co-ordinate, publicize and encourage the new wave of writers 
which was r i s i n g i n B r i t a i n and America, Perht^s his time as 
a c r i t i c (nearly four years) of f i c t i o n prepared him for the 
30 
papers he would l a t e r deliver. I n 1950 he married Pamela 
Hansford Johnson, a distinguished w r i t e r and c r i t i c , who supported 
31 
him from the beginning i n his c r i t i q u e of novels of s e n s i b i l i t y . 
I n 1951 The Masters was published. I t was popular. Snow 
remarked: " I n the U.K. I had become a useful property." I t i s 
one o f his most i n t r i g u i n g and impressive books, presenting a 
paradigm of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n cerebral and emotional terms. 
Throu^out the 1950s he wrote various a r t i c l e s f o r popular 
journals, s t i l l attempting to bridge the gap between scientists 
and non-scientists by presenting scientists as men worthy of 
respect and science aa the key to the future. An a r t i c l e cialled 
-'The. Two. Cultures'was published i n the New Statesman and Nation, 
with l i t t l e r e s u l t i n g reaction, i n 1956, 
I n the 1950s he wrote The Devoted - anovel about the 
frig h t e n i n g areas of deirkness and i r r a t i o n a l i t y i n the human mind. 
He scrapped the novel, salvaging some of i t f o r the similar Sleep 
3^' 
of Reason which, he f e l t , was more congruent with the series. ' 
I n 1954 he published The New Men, a novel of topical interest i n 
the context of the Cold War. Burroughs M i t c h e l l , a senior editor 
w i t h the New York publishing house of Charles Scribner, flew to 
London and negotiated, w i t h i n a few hours, to publish the novel. 
Snow has published with Scribners since then. Often i n advance 
of English editions brought out by Macinillan. 
The New Men and The Masters j o i n t l y won the American James 
Tait Black Memorial Prize f o r the best novel of 1954, and narrowly 
missed becoming the Book of the Month Club Book, which would have 
guaranteed large sales. 
I n 1956 Homecomings was published and interpreted as the 
i n d i v i d u a l l y most important novel, and the keystone of the series. 
I t awakened c r i t i c a l appreciation of the series as a whole, as i t 
provided an important clue to the f i n a l structure of the sequence, 
and alerted the c r i t i c s to Snow's intentions. The c y c l i c a l 
structure of the series, f o r example, became apparent. Homecomings 
was published sixteen years af t e r Passant, almost twenty years 
since the ;• o r i g i n a l i n s p i r a t i o n . 
This period saw the Russian development of the atomic bomb, 
and the grim beginnings of the Cold War. Snow continued to t a l k 
about world poverty, the advances of science and the dichotomised 
c u l t u r a l s i t u a t i o n i n the West. Prior to the Rede Lecture'The Two 
Cultures and the S c i e n t i f i c . Pevolution,' he wrote something l i k e • 
200 a r t i c l e s f o r B r i t i s h and American journals. 
To Snow the Rede Lecture was only one more attempt to open 
the eyes and ears of a group, of people i n a lecture h a l l to what, 
he. Snow, and his followers, could already see and hear; and, of 
course, had already attempted to communicate. The Rede Lecture, 
f o r some reason, did not s l i p unconscious intoi.liistory, as his 
previous attempts to communicate had done. Essentially concerned 
wit h the same theme as e a r l i e r talks i t evoked an explosive reaction. 
Perhaps the mood of the times had only j u s t c a u ^ t up with what 
Snow had been saying. The lecture was printed and published, 
and reviewed and c r i t i c i s e d . The most notable, though not the 
most t e l l i n g , c r i t i c i s m was made by F.R. Leavis i n 1961, i n the 
Richmond Lecture at Downing College, 
Leavis Bade several mistakes - on the level of schoolboy 
howlers - i n his polemic, and when rumours of the lecture began 
to circulate the l i t e r a r y world, Leavis published the text i n 
The Spectator, ( i t was subsequently published i n hard-cover) 
According to Snow, the text was le g a l l y actioneble; both publishers 
37 
sought his permission to p r i n t . 
I n the lecture, Leavis observed that Snow had become a 
figure of i n t e l l e c t u a l authority by vi r t u e of prevalent c u l t u r a l 
c o i t i o n s (of whicih Leavis obviously thought l i t t l e ) . Snow's 
credentials as an a r t i s t were forgeries. Snow; was " i n t e l l e c t u a l l y 
38 
undistinguished as i t i s possible to be" , a fountain of cliches 
who had s i m p l i f i e d the world, and human motivation, to an unaccep-
table degree. Basically such assertions were mistakes, i f not 
i n t h e i r inception, then at least by v i r t u e of the v i t r i o l i c 
force of delivery customarily adopted by Leavis. I f Snow was a 
symbol or a s&gn of the changing climate of opinion, what p r o f i t 
was there i n attacking him i n the most personal terms? 
The f l a g was duly picked up the following week i n the Spectator 
by a number of distinguished people, among them William Gerhardi, 
JToD. Scott, S. Toulmin, G. Reichardt, Ronald M i l l a r and Peter Jay. 
The debate was taken elsewhere, and continued throughout the 
1960s,^^ Snow did not j o i n i n (beyond an oblique a r t i c l e i n 
1970),^ although i n the l i ^ t of the criticisms made lay people 
41 
other than Leavis he modified the lecture and shifted the emphasis. 
42 
I n 1960 i n the Godkin Lecture 'Scrlence and Government' 
Snow produced a case study of closed p o l i t i c s i n the high ranks 
of the government. His point was that scientists and p o l i t i c i a n s 
should learn something about one another, which he argued from the 
basis o f a factual example. He demonstrated the ignorance of 
p o l i t i c i a n s of science, and i n his example he publicised the 
10 
procedure involved during the war to integrate s c i e n t i f i c know-
ledge with the strategists of the nation. This l a t e r involved him 
i n controversy over his assessment of one of the personalities 
involved i n his example. 
In a speech given i n the same year i n New York - known as 
*The Moral Un-neutrality of Science^^he challenged the r i g h t of 
sci e n t i s t s to serve Science alone. Scientists have an obligation 
to the t r u t h . Snow said, p a r t i c u l a r l y because th e i r profession 
is continually searching f o r t r u t h - the t r u t h , especially, of 
the physical world. They have an obligation i n that t h e i r search 
has been successful - they have found processes and formulated 
laws which have universal a p p l i c a b i l i t y . They know, as facts, 
what can be done, and i n what span of time, with technology. 
Further, they have an obligation not only to respect the t r u t h , 
but to impress i t upon people, to raise t h e i r voices. Snow 
divided science according to i t s two faces - on the 'malevolent 
side' s c i e n t i s t s know that w i t h i n a short period of time other 
countries will^possess f i s s i o n bombs; on the 'benevolent side' 
the poor of the world could be fed with e x i s t i n g technology. 
" A l l that i s missing i s the w i l l . We know that."^^ 
I n 1962 Snow was elected Rector of the Uniiversity of St, 
Andrews, an old and di g n i f i e d o f f i c e , f i l l e d by a t r i e n n i a l 
election, with the franchise of a l l matriculated students. 
J.S. M i l l had f i l l e d that o f f i c e almost a hundred years previously. 
Snow's speech on that occasion -^On Maspanimity^^'- pursued a 
l i n e of comment similar to the Rede and Godkin lectures. 
Something happened i n the l a t e r 1950s through the early 
1960s which i s d i f f i c u l t to explain other than i n terms of 
Zeitgeist.^'' A large number of people found that.Snow was saying 
something they were struggling to ar t i c u l a t e themselves; and, 
from the extent of the controversy, there were those vho found what 
11 
Snow was saying was unacceptable. Possibly, i t was the Cold War, 
and Snow's apparent intimacy with that new balance of power, 
which attracted the attention. Perhaps i t was the technological 
boom of the 1950s and the subsequent outdating of old values. 
Science, after the f r a n t i c energy brought out during the war, 
was not pausing for a breather. Television moved i n upon an 
unsuspecting world. 1957 was, among other things, the year of 
the Sputnik. Snow's views were r e a l i s t i c and harsh - not t o t a l l y 
black, but not l i g h t enou^ for optimists. There were exhortations 
i n h i s speeches, and moral tones which may have been too uncom-
fortable to remain ignored. 
Snow became an international figure in the lat e 1950s. He 
spent time i n America studying the reasons for the 'Brain Drain,' 
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the flow of Ph.Ds. from B r i t a i n to the United States. I n 1957 
he was knighted. He appeared on the Brains Trust programme. He 
was popular i n the United States, which he considered more forward-
looking than B r i t a i n i n i t s policy regarding science. In the 
early 1 960s he was v i s i t i n g Professor i n English at the University 
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of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, and he was laiown and friendly to the 
Russians, where h i s novels were widely read. 
I n 1964 a Labour government was elected. The Party had 
promised to place greater emphasis on science, and on technology. 
Snow has indicated that he was c a l l e d to Downing Street within 
50/l 
two days of the result.^ He had resigned as a C i v i l Service 
Commissioner four years previously; on November 18th, 1964, he 
made h i s maiden speech i n the House of Lords as the Parliamentai^y 
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Secretary i n the Ministry of Technology. 
He had doubts about taking the position: between 1960 and 
1963 he underwent an operation for a dislodged retina, and his 
heart stopped in the theatre; he was afraid he would die before he 
12 
53 finished h i s sequence of novels His s p e l l i n Office, however, 
enabled him to see h i s way c l e a r to f i n i s h i n g the s e r i e s , ( t h e 
f i n a l novel i s set i n 1964 and involves what seems on the surface 
to be some semi-autobiographical material). In speeches in the 
House of Lords he re-emphasised the points made i n the e a r l i e r 
l e c t u r e s , the v i s i o n of the future growing darker as the years 
passed. 
I n the same month that he was offered a peerage, Snow 
published The Corridors of Power^^. Since the t i t l e had been 
coined i n Homecomings the phrase had passed into popular usage. 
The book had been long expected. A number of c r i t i c i s m s of the 
s e r i e s of novels had been written by l i t e r a t i after The A f f a i r 
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was published. I t was known that there were three books to 
come, and that the f i r s t would be The Corridors of Powero As 
everyone knew, The Corridors of Power connected offices i n \7hite-
h a l l f o r the convenience of the c i v i l service mandarins who ran 
the country. The book attracted great i n t e r e s t . Not a l l the 
c r i t i c s were e n t i r e l y happy with i t , or with Snow's l i t e r a r y 
l i m i t a t i o n s , but they were no longer able to ignore him or leave 
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hi s popularity unexplained. 
I n 1966 Snow published The Sleep of Reason, the descendant 
of The Devoted, incidentally fooling several c r i t i c s with the 
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change of t i t l e . The same year saw the appearance of Variety 
of Men, "a set of personal impressions, "^^of nine of the greatest 
figures of the twentieth century. 
I t was the end of December, i n 1969, when Snow wrote the 
l a s t book of the sequence, Last T h i n g s . I t was t h i r t y - f i v e 
years on from inception, a collossus of modern f i c t i o n , of 
perhaps a million and a half words, eleven volumes, vinique i n 
i t s combination of method and scope. In the following year 
Snow began c o l l a t i n g the books into thiee fat volumes, altering 
62 the sequence as he did so. These books were published i n 
1972; the same year as another piece of f i c t i o n , The Malcontents. 
which appears i n many ways to be an enlargement of the action i n 
Last Things. In 1974 he published In Their Wisdom, a novel which 
was dramatised by Ronald M i l l a r (who, i n addition to The Affair. 
produced plays based on The New Men and The M a s t e r s ) . T h e play 
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opened i n London i n March 1975. 
Snow was not i d l e i n h i s role of contemporary speaker and 
public figure. I n 1968 he delivered the Pulton Lecture -'The 
State o f . S i e ^ ^ ^ which re-emphasised facets of the 'Two Cultures' 
argument. He previously i d e n t i f i e d the three main hazards facing 
the world as the H-bomb,over^population and famine. I n 1968, with 
the Cold War at l e a s t tepid, and with his knowledge of the develop-
ments i n the 'Green Revolution' he emphasised the booming population 
more strongly than before, suggesting that birth was now more 
mortal than death. He continued with t h i s message i n the Lords 
u n t i l the early 1970s.^^ 
He became chairman of the G.P.O. Think Tank i n 1970, He 
was also at th i s time a member of the Arts Council, (he spoke 
frequently i n the House upon the A r t s ) , and also a member of the 
committee which supervised the finances of the Regional Arts 
Associations,^''' 
I n 1971 he published Public A f f a i r s , a coll e c t i o n of h i s 
lectui-es. 
I n 1 976 he produced a volume on the writer with whom he may 
68 most profitably and most probably be compared: Anthony Trollope, 
13 
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Chapter Two 
LIGHT (OR ILLUMINATING) FICTION 
" I n fact, of course, there remains a great 
deal about man-alone and man-in-society and . 
the interaction between them...which during 
foreseeable time can not only^ be best 
rendered i n terms of a r t , but rendered i n 
no other way." 1 
The sources of CP. Snow's thought are of various s i z e 
and hue. There are a r t i c l e s about science and s c i e n t i s t s i n 
periodicals from 1936 onward; a quantity of book reviews i n the 
l a t e 1940s, early 1950s; a handful of lectures, which led to wide-
spread publicity a f t e r the Rede Lecture i n 1959; speeches made 
i n the House of Lords a f t e r 1964; sixteen novels, a book of 
biographies, a work on Trollops and press interviews. I t i s 
tempting to assume that Snow i s wearing a number of different hats -
2 
s c i e n t i s t , a r t - c r i t i c , public speaker and novelist - for his 
expression of opinion i n these different f i e l d s , and to a limited 
extent t h i s i s so. 
There are indications, however, of theories common to a l l 
aspects of his work - and, of course, i t would be surprising i f 
t h i s were not so. One observes i n the a r t i c l e s written by Dr. Snow, 
the s c i e n t i s t , that the writer wishes to encourage interest i n 
the benefits of science, and i n i t s nature, and recognition of the 
liumanity of s c i e n t i s t s ^ . C r i t i c Snow i s out to attack the moment-
by-moment technique of the novel, for i t s f a i l u r e <io adjust to the 
changes brought about by science, and i t s \inwillingness to relate 
4 
i n s t r u c t i v e l y to the processes of l i v i n g . S i r Charles, and l a t e r 
Lord Snow, i s appealing for recognition- of the r e a l i t i e s of world 
p o l i t i c s , the effective use of science, and the incorporation of 
that d i s c i p l i n e within man's general consciousness^. 
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No one has suggested that these separate views are based 
on anything other than a common aim. I n his writings on a r t and 
science Snow i s attempting to bridge the c u l t u r a l gap which his 
l a t e r work incorporates as a symptom of a world situation, and a 
place to begin remedial action. 
C P. Snow, the novelist, however, presents a description 
of the processes of human - individual and national - interaction 
which contradicts, at f i r s t sight, the element of hope,in h i s non-
f i c t i o n writings. The processes which Snow, the novelist, describes 
are rooted i n se l f i s h n e s s and i n d i v i d u a l i t y - at f i r s t sight, at 
l e a s t - and not the good w i l l and fellowship he exhorts in his 
other works^. He seems to be conscious of t h i s : i n his Rectorial 
AddressVQn Majsnanimity^'^, he appealed for that rare attribute, 
while acknowledging the seemingly incongruent 'realism', i . e . 
pessimism, of h i s novels. 
The discrepancy i s resolved by noting the primary aims of 
each form: h i s lectures are attempts to influence action in a 
s p e c i f i c case - whether i t be educational reform, or world p o l i t i c s . 
His novels are more concerned with understanding the processes of 
the world, with indications of healthy general action. They 
indicate, i n instances, the symptoms of the diseases which Snow 
the public figure i s anxious to see cured . 
There i s a h i ^ l e v e l of congruence between ideas expressed 
i n Snow's f i c t i o n eind non-fiction writings. Phrases recur; even the 
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conversational, r e f l e c t i v e s t y l e i s the same . 
J . Thale^^ sioggests that Snow's non-fictional writings 
a r e " p a r a l l e l " i n content to the work of his novels. Perhaps they 
are understood s t i l l more usefully i f they are seen as l o g i c a l 
extensions of one another, two wings of a set of theories, separ-
ated, according to the functions planned for each of them. On a l l 
major issues, novelist Snow agrees with lecturer Snow, and an under-
16 
standing of either wing of his work i s useful i n interpreting 
the other. 
The bulk of Snow's written work takes the form of novels. 
Their subject-matter i s the commonly-perceived a c t i v i t i e s of men 
i n society recognisable as that of our own, which are explained 
by coherent theories. I t i s obvious that Snow sees his novels as 
vehicles for h i s thought and wishes to coimnunicate through them. 
The methods he uses to convey his theories are, however, often 
subtle, and the purpose of the remainder of th i s chapter i s to 
display some of the mechanisms concealed beneath the story-line 
of a Snow novel. 
I t i s perhaps convenient to dispose of the notion, at 
th i s point, that one w i l l find i n Snow stark allegory or p o l i t i c a l 
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myth, which he disparages i n Orwell and Camus , and suggest 
that h i s concentration upon processes within given h i s t o r i c a l 
periods i s an attempt to demonstrate a method of interpreting 
events and, on that basis, to educate and to influence his readers 
to carry out appropriate courses of action. 
E s s e n t i a l l y , Snow uses his characters to act out his various 
theories and display his interpretation of the world. He has called 
his major concerns "themes:" 
"When I started to write I wanted to deal with a 
number of themes. Among them, though incidentally, 
not the most important, were science and p o l i t i c s . " 13 
Elsewhere he says that he i s interested i n "the power 
14 
re l a t i o n s of men i n organised society" . And he. i s interested i n 
explaining these: 
" I f I were seeking a pr a c t i c a l reason for trying 
to express t h i s theme i n terms of art, I should 
repeat what I have said elsewhere - you've got 
to understand how the world t i c k s i f you're 
17 
going to have any chance of making i t t i c k 
better." 15 
Snow's st y l e , or absence of s t y l e , has been c r i t i c i s e d 
for i t s flatness, i t s a r i d i t y , s t e r i l i t y and assertion^^, I t i s 
a calm, unemotional prose, written well a f t e r the event; the 
characters whom Snow favours r a r e l y r e f l e c t intensely on their 
surroundings with panic, or fear, or spontaneous joy. They are 
17 
s t o i c a l , prosaic . The story-line i s generally carried by 
strong narrative, although i n l a t e r works Snow developed an 
episodic structure focussed upon meetings at which information 
18 
i s exchanged and discussed . 
The s t y l e was not i n vogue when Snow began to write; i t has 
scarcely altered over the years. I t i s consistent with his theories: 
regular, r a t i o n a l , unfanciful. Events take place - interactions of 
various characters - and t h e i r meaning i s evaluated, either by a 
narrator, by discussion or even the narrative i t s e l f . Snow focuses 
on the choices which people must make i n the course of l i f e and 
how they should prepare themselves. Of the novel form. Snow 
wrote: 
"There i s a p a r t i c u l a r fusion of the investigatory, 
r e f l e c t i v e and moral intelligences that sp e c i a l l y 
f i t s the novel, and which i s s t i l l the only way open 
to us of exploring certain aspects, including the 
most important aspects, of the individual and so c i a l 
condition." 19 
The r e f l e c t i v e intelligence i s present t h r o u ^ u t the 
novels, interpreting events portrayed thereino Lewis E l i o t 
i s the housing for that intelligence i n the 'Strangers and 
Brothers' s e r i e s ; by use of E l i o t ' s r e f l e c t i o n s meaning i s 
injected into events, the significance of which would otherwise 
be manifold. E l i o t attempts to gain understanding of the 
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significance of events, and acts upon his interpretation. M.B 
judgements are not always correct, but his method of forming 
these judgements, h i s use of re f l e c t i o n i s approved by Snow^° 
The method transcends i t s vehicle. Although E l i o t i s an astute 
observer, events often prove him wrong, but Snow shows him as 
right to p e r s i s t i n attempting to puzzle out what he sees by 
mingling present experiences with the memory of past experience. 
This i s the basis on which Snow builds h i s theories and, as 
Professor Kermode confesses: " i t has to be admitted that this 
i s how, from day to day, we do go about judging and estimating 
2t 
people." 
The process of r e f l e c t i o n involves comparisons, and the 
r e s u l t i s a series of experientially v a l i d theories. Comparisons 
of events, or characters, ot the behaviour of a character i n 
22 
variable situations, are the dif f e r e n t i a t i n g devices E l i o t uses . 
This i s c l e a r l y perceivable i n the work i t s e l f , but l e s s obvious 
i s i t s extension as a s t y l i s t i c device by means of which Snow 
conveys not only the present, observed state of a f f a i r s , but the 
customary state, too, and thus the t e l l - t a l e discrepancy between 
them. 
Continuing with Snow's thesis, one might hazard the guess 
that the investigatory intelligence manifests i t s e l f as attention 
to meaningful themes. Snow's episodic exposition of E l i o t ' s l i f e 
d i s t i l s a meaning from events largely by exclusion of the i r r e l e -
vant. An example i s the recorded effect of events common to two 
novels, which i s emphasised differently according to i t s rel a t i o n 
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to E l i o t ' s concern i n each novel , 
The moral intelligence w i l l be accorded more thou^t i n ai 
l a t e r chapter^'''. A humanistic desire to achieve better conditions 
for one's fellow man i s a common feature and a driving force i n 
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many Snow characters - B i l l y Pilgrim, the Malcontents, George 
Passant, Francis G e t l i f f e , Charles March and Roger Quaife, among 
25 
others , 
Reflections upon the world, provided they are based on 
reason and experience, may detect the r e a l i t y beneath appearances. 
The experienced observer holds the key to events. This i s 
s t r i k i n g l y presented i n Corridors of Power, where the world of 
appearance regi s t e r s only the cypher-like gestures, innocuous 
26 
events, which the experienced must translate , 
I t i s i n the l i g h t of Snow's views of the s o c i a l importance 
of l i t e r a t u r e , and h i s b e l i e f that 
" I t i s theaLements of experience which those kinds 
of intelligence give - not only the here-and-now 
experience, but the experience of thinking about 
i t - that we have to organise into a work of a r t . " 27 
Snow's themes are demonstrated by his characters, rather than 
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belonging to them. Although he has denied symbolism , his major 
characters are, i n fact, symbols - or representatives of types of 
character. Not much i s revealed through symbols that i s not 
explained i n other ways, except insofar as the actions of certain 
characters assume greater significance i n the l i g h t of their 
representation. 
Passant i s , i n broad terms, representative of an antithesis 
to E l i o t . He believes i n the innate goodness of human beings, 
and the t r i a l i n The Sleep of Reason i s the l o g i c a l conclusion, 
29 
not only for Passant, of such ideas . Also, he represents the 
man who lacks self-knowledge, despite his b r i l l i a n c e , and his 
r e j e c t i o n the C i v i l Service i n Homecomings i s the rejection of 
the ' f i r s t - r a t e man' by Snow's representative of a certain type 
20 
bureaucrat. Hector Rose, the 'second-rate man.' T h i s . i s not to 
say that the incident means no more than this, but this inters 
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pretation i s s i g n i f i c a n t . 
Roy Calvert i s , i n part, every man barred from true fellow-
f e e l i n g - a man-alone who cannot endure h i s loneliness. I n part 
he i s any man who sees too c l e a r l y ( a t r a i t which recurs i n 
Sh e i l a E l i o t ) ; any man without egoism. Snow's use of symbols 
continues beyond t h i s point, however, supporting his more e x p l i c i t 
theories. Symbols are used as a type of shorthand, or as 
supportive structural elements, and concern events or actions which 
mean more than t h e i r appearance suggests. As with the major 
characters they appear frequently through;lfout the 'Strangers and 
Brothers' s e r i e s . The frequent committee meetings, the t r i a l s , 
for example, emphasise the s o c i a l basis of action and truth of 
which Snow approves. The lighted window, viewed from the dark, 
i n part represents the comfort of men-in-society as opposed to the 
loneliness of the man-alone. Children express a hope for the 
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future ( s t r i k i n g l y , at the end of Corridors of Power) . The 
homecoming represents a certain element of the power relation-
ship of the individual. 
Minor characters and events more obviously pqtray i n cameo, 
themes which concern Snow at length elsewhere. The contenders 
for the Mastership i n The Masters not only represent the sensitive 
and the complacent, the Conservative and the Liberal, but also the 
tr a d i t i o n a l humanist and the new s c i e n t i f i c ethos: the action 
throughout The Masters i s representative of more than a college 
election: the l a t e r election demonstrates t h i s more c l e a r l y -
G.S. Clarke i s more than an individual with r i ^ t - w i n g views 
32 
and a bad foot. 
In face-/to-face situations, the characters are individuals: 
i n 33mop3is they are evidently much more. Often i t i s r e l a t i v e l y 
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easy to detect the character or action which means more than 
E l i o t perceives, or i s prepared to divulge', but Snow^s nuance 
of meaning i s d i f f i c u l t to grasp. F i r s t one character and then 
another may speak i n what i s recognisably Snow's voice , One 
should appreciate the character at t h i s point, but beware of him 
i n future. Repetition, or the absence of i t , w i l l prove him right 
or wrong. I n his vocalised reflections upon events of the novel. 
Snow i s often demonstrating the character of the speaker, rather 
than summarising what has gone before. 
Snow's prose i s arid, i . e . dry, enough to contain irony, 
and an obvious aid to interpretation i s the bulk and homogeneity 
of h i s work. There i s a dialogue running through the 'Strangers 
and Brothers' sequence, with questions and answers and echoes 
of both, which renders the whole work more luc i d than any individual 
novel, or indeed, any particular passage. As the novels form a 
continuing story, with a number of characters recurring in many 
novels, the process of change and ageing i s demonstrated. 
ChiUiging interpretations are also a feature of the sequence, as the 
narrator, Lewis E l i o t , also ages. As a description of the 
processes of s o c i a l l i f e , a view of the sequence as a whole i s 
most valuable. 
Secondly, the structure of the sequence i s such as to present 
th^echoes and comparison of single events i n a way similar to 
accumulation of experience. There are two elections for the 
Mastership of Snow's Cambridge college; the E l i o t brothers both 
refuse positions of power at different times; people from Passant's 
groups are twice put on t r i a l . U n r e a l i s t i c hope springs in the 
breast of the most hardened of men. The subtle power relations 
between brothers, lovers, husbands and wives, are demonstrated 
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again and again. No one example, for they are a l l s l i g h t 
deviations, variations on a theme, i s the l a s t word. 
Individual novels are also highly structured. A simple 
te s t demonstrates one aspect of t h i s . No Snow novel can be 
adequately related in terms of either one protagonist or one 
process, whereas they are indeed much more s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
explained i n terms of two or more processes, recogniseable 
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elsewhere . 
At a certain l e v e l , abstracted from the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of 
each situation, interactions and personal actions form a 
generalisaMcaa pattern. In such cases, the methodology most 
l i k e l y to produce accurate interpretations i s to examine 
ambiguities i n r e l a t i o n to Snow's complete work. To achieve 
anything more than vague and useless generalisation i t i s 
necessary to accept passages of work at face value, and herein 
l i e s the r i s k of f a i l i n g to recognise irony or a false t r a i l . 
On these occasions one can only reference sources and plead the 
case that the interpretation dravm i s consistent with the 
recognisable core of Snow's work, and defensible on these grounds. 
The major themes of Snow's work have been given^names by 
him and others. The "power relations of men i n organised society" 
has been broken down, by Snow into three themes: human s o l i t a r i -
ness, attempts through various kinds of love to shut out that 
s o l i t a r i n e s s : and p o l i t i c s ^ ^ . Or man-alone, possessive love and 
man-in-society . Or causal psychology, sociology (and p o l i t i c s ) . 
Snow's theories are based on the assumption that death (and 
therefore l i f e ) i s not transcended. This given, his three 
theories omit very l i t t l e . 
Other eyes see other themes, and one must beware of taking 
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the intention for the fact. For example: 
"Power, and i t s manifestations, i n different 
circumstances, i s the theme of the whole s e r i e s i " 37 
"The single theme which exercises Snow's mind i s 
ambition and the struggle for power among men."^  38 
"Snow has set out to examine the moral conscience 
of England i n the years following World War I . " 39 
"The deepest theme i s the poles between which 
men s h i f t i n their relations with one another," 40 
Barring exclusion clauses, these assertions are a l l true. 
They lack the economy and comprehensiveness of Snow's t r i p a r t i t e 
statement of intentions, however, choosing, as they do, impressive 
facets of Snow's t o t a l thought as summaries of the thought 
i t s e l f . 
The impressive facets which w i l l be discussed i n the 
following chapters w i l l contain something of power and ambition, 
moral conscience and s h i f t i n g relations, and suggest that 
possessive love i s only an emphasised feature of man-in-society, 
an element of personal p o l i t i c s , p o l i t i c s being defined as the 
conscious interaction of human beingsj in limited c o n f l i c t . 
I n h i s grading of the three themes. Snow relegated p o l i t i c s 
to t h i r d place. Perhaps, by naming the themes, one r e i f i e s them, 
and t h i s leads to the impression that one may be placed aside, 
the others retained. Sig n i f i c a n t l y , the novel i n which Lewis 
E l i o t decides that h i s p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s over i s taken up with 
h i s son's p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s and the personal power struggle 
41 
between father and son . 
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Chapter Three 
IMBALANCE 
A v i s i o n of the individual 
The tragedy of the individual i s i n the limitation of his 
scope for change. The individual i s imprisoned i n h i s temperament 
which governs his actions i n a way he can neither completely control 
nor a p r i o r i understand^. I n his innate c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s the i n d i v i -
dual i s separated from his fellow men by a f a i l u r e of understanding: 
i n the s o c i a l area of his a c t i v i t i e s h is urge to r e a l i s e his 
potential involves c o n f l i c t s with h i s fellow men; the tendency of 
the s i t u a t i o n i s to use other men for comparison and competition . 
The s e l f i s h temperament, what Snow occasionally r e f e r s to as the 
"old Adam",^ the earthy Sinner, r e j e c t s the intrusion of others upon 
i t s own exercise of w i l l . The individual also faces a death of 
ut t e r annihilation of identity. (Jod i s a convenient outlet for 
b e l i e f for those who, by luck, are temperamentally equipped to 
believe. God's e s s e n t i a l non-existence ultimately leaves the i n d i v i -
dual s o l i t a r y , i n the trap of his character . 
Snow's i s not a passive view of the individual, however. There 
i s , i n human cheiracter, a limited room to manouevre. People can 
learn to control or l i v e with t h e i r temperaments: they can partisuLly 
escape them by "losing themselves" i n shared ideas, i n communication 
through love and friendship, i n material constructive action towards 
a pnnpose^. 
The l i f e of the individual i s fashioned by the forces i n 
tension as a r e s u l t of the inner struggle between maintaining and 
losing " s e l f . " 
The f i r s t requirement made of the individual i s that he must 
try to come to terms with, i . e . know, himself. The process of 
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l i v i n g i n contact and co-operation with other human beings, and more 
s p e c i f i c a l l y , the process of decision-making, w i l l challenge the 
individual's view of himself and require him to protect his identity^. 
To know himself, the individual must approach the forces which 
n 
influence his actions and decisions with the measure of reason , 
Many of the forces are i n tension with one another; they react to 
external stimuli producing drives which happen to the conscious 
individual, rather than proceed from him; they l i m i t rational and 
controlled reactions to the challenges of the individual's l i f e 
and accordingly l i m i t h i s prospects of success i n the so c i a l sphere. 
He can become self-defeating, pulled t h i s way and that by inner 
imperatives: without some mediation by reason, the individual can 
g 
even lose his humanity. 
Judgement 
Snow i s concerned with maintaining humanity, E l i o t i s an 
e s s e n t i a l l y moral character. Yet maintaining humanity i s not easy. 
" I have never believed that men are naturally 
good, or that a l l one has to do i s give them a 
bi t of freedom i n order to obtain a perfect 
society." 9 
Morality resolves i t s e l f i n the actions of men toward others. 
Snow's world i s based on matter, and v i s i b l e action. A l l human 
beings are subject to s i n f u l thoughts ( i n any sense of morality). 
This i s part and parcel of th e i r given nature. One cannot expect 
to control the Adamic needs emerging as desires, but one has control 
over the r e s u l t i n g action. Morality i s thus responsibility for 
others, and for one's action towards others^^. 
S o c i a l mores accept t h i s , and one function of so c i a l judge-
ment i s to assess res p o n s i b i l i t y for crimes and frauds. The murder 
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case i n The Sleep of Reason i s the prime example of a t r i a l of 
people who had cut themselves off, both from thei r responsibility 
towards others, and from the functional knowledge of their own 
characters^ ^, 
A second kind of judgement i s that held by the individual upon 
12 
himself , Given that Snow's view of human beings i s not a 
? 
complacent one, we.shiill to explore the nature of judgement i n 
t h i s section: s o c i a l and self-judgement, and not only i n terms of 
morality, although that forms a part. 
I n h i s natural state, i n society, where he i s required to 
in t e r a c t with others, the individual may p a r t i a l l y escape his 
loneliness - not so much through f u l l and direct communication 
13 
but through joining with others i n action . As Snow regards 
men as brothers, he sees t h i s escape from the individual state as 
laudable. Each individual, however, i s also a stranger in the 
eyes of others, and a natural reaction to the spectacle of other 
members of the species, a l l i n some way dissimilar, i s to c^pare 
himself with them. 
Certain attributes make l i f e more comfortable for some: one 
may h^ve an outgoing nature, or an absence of self-doubt, while 
another i s secretive and worry-ridden. These are facts of nature, 
based purely on luck. Comparison with others i s a force for 
coming to know ones«lf, but the room for self-improvement i s 
limited^^, 
I n terms of action - the playing of the cards - the situation 
i s somewhat different. There i s more f l u i d i t y i n deeds, and men 
may control their nature s u f f i c i e n t l y by acts of w i l l to function 
i n society i n such a way as to merit the approval of others. The 
comparison of the i n i t i a l situations i s only a preliminary to compe-
t i t i o n between self-seeking men. I n s o c i a l judgements - as in s o c i a l 
e f f e c t s - men are what they have done (or appear to have done). 
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Self-judgement and social judgement do not correspond to 
matters temperamental and to events, but na tura l ly , there i s a 
tendency i n the self-judgement to emphasise the inner man, and a 
leaning i n the social towards what the man has done. Self-judgement, 
however, extends to a l l the ind iv idua l actions too. 
Within the ind iv idua l temperament not a great deal can be changed 
while i n the social sphere, change on a material level can be 
e f fec ted . Snow would suggest that the ind iv idua l has a respons ib i l i ty 
towards h i s brother men which should be manifest i n act ion. This 
s a t i s f i e s the social sense which i s potent ia l i n men, i n tension 
wi th the s e l f i s h drives of the ind iv idua l^^ . 
The measure of morali ty i n one's judgement of oneself i s i n 
one's approximation to e th ica l standards of behaviour. Fa l l i ng 
short of one's standards enta i l s a loss of respect f o r oneslef. 
Men wish to be more virtuous than they are - and to be regarded as 
such - and i n th i s "vanity" l i e s the root o f actions of good w i l l . 
"Don't be f r ightened of the word/vanity_y. We 
come from the earth and the origins of human 
excellence are o f t en murkier than we expect." 16 
This dynamic vani ty - to which Snow opposes the s t a t i c vanity 
17 
o f se l f - regard , i s desirous o f change and forms a spring of moral 
ac t ion . He i s most responsible i n his actions towards others who 
knows something about himself. And i s appalled. And has to 
18 
forgive himself to get along. 
Snow's main in te res t , from the point of view of morali ty, i s 
not the judgement, but the action which springs from i t . 
While the ind iv idua l ' s character i s judged by others, i t 
i s generally re la ted more closely to a func t iona l aspect. The 
question asked i s : could th i s person have done t h i s , could th i s 
person do th is? The s t a t i c state i s i n terms of recognition, or 
acclaim, and men enjoy th i s t r i b u t e to themselves. In social 
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acclaim they may s a t i s f y t he i r need f o r respect o f the i r character. 
This bolsters t he i r estimations o f themselves: as Jago 
"thought wi th wonder and del ight ' t h i s man believes 
i n me.' t h i s man i s competdat, down-to-earth - and 
he•s ready to make me Masteri I f such a man believes 
i n me, I can believe i n m y s e l f I ' " 19 
Maintaining self-respect , i n terms of self-judgement, 
i s a continuing and ongoing process of l i f e . The basis of judge-
ment, however, i s perception of the relevant c r i t e r i a , and such 
c r i t e r i a vary from the concrete and tangible to the personal view 
of codes and values. The process of self-judgement has the potent ial 
f o r taking in to account much more than any general social opinion -
any opinion of others, i n f a c t - except one: a love-relat ionship, 
to be loved, implies that another human being has seen a great 
deal of one's character, and approves i n a special way. A knowledge, 
i n some men, that they w i l l be loved, manifests i t s e l f as confidence, 
20 
and i s noted by Snow as an important matter . 
The basis of the more general social judgement i s a subject 
which recurs throughout Snow's work. A great deal of i l l u s i o n i s 
involved. The c r i t e r i a of judgement are questioned: the mixture 
o f temperamental and func t iona l fac tors , the weight which i n socia l 
terms ought to be given to each, and the ways i n which they are 
confused, are demonstrated i n Snowfa novels as a s ign i f i can t 
21 
element of l i f e . 
The reifsurds o f those judged s a t i s f a c t o r i l y are self-respect, 
love and acclaim. Acclaim i s associated, by Snow, wi th roles, and 
wi th power. These somewhat diverse rewards emphasise the point 
that self-judgement and social judgement may not necessarily agree 
i n a l l cases; d i f f e r e n t motives, d i f f e r e n t c r i t e r i a , d i f f e r e n t 
goals. I n f a c t , a common s i tua t ion f o r Snow to present i s that of 
22 
the good deed which may damage the doer's fu ture , This clash 
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between the urge to do good, which springing from conscience can 
be a strong desire i n that i t proceeds from a need f o r s e l f -
respect, and the desire f o r s e l f i s h ends which w i l l be the subject 
of soc ia l acclaim, turns the drives of the ind iv idua l against them-
selves. The s i tua t ion asks the ind iv idua l who he i s : replies by 
act ing, d i f f e r e n t characters resolve the i r c o n f l i c t s i n d i f f e r e n t 
ways, driven by the unique shape o f t h e i r personali t ies . 
Snow presents various mixtures of the basic indiv idual 
needs. Some individuals s ac r i f i c e s e l f i s h desires f o r the sake of 
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conscience: i n other*individual pride i s too strong ; others form 
workable mixes; they adhere to codes of decency, f o r the sake of 
se l f - respect , wi th the e f f e c t of strengthening the t rus t deposited 
i n them by others, and inc iden ta l ly by developing i n a code a guide 
to the l i m i t s o f act ion, protect ing themselves from the constant 
24 
questioning of the i r uncharted selves , 
The ideal state i n Snow's theories, i s a compromise between 
extremes o f act ion. Codes of behaviour are not se l f less , but ego-
cent r ic , not se l f -des t ruc t ive i n material terms, but considerate. 
To answer t o t a l l y to the demands of conscience i s , i n essence, a 
' v a n i t y ' , and therefore u l t ima te ly based on ' i l l u s i o n ' . To s a t i s f y 
conscience. Snow suggests, i s to be as inner-directed as to s a t i s f y 
ambition, and the ideal mixture i s tol^easured i n terms of social 
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resul ts . I n p rac t ica l terms: what amovmt of good may be done, 
at what pr ice to future? Recognition of the degree to which 
conscience and self-seeking must be compromised, i s i n the i n d i v i -
25 
dual, a sign of self-awareness , 
Fixed and F l u i d Temperament 
At the outset, the ind iv idua l i s l imi ted by his temperament, 
which i s mediated throughout his l i f e by chance, by the operation 
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of h is own r a t i ona l - . m i l , and by the in terac t ion of others. 
As much of the i nd iv idua l ' s reaction to l i f e i s emotional and depen-
dent upon his nature, chance may put the ind iv idua l i n to a s i tua t ion 
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which ca l l s extremely damaging reactions from his temperament . 
This l i m i t e d scope f o r action and change avoids emphasis on 
the question of inevi table predetermination of the ind iv idua l f a te , 
subs t i t u t i ng p robab i l i t y or tendencies i n i t s place. Snow's thought 
has no place f o r ul t imate answers to the dilemma of whether men 
have f ree w i l l : to be responsible, to maintain any d i rec t ion or 
respect they must assume they have: f o r the maintenance o f society, 
i t must be assumed they have. This i s , a f t e r a l l , a hypothesis 
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which has been tested i n practice . 
I n drawing codes of behaviour the ind iv idua l has already, by 
l i m i t i n g the extent of h is reactions, l i m i t e d his func t iona l nature. 
Another form of l i m i t a t i o n involves a fu r the r , mote d i r ec t , mani-
pula t ion of what i s and what ought to be. Mental compartmentali-
sa t ion , which u t i l i s e s usefu l hjrpocrisy, i s a f r o n t which Snow sees 
i n those people who are capable of con t ro l l i ng and d i r ec t ing them-
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selves u s e f u l l y , 
Compartmentalisation i n any form involves narrowing the focus 
of concentration and a subsequent contraction of the scope of 
character which responds wi th act ion to s i tua t ions . Compartmen-
t a l i s a t i o n produces a public persona; i t shields the indiv idual 
from experiencing the f u l l c o n f l i c t w i t h i n his character and f i t s 
him to func t ion use fu l ly by f r ee ing his w i l l o f the wide range of 
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doubts which would otherwise detract from i t s strength The w i l l 
i s at i t s most e f f ec t ive where i t s aim i s undiluted and simple. 
Compartmentalisation produces a useful s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of character. 
Within the framework of an ine las t ic temper^unent, th i s com-
partmentalisation does not contradict i t s grounding by assuming 
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complete m a l l e a b i l i t y of the i nd iv idua l ' s responses. The assvunption 
of a ro le i s bene f i c i a l - even necessary - f o r the ind iv idua l , 
shrouding his 'nakedness to l i f e ' i n a recognised comment. But the 
danger of i t , f o r the i nd iv idua l , i s perhaps loss of communication 
w i t h his inner s e l f . 
Compartmentalisation i s demonstrated by Snow as a technique 
of excluding c r i t e r i a from the basis of making decisions. At i t s 
simplest l eve l i t requires a decision i n a public matter which i s 
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lonobscured by considerations of s e l f , or emotional reaction . 
The status of the concept i n Snow's work i s not en t i r e ly 
clear. As i n matters of moral i ty , there i s a confusion over what 
i s normal and what only possible, the practice and the advocated 
use of p o t e n t i a l . The concept involves conscious d i rec t ion and i s 
a clear instance of the act ion o f the w i l l upon the temperament. 
Perhaps the example of j u d i c i a l behaviour s t r ikes closest to the 
heart o f compartmentalisation, but also of in teres t i s the posi t ion 
of s c i en t i s t s of conscience i n bui ld ing the atomic bomb, Compart-
menteilisation i s a deliberate breaking-down of the process of 
r e l a t i n g to interpretat ions of events and people^^, This i s a 
dangerous loose connection, special ly where compartmentalisation 
shades i n to unconscious se l f -dece i t . 
Se l f -dece i t , Snow suggests, i s a natural se l f -protec t ive 
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mechanism which operates to make l i f e bearable . 'Useful hypocrisy' 
i s apparent i n f igures such as Thomas B e v i l l , the Minister , when 
he makes a speech at Barford " f u l l of nursery images, i n which 
w i t h the utmost s i n c e r i t y he paid t r ibu te to everyone's good 
in tent ions , including those people whom he regarded as tufisters and 
blackguards,"^^ Useful hypocri iy i s the a b i l i t y to forget uncom-
fo r t ab le fac t s such as these, but the crucia l f ac to r i s that i t 
i s a process of f o r g e t t i n g - not ju s t of remaining s i l e n t . 
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I t , too, strengthens the w i l l and appeases the s e l f -
respect, s a c r i f i c i n g i n c l a r i t y of percpetion f o r what i t 
gains i n conviction and protect ive qua l i t i e s . 
I t i s ' u s e f u l ' hypocrisy from the point of view of the 
i n d i v i d u a l . One might argue that , as wi th conscious compart-
mentalising, i t involves a r e fusa l to perceive and relate to 
uncomfortable f a c t s . An in te res t ing example of th i s process 
i s the s i tua t ion i n which a p o l i t i c i a n i s pursuing action 
ostensibly f o r the sake o f his be l i e f as to what i s good f o r 
the community, while the success of the action w i l l resul t i n 
an advantage f o r himself . Whether, i n the two borderline 
cases i n the 'Strangers and Brothers' sequence, th i s hypocrisy 
i s regarded as admirable or not, i s perhaps a question of 
personal taste, but the process as shown here i s not of a 
d i s junc t ion from r e a l i t y , but a manipulation of the weight of 
relevance. Arthur Brown hopes that he sha l l not be misunder-
34 35 stood: Douglas Osbaldiston i s more wordly-wise . They 
recognise the drive of the ego i n soc ia l a f f a i r s , but they 
believe t h e i r own j u s t i f i c a t i o n s . 
Hypocrisy i s not only use fu l f o r p o l i t i c i a n s . I f i t s 
refus£i l to perceive i s extended fu r the r , the balancing of 
relevance becomes less s i g n i f i c a n t than recognition of the 
elements o f the s i t ua t i on . Perception i s not automatic. Emotion 
clouds i t : loneliness d i v e r s i f i e s i t . Useful i l l u s ions replace 
what a consensus of people would designate as ' t r u t h . ' 
Although these i l l u s i o n s render individuals useless i n social 
terms, they prop up the man himself and may imbue him wi th a 
res i l i ence denied to the more perceptive. While those i n th is 
state of deceit are thus able to pers is t , t he i r scope f o r taking 
decisions i s l i m i t e d , f o r part of t he i r deceit involves ignoring 
t h e i r own nature. 
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George Passant, wi th his be l i e f i n the ' l i b e r a l i l l u s i o n ' 
o f the innate goodness of man, i s the prime example, but he 
i s not alone^^. 
Prac t ica l Decisions 
The force of the human ego, w i l l power, i s the dynamic 
component of l i f e , but i t i s l i m i t e d by the resources and 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s avai lable . This i s the primary compromise: 
desires and optimal actions are mediated by the material nature 
of r e a l i t y . I n soc ia l a f f a i r s other governing factors l i m i t 
the exercise of the w i l l to the extent of reducing i t s action 
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to a choice of available options . Any option may be sa t i s -
f a c t o r y : extending in to the fu tu re the act ion, which flows from 
the decision i s unknowable i n i t s consequence. Mediated by 
chance aiid the actions of others, the consequences may be the 
opposite of what was intended. 
For the sake of ac t ing at a l l , Snow indicates, individuals 
ought to l i m i t t he i r reactions to the options. One invaluable 
hypocrisy or be l i e f i s the assumption of f r e e - w i l l . This 
assumption accrues r e spons ib i l i t y to the ind iv idua l and requires 
him to examine the actual choice involved. I n many cases, 
options are hidden: there may seem to be no al ternat ives. Yet 
recogni t ion o f the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a decision i s the f i r s t 
precondit ion. 
The r e spons ib i l i t y f o r taking a decision i s that which i s 
scrut in ised i n judgements. I t fo l lows , therefore, that social 
pressures may c o n f l i c t w i t h ind iv idua l drives over the decision 
to be taken, and that some form of compromise i s again necessary. 
Guides to act ion, usefu l i n t h i s s i tua t ion , are codes of behaviour 
and notions o f the e f f e c t of act ing out each option; the 
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former l i m i t the freedomi of the ind iv idua l fac ing the decision, 
the l a t t e r tes t the worth o f deciding th is way or tha t . Of 
course, one may only estimate the e f f e c t s . 
I n the sphere of social decision-making, the social 
fac tors which govern the extent to which any decision may be 
e f f e c t i v e , should be perceived and understood, so f a r as i t i s 
possible to do so, f o r to avoid being inner-directed, i . e , 
whol ly based i n ind iv idua l self-respect or greed, the course of 
ac t ion chosen must r e ly not only on pr inciples but also on 
38 
p r a c t i c a l i t i e s f o r i t s determination , Actions based on high 
p r inc ip les (the most frequent example i n Snow's work) are 
essen t ia l ly inner-directed - i . e , they regard the element of 
self-judgement as i t relates to standards of conduct as of 
monopolistic importance; s i m i l a r l y , those decisions which ignore 
t h i s area of self-judgement, and r e l y upon social acclaim and 
personal advancement as c r i t e r i a , are equally unbalanced. 
As the ind iv idua l i s divided w i t h i n himself, pulled by 
c o n f l i c t i n g forces, the formulation of a decision i s by no 
means a simple process. I n decisions which are i n f l u e n t i a l 
upon the i nd iv idua l ' s fu tu re - and therefore of prime importance 
to him - th^felement of reason i s not dominant» I n The Malcontents 
Snow presents his most detai led descript ion of the formation 
of a choice: Stephen i s faced wi th deciding whether to speak 
as a character referee i n the t r i a l o f a f r i e n d who i s being 
prosecuted on fa l se charges. I f Stephen does t h i s , he w i l l 
probably do some damage to his career prospects. According to 
an expert consultant, the reference: might save the 
defendant a few pounds o f f his f i n e ' " ' , and " 'You'd have a black 
mark against you, I don't know what your plans are about jobs, 
but I guess that Cambridge wouldn't want to give you one, '" 
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Also i t " 'could f l i n g your whole p o l i t i c a l game wide open... 
a l l you.seem to have a fancy f o r would get in to disrepute. '"^^ 
Stephen 
"would have said - and l a t e r did say - that 
he spent a l l those hours, from the evening 
before to t h i s Thursday afternoon, making up 
his mind. When he t o l d Hotchinson / t he expert 
aboveJ that he had not 'qui te decided', he 
wasn't pretending - he believed that to be the 
t r u t h . And yet the decision had been made 
hours before . . . ( there i s n ' t a precise time f o r 
the f i r s t c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n o f a d e c i s i o n ) . . , . 
"Sometimes, but very rare ly , i n a state l i k e 
Stephen's, a f luke happened from outside, and 
one could back out, then one fe i l t judicious, 
f o r not having made the decision i n a hurry: i n 
everything but the act, one had. Usual ly . . . there 
was no chance of backing out and one moved, or was 
passively transported, to a second c r y s t a l l i -
sat ion. At th i s point - i t could be very sharp -
the decision, already made but shied away from 
and submerged, became conscious. Then one had i t . 
" U n t i l the decision was conscious, then one f e l t 
f ree and also conf l i c t - r i dden , as Stephen had 
done, w i t h intermissions, up to t h i s Thursday 
afternoon. Even when i t was conscious, there re-
mained consequences, new choices where (perhaps 
one deceived oneself) one s t i l l f e l t f r ee . One 
decision was forming i t s e l f clear i n the open, i n 
f j ront of Stephen. When he couldn't r es i s t i t , there 
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were others which he hadn't l e t himself br ing 
to mind: but they were wai t ing there," 
The sub-rational processes of decision-making, form a 
balance of the c o n f l i c t i n g drives, and surface the decision 
i n to the conscious and r a t iona l processes. The conscious and 
r a t i o n a l create j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r the outcome. I t presents 
men w i t h "names f o r t he i r actions which are nothing l i k e the 
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r ea l names,"; but maintain the appearance of r a t i o n a l i t y . 
I n the above example, Stephen distinguishes between g iv ing 
evidence f o r Ne i l - where the i n j u s t i c e of the s i tua t ion i s 
evident, and some benefi t may resu l t - and g iv ing more l im i t ed 
evidence f o r Lance, where the benefi t would be even s l ighter and 
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the damage f o r himself greater . To the sensible decision-
maker, the estimate of effectiveness i s an important fac tor , 
evident ly , but the basis of the decision i s very much the 
character of the i n d i v i d u a l . N e i l , who i s without much i n d i v i -
dual conscience, would only do the same f o r Stephen i f " ' I 
thought two things. F i r s t , that I could have some e f f e c t . On 
the blasted t r a i l . Second, that I was cer ta in you were objec t ive ly 
u s e f u l . To the movement.'"^^ I n th i s respect, Ne i l ' s s ingle-
mindedness i s h i s strength i n social matters: but perhaps that 
i s N e i l ' s luck - to have missed conscience i n personal p o l i t i c s , 
and to be capable o f reducing matters to t he i r ideological 
s igni f icance . 
This presents a peculiar s i t ua t i on . How much i s the 
decision predetermined wi th in any one individual? Perhaps two 
points are relevant here: the decisions need to be e f f ec t ive 
( i n ind iv idua l cases), to be carried out by conscious acts of 
w i l l , and therefore even i f the decision i s predetermined, the 
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resu l tan t action i s less so. And, secondly, although wi th 
hindsight the decisions may appear predetermined, they are not 
e n t i r e l y predictable to oneself or others: one may only guage, 
on estimating the incentives and one's (imperfect) estimation 
o f character, how they w i l l be resolved. 
Nevertheless, however.imperfect, the estimation remains 
something by which reasonable judgements - not i n f a l l i b l e , but 
bet ter than random guesses - may be made. Snow feels i t i s 
important, therefore, to have some ins ight in to the motives of 
men i n general (rather than attending wholly to the i r r a t i o n a l i -
sations) and, i n spec i f i c cases, to pa r t i cu la r individuals . 
Especial ly important i s the most speci f ic ind iv idua l of a l l -
oneself; b e l i e f i n the pronounced ra t iona l i sa t ions i n one's own 
case i s an abstraction from the r e a l i t y of one's motivations. 
Useful hypocrisy enta i l s a capacity to make l i g h t o f , or ir|gore, 
one's baser motives, but i n order to prevent a lapse in to 
fantasy and se l f -dece i t , the moral man - who may achieve 
personal hkppiness - must come to terms w i t h the darkness wi th in 
himself^^o 
An examination of decision-taking i n Snow's theories 
leads to two d i s t inc t ions relevant to soc ia l act ion, concerning 
the ro le of judgement and the character of action-orientated 
men, not discussed above. 
I n terms of judgement i t i s easy to dis t inguish between 
the socia l and the ind iv idua l form and to note that , through 
the d iscre t ion o f ind iv idua ls , the social judgement may be 
based on i l l u s i o n s and appearance. Having noted that morali ty 
resides i n action^^, and that the social judgement, i n formal 
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areas, i s based on the h is tory and functions o f the ind iv idua l , 
i 
and agreeing, f o r the sake of argument, wi th Snow's idea of 
decision-making, the concept o f func t iona l judgement receives 
add i t iona l emphasis. 
Since i t i s defined more c lea r ly by comparison, the idea 
o f human judgement, and ideologica l judgement, may be l a i d 
alongside i t , and references drawn from Snow's major work on 
the assessment of individuals i n a formal s i tua t ion - The 
Masters, Who i s the bet ter suited f o r the position? Jago or 
Crawford? 
Ideological judgement examines the professed p o l i t i c s of 
the candidates (perhaps i t i s j u s t i f i a b l e to extend th is to 
d i sc ip l ines of thought i n t h i s case a lso) , Jago i s a reactionary, 
a man of l e t t e r s , a Conservative s imi la r , according to one 
decision-maker, to the Nazis, Crawford i s a l i b e r a l : "'He's 
got -the r i g h t opinions '" (p.70) and a s c i e n t i s t . 
E l i o t ' s pos i t i on i n regard to ideological arguments of 
t h i s type i s to say: "'We're choosing from two human beings'" 
(po219), " ' . . . t h i s i s a job where human things come f i r s t ' " 
( p , 7 l ) and of Jago: "'Ite a human being there's a great deal i n 
h i m ' " , (p.69) while Crawford i s " 'conceited. He's shallow. 
He's a t h i rd - ra t e man.'" (p ,70) , 
Raney Stanford^^ observed these two types of judgements as 
"personal p o l i t i c s " and "ideological pol i t ics ," and gives the 
f u r t h e r example of confusion of types as the objection of a 
group o f sc ient is ts to the presence of E l i o t because he i s an 
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o f f i c i a l , not a f e l l o w - s c i e n t i s t , i n The New Men , and he notes 
that i n t h i s novel " I n a fashion very reminiscent of r e a l i t y , 
in t e rna t iona l p o l i t i c s comes to play as important part i n 
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these events as mathematical formulae."^® 
I n his commentary on The Masters. Stanford sees the 
continuing in te rp lay between personal and ideological p o l i t i c s 
i n terms of "the d i s t i n c t i o n between public fa lse images and 
pr ivate true ones, and the harm that misjudging the d i s t i n c t i o n 
can do", which " is a major theme th rou^ou t Snow's novels."^^ 
Stanford wrote at a time when four of the 'Strangers and 
Brothers ' sequence remained to be published, ^' ' i th the advantage 
of hindsight less perceptive c r i t i c s , such as th i s wr i t e r , may 
indica te Snow's approval o f the middle course, between personal 
judgement and the "seemingly r a t i o n a l , abstract p o l i t i c a l 
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generalisat ions." 
Yet the two forms o f judgement - which, as Stanford's 
subs t i tu t ion of ' p o l i t i c s ' f o r 'judgement' indicates - are 
expressions of theories of p o l i t i c s . As he observed, the 
growing complexity a r i s i n g from the increasing in te rac t ion of 
i n s t i t u t i o n s "seems to fu rn i sh more and more opportunities f o r 
the decision-making ind iv idua l to go wrong, when he applies 
values draim out of one context a r b i t r a r i l y in to another context 
where they do not apply^^. Pref igur ing what i s perhaps the 
increasing power of i l l u s i o n and ideologica l p o l i t i c s i n open 
p o l i t i c s s i tua t ions . 
The progression o f The Masters indicates how e f fec t ive each 
candidate would be as Master. Despite his "human qual i t ies" 
Jago i s not elected. S u p e r f i c i a l l y , the proponents of ideologi -
c a l p o l i t i c s seem to win the day. Yet there i s a middle path 
between e x t o l l i n g the human vi r tues or t i d y i n g appearances. 
Stanford chooses personal as opposed to ideological , choosing 
one as t rue, one as f a l s e . As one might expect, the true 
reso lu t ion o f the theme i s more i n the nature of a compromise. 
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Lewis l a t e r r e f l e c t s that his judgement of Jago "had been 
a bad judgement." He had become "more interested i n people 
' • 52 than i n the job they had to do." "Sometimes my affect ions 
ran away wi th me. They had done so...when I had been vot ing 
f o r a Master of my college. They had made me forget func t ion , 
or j u s t i c e , or even the end to be served,"^^ 
As Snow observes elsewhere: "'What people f e e l doesn't 
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matter very much. I t ' s what they do we've got to think about. '" 
While thgfentirety of a character i s suitable f o r judgement i n 
matters of f r iendship and love, i t i s a confusion of c r i t e r i a 
to mix "human" and " f u n c t i o n a l , " judgements. 
Perhaps the nature of soc ia l act ion, which concerns a 
mult i tude of decisions, lends emphasis to th i s point . Man i n 
h is professional capacity i s the relevant object of discrimination, 
not the ent ire creature but the compartmentalisation of him 
which forms the professional face t . The expert to whom Stephen 
o f The Malcontents turns f o r advice, f o r example, i s hos t i l e , 
but Stephen i s in ten t on " t r y i n g to cut through his own 
h o s t i l i t y and t h i s other man's, occupied wi th one thought alone, 
how th i s man could compartmentalise his mind and apply himself 
to do his best about t he i r t ac t ics , "^^ 
The basis of func t iona l judgement i s thus a measurement 
of how people behave, how trustworthy they are and how much 
they can l i m i t the grounds of decisions. Hector Rose, the 
paradigm c i v i l servant "judged men as funct ional creatures, 
and there he was, more o f ten than I cared to remember, dead 
r i g h t , " ^ ^ 
Moreover, a func t iona l judgement i s tested, as i t relates 
d i r e c t l y to estimates of ac t ion, whereas a human judgement may 
encompass the deepest ins ights in to character. By judging men 
as func t i ona l creatures Rose can bring to bear the whole o f 
h i s experience and perception, without having to peear through 
fee l ings o f a f f e c t i o n . 
The empirical nature of th i s kind of judgement i s reminiscent 
o f s c i e n t i f i c means of discovery, i n that hypotheses are proved 
or disproved by f a c t . Ife i s more usefu l to the processes of 
soc ia l a c t i v i t y than personal judgement, although i f one were 
to begin wi th the category of " func t iona l judgement" some 
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elements o f motivational theory would need to be explored. 
To summarise Snow's pos i t ion , perhaps the words of a judge 
to a j u r y may be taken at face value: " ' I t ' s your decision. 
You w i l l have to be guided by your experience of l i f e , your 
knowledge of human nature, and I must say, by something \je 
CO 
sometimes underv£ilue, by your common sense.'" 
Men of Action 
The d i s t i j igu i sh ing character is t ic o f action-oriented men, 
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otherwise presented as "wordlings" and "men of action"'^-', i s 
an element of nature. The d i s t i n c t i o n divides the inner^directed 
(contemplatives) from the socia l ly-or iented (actiVes). The 
l a t t e r f e e l , i n s t i n c t i v e l y , that despite the i r interpretat ions 
o f events, act ion may be e f f e c t i v e (usually, i n t h i s context, 
f o r the social good), "Hope o f the f ib re s" or "emotional 
optimism" i s a propel l ing force f o r men who w i l l become involved 
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i n p o l i t i c s . Hope of advancement, hope o f e f f ec t i ve solutions, 
admits p o s s i b i l i t i e s , which pessimism denies, and thus frees the 
w i l l to act. 
Sustained by t h i s k ind of hope, happier - and thus more 
l i k e l y to survive psychologically than those who lack hope -
Snow's man of act ion views the resul ts of his intended acts. 
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Act ion i t s e l f i s simultaneously e f f e c t i v e and a release f o r 
him^^', an assumption of power while r e f l e c t i o n i s subjection 
to outside forces, and s i g n i f i e s powerlessness, 
Contemplatives w i l l correspondingly form d i f f e r e n t codes 
of behaviour, emphasise and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y manipulate the i r 
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p r inc ip les and deny the cause of action .. They may be 
characterised by t h e i r resignation to the fac ts before them, 
or the worst o f possible fu tures . They are not forces f o r social 
wel fare , and as such Snow i s not much interested i n them. 
The "hope o f the f i b r e s " i s a product of emotion. To hold 
to i t one must s a c r i f i c e (as w i th other emotions) a part of one's 
' c lea r s i g h t , ' Vain hopes are evident i n Snow's men of action, 
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men who are remarkably perceptive i n other matters. 
I n th i s picture of individuals there are two perspectives. 
Much of what Snow a t t r ibu tes to the ind iv idua l takes the form 
of descript ion and explanation. The n a t u r a l i s t i c approach -
the ind iv idua l whose character^confl icts are tr iggered by 
perception of external acts - and the prevalent loneliness and 
egotism of the i nd iv idua l indicate general theories o f behaviour. 
The novel-vehicle o f these theories i s b u i l t up of examples. 
W i t h i n these general theories, f u r t h e r study m ^ reveal d i s t i n c t 
types o f i n d i v i d u a l , w i th d i s t i n c t i v e a t t r ibu tes , as the 
w o r l d l i n g and the contemplative have been b r i e f l y distinguished 
above. One can see indicat ions that a composite c i v i l servant 
could be produced, f o r example, and sc ien t i s t s , as opposed to 
non-scient is ts , are c lea r ly dist inguishable. For the purpose 
o f t h i s work, however, except insofar as they are ' leaders ' or 
'managers' the characters w i l l remain as merely examples of 
d i f f e r e n t balances of in t e rna l dr ives . 
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Secondly, Snow has chosen to look at men of conscience, 
predominantly i n events, and h i s thesis i s that the wish to 
help one's fellovi-men i s normal and healthy, while the with-
drawal of the non-interventionist i s , i n the end, self-destructive. 
I t i s i n one's i n t e r e s t s to act for the benefit of others. 
I t i s an opportunity to communicate i n a purposeful fashion, 
as w e l l as s a t i s f y i n g s e l f i s h drives and enhancing one's s e l f -
respect^^. 
Snow also tends to look at the individual, not i n a. vacuum, 
but i n groups and i n action, Stmggles within a character 
are set off by the events of ordinary l i f e . Groups of individuals, 
and the processes within them, have a certain s i m i l a r i t y whether 
they are at the centre of power or elsewhere. Snow has more 
elaborations to add to his theories of the individual - his 
man-alone theme - but for the purpose of t h i s work s u f f i c i e n t 
groundwork has perhpas been l a i d for the theories of p o l i t i c s . 
• 44 
Chapter Pour 
POLITICS 
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Within groups individuals find not only comfort and 
refuge from individual fate^, but also settings for thei r 
competitive drives and desires for power. Croups, or enclaves, 
are categories large enough to encompass nations and s o c i a l 
c l a s s e s , or small enough to admit only a communion of three 
or four. This competitiveness i s the process from which 
personal p o l i t i c s are elaborated. Beginning outside any 
pa r t i c u l a r structure with personal imperialism and attention 
to s e l f - i n t e r e s t , personal p o l i t i c s flourishes i n the enlarged 
potential for interaction of groups. 
Snow draws a d i s t i n c t i o n between two types of p o l i t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n s , between open and closed p o l i t i c s . 
"Closed p o l i t i c s . The p o l i t i c s of small 
groups, where person acted upon person. 
You saw i t i n any place where people were 
i n action, committees of sports clubs, 
cabinets, colleges, the White House, boards 
of companies, dramatic s o c i e t i e s . " 2 
Closed p o l i t i c s i s "any kind of p o l i t i c s i n which there 
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i s no appeal to a larger assembly." Open p o l i t i c s involves 
s o c i a l forces, the pressure of man's opinions, an electorate, 
perhaps an element of representative democracy. 
"For instance, some of the struggles i n 
an English Cabinet partake of the nature 
of closed p o l i t i c s : but th i s i s not pure 
closed p o l i t i c s , since the Prime Minister 
or any member can, i f pressed, move from 
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personal to mass opinion." 4 
Snow further distinguishes three types of closed p o l i t i c s : 
committee p o l i t i c s , the archetype of which " i s that kind of 
committee where each member speaks with his individual voice, 
depends upon his personality alone for his influence, and i n 
fhe long nin, votes with an equal vote."^ Hierarchical p o l i t i c s , 
which recognises the struggle of individuals beneath the theory 
of a "chain-of-command"^ situation; and "court p o l i t i c s " -
"attempts to exert power through a man who possesses a con-
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centration of power," The conceptual tools are too fine, 
almost, for the purposes of examining personal and theoretical 
p o l i t i c s ; while the f i e l d of closed p o l i t i c s i s ideal. I n the 
interaction of man upon man, closed p o l i t i c s , as Snow reveals 
them, are characterised by the struggle of individuals locked 
i n r i v a l r y or opposition. 
Snow believes that "the permutations of men l i v i n g i n 
closed so c i e t i e s were quite limited, and there wasn't £dl that 
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much to discover" . I n each issue, i n each situation, the 
personal manoeuvres take on new forms, but the processes, at 
whatever focus of power the group i s gathered, are the same, 
stemming from human nature. 
Within the uncertain environment of s h i f t i n g appearances, 
Snow demonstrates personal p o l i t i c s and the extent to which 
p o l i t i c a l action can be successful. 
Explanations of P o l i t i c a l Processes 
Paced with the task of understanding the nature of p o l i t i c a l 
action i n a personal context, perhaps prior to attempting 
action oneself, one might look at the formalistic rules of 
one's group ( i f any) - the l e g a l i s t i c procedures through which 
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action i s channellled. 
For example, a college needs a new master. A majority 
of Pelfows of the college must endorse the successful candidate 
i n the college chapel, on a predetermined date. Each Fellow 
i s e n t i t l e d to one vote. 
I t becomes evident, from the poverty of procedure, that 
these rules are by no means the only generally accepted r e s t r i c t i o n s 
of the scope and mode of action. As a theory of how the Master 
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w i l l be elected they are rather simple . To understand more 
comprehensively one must hypothesise further. Hypothesis i s 
necessary, a r i s i n g from the p a r t i a l ignorance of a l l things 
which i s the individual condition. The formal explanation, 
however, i s proved i n f a c t : a new Master i s required, and he i s 
elected by the specified majority of Fellows i n the college 
chapel. Moreover, further, fonnal rules are recognised, 
governing the eventuality of a tied contest, which f l e s h out 
the previously s k e l e t a l theory. Between the predetermination 
of the date, however, and the prescribed announcement of the 
votes, the college hums to the grouping of men, the clash of 
c o n f l i c t i n g values, procedures, theories of conduct, changes 
of heart, rationalisations which are quite outside the formal 
th e o r e t i c a l p o l i t i c s . 
Further examination of the situation reveals that the 
election i s regarded as important by a s u f f i c i e n t number of 
Fellows to invest the action of voting with power. There i s 
attraction, for at l e a s t one of the candidates, i n being 
elected, to the Mastership, although this w i l l not be 
advantageous i n monetary terms^^. His election depends upon 
the voters. The formal rules are confirmed: the power l i e s 
with the electorate. 
Yet the formal rules, while presenting t h i s , i n abstract 
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terms, omit the significance of the fact that as i t i s i n the 
hands of the electorate to give the Mastership, so the 
candidates themselves, and thei r hopes and desires, are in 
the power of the enfranchised. 
The sensitive candidate recognises and resents his power-
lessness beside the voters. Even while he enjoys the support 
and companionship of a group of Fellows, he i s at the same time 
obscurely conscious of his position as an individual i n relation 
to them. Correspondingly, the voters enjoy their power over 
the candidate^ \ This emotional relationship with the formal 
diagnosis of the position i s accentuated i n small groups, where 
a single vote counts for much more than i n a broader c on text. 
The processes involved i n using that power are b a s i c a l l y 
those of decision (making up one's own mind) and persuasion 
(helping others to come to a sim i l a r conclusion). Decision-
making focusses upon the individual who brings to the event 
some preconceptions as to i t s meaning, and, balancing the 
c o n f l i c t s of h i s nature, acts upon his interpretation. The 
sit u a t i o n i s such that his decision w i l l have some effect upon 
his future, that to express h i s desires for that future, he 
must r e s t r i c t his act of w i l l i n the f i r s t instance to a choice 
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of limited alternatives , but that the element of self-protection 
i s l e s s evident than i n purely individual decisions. I f he 
wishes to make his choice effective i n th i s case, i t i s not 
enough to cast h i s vote, he must persuade others, too, to vote 
13 
as he did. 
Decisions, Snow shows, are not made r a t i o n a l l y and therefore 
the r a t i o n a l basis for them i s not compelling, so that persuasion 
based on reason w i l l be ine f f e c t i v e . Persuasion plays upon 
elements of a man's nature which are closer to motivation than 
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reason: upon self-respect, one's picture of onesiBlf; upon 
14 
weaknesses and affections , Events mean different things to 
individuals, and the process of persuasion involves a mani-
pulation of the relevant interpretations of p ^ s i c a l events. 
Once a man concedes an interpretation of events as correct, 
or v a l i d , or as 'truth', his action may subsequently be 
modified. I f the concession a r i s e s from his nature, the 
modification, a l l things being equal, i s very probable. Even 
hypocrites, Snow says, do not f l y i n the face of their b e l i e f s : 
t h e i r secret i s to deny the v a l i d i t y of certain interpretations 
of t h e i r actions^ ^ , 
As E.W. Mandel observes, i n an a r t i c l e preoccupied with 
i l l u s i o n i n Snow's novels, the closed p o l i t i c i a n engages i n 
"rewarding the proposition offering the compromise, blurring 
the fine d i s t i n c t i o n . " ^ ^ 
The manipulation of what i s significant and v/hat i s not 
di s t o r t s the basis of decision. I s i t important that one of 
the candidates i s a second-rate s c i e n t i s t , or that the wife of 
the other speaks as though he were Master ? I f human beings 
were as rational as they would l i k e to be, then t h i s would not 
be s i g n i f i c a n t . Self-respect prevents the Fellows admitting 
that they would f r e e l y exercise their w i l l for no greater 
reason than t h i s , but the temptation annoys them. 
I s i t important that one of the candidates i s a l i b e r a l 
s c i e n t i s t , and the other a Conservative-Humanist? The problem 
for the poor decision-maker i s that, unlike the announcement 
of h i s vote - a f t e r which the thing i s done - the decision i s 
not made i n a moment, but i n a proc;ess which i s , i n fact, 
continuous. The decision i s the re s u l t of a balance of drives 
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and values within the individual, which may a l t e r ; the decision 
may need propping up at a l a t e r stage with rationalisation, the 
ignoring of defects and the praise of merits of the candidate. 
Even before the persuasion process, events and meanings have 
thus been d i s t i l l e d and subtly changed. 
Appearance being that which i s v i s i b l e , i s thus s i g n i f i c a n t 
where i t forms the basis of an attitude or a decision. I f an 
individual appears to be sensible, slow, level-headed, then 
hi s opinions w i l l be regarded with the presupposition that they 
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have the same attributes - even i f they do not . I f i t appears 
that one has been involved i n Communist a c t i v i t y then one's words 
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and history w i l l be regarded with an eye to that assumption ^ 
Appearance provides the f i r s t hypotheses for charting the 
unknown. Sometimes - for l i f e i s an ongoing process, and one 
must take some things for granted, the f i r s t hypothesis sets 
the mould for the r e s t 
Theories of P o l i t i c s ; Formal and Ideological 
P o l i t i c a l appearance, i n a large view of p o l i t i c s , i s 
categorised by the spectrum shades between blue and red, from 
the Conservative a r i s t o c r a t to the Communist. Convenient 
labels are available, so that rather than assess the t o t a l i t y 
of a man's views and placing him at a point on the spectioim, 
one may r e f e r to him simply as a Conservative, a S o c i a l i s t , 
a Conmiunist. 
Snow observes: " I t i s an outrage to human dignity to think 
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of someone f i r s t as a label and then as a man." Class and 
race structures, and perhaps one might add, p o l i t i c a l structures, 
20 
degrade the human condition . 
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Up to this point, we may agree with an application of 
Standord's diagnosis of the personal judgement as the one 
composed mainly of 'truth', and the public or ideological 
judgement - the la b e l , or ticket - as composed mainly of 
' i l l u s i o n . ' ^ ^ 
I n a novel published i n 1968, Snow presents a committee 
sit u a t i o n i n which a student c a l l e d before the committee reacts 
i n accordance with h i s l a b e l l i n g interpretation: 
"On the surface, i t might have sounded l i k e a trade union 
boss negotiating with an employer. On one side stood the student 
body, Pateman was grating away,,,on the other, 'the authorities.' 
"The authorities had no right to impose thei r own laws u n i l a t e r a l l y 
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on the students, s a i d Patemen." 
This gets Pateman, who faces a d i s c i p l i n a r y charge, 
nowhere. I t alienates the committee. This part of the chapter 
i s an excellent example of massive s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of the 
si t u a t i o n . The 'authorities' - the committee i t s e l f - i s ncit 
homogeneous, but s p l i t by argument. The important factors i n 
the decision of what to do with Pateman are the various characters 
on the committee vrhich are obliterated by his theoretical 
stance. The best he could have done would have been to regard 
the event as a piecemeal s e r i e s of individual actions, to 
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"domesticate" i t to the common sequence of event following 
event, rather than :^eat i t as a trigger for emotional 
( l a b e l l e d ) p o l i t i c a l manoeuves. Of course, Pateman i s not 
e n t i r e l y mistaken i n regarding the committee as a representative 
of the authorities, or i n h i s view of himself as a member of 
the student body. For the issue involved, however, t h i s 
a n a l y sis i s too general to be of any pr a c t i c a l use. I n this 
issue i t i s the personality of the chairman which i s c r u c i a l . 
Pateman only succeeds i n antagonising him. 
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To take the viewpoint of the committee, i s i t important 
that Pateman i s an ideological enemy? or i n breach of a 
d i s c i p l i n a r y , or Christian-ethic rule? I s i t necessary for 
abstract 'Justice' to punish Pateman and h i s fellows with the 
same severity? Or, on theoretical grounds, should only one 
be punished? 
E l i o t , by which we may imply Snow too, makes a mingling of 
personal and functional assessments. The ideology only obscures 
the issues. Stanford's opinion on the r e l a t i v e roles of 
ideology and personality would apply with no d i f f i c u l t y here. 
Yet the example serves to i l l u s t r a t e a point which Stanford 
notes but does not emphasise: acting upon h i s theoretical grasp 
of what i s happening i n committee, Pateman creates an atmosphere 
of emotion. Similarly, the chairman of the committee denies 
the relevanc^of personality and influence i n judging the four 
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students , 
Stanford does make the d i s t i n c t i o n between 'truth' gnd 
• i l l u s i o n ' . The functional implications of the interplay 
between the two are most relevant to Snow's theories of p o l i t i c s , 
and for truth and i l l u s i o n personal or contextual c r i t e r i a may 
be substituted as l e s s assertive categories, more suited to 
p r a c t i c a l matters. 
For while. Snow f e e l s that structure and. divisions degrade 
the human condition "Yet we are s t i l l l i v i n g , l e t us hope 
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temporarily, i n such structures." The ideological theories, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y the more obvious forms, are easy to grasp: the 
evidence i s apparent. Complexity i s bleached from the l i v i n g 
context. The theory i s a guide to those who lack insight into 
p o l i t i c a l or human processes. And they mav be expected to act 
upon t h e i r theories. 
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The concept of ideological^.politics i n t h i s discussion 
has deliberately been l e f t vague. A definition would indicate 
a reliance upon fixed principles, a refusal to see individuals 
as other than representatives - i n the s t r i c t e s p o l i t i c a l 
circumstance, as representatives of a party. 
Snow observes: 
"The seat was safe, the Kensington end would 
go on returning Roger, i f he turned into a 
gorilla...Among the knockabout poor , the lumpen-
prole t a r i a t , she /Quaife's w i f e J might pick up 
a vote or two; but the r e s t , with similar English 
i m p a r t i a l i t y and phlegm, would go on voting for 
another g o r i l l a , provided he was Roger's 
opponent." 26 
Perhaps the truth of the matter i s that Roger i s a g o r i l l a , 
but the c o l l e c t i v e i l l u s i o n prevails, and he i s returned to 
Parliament. The theoretical judgement, theoretical p o l i t i c s 
thus act upon personal p o l i t i c s , and i n a special way. 
Theoretical p o l i t i c s may not lead to an understanding of the 
personal manoeuves, but a grasp of theory may be useful i n 
carrying out programmes of action, e s p e c i a l l y i n the larger 
context of open p o l i t i c s . 
To r e i t e r a t e , this tyjie of theoretical p o l i t i c s i s built 
on evident facts - within which inevitable judgements are 
associated. I n an attempt to gain a consensus from a large 
number of people, the extremes of personal insight and supposition 
may tend to average out, and agreement r e l i e s on a simple and 
unarguable base of the labels i n question. The blindness, the 
r i g i d i t y of l a b e l l i n g may be deplored, but the operation and 
the pressure of label-based judgement, especially i n open 
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p o l i t i c s , i s a f a c t of p o l i t i c a l l i f e • 
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The danger of this theorising i s that i t provides an 
explanation of events without properly understanding them, 
and that action which i s endorsed by the explanation may, i n 
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human terms, be inappropriate to the physical circumstances . 
Conspiracy 
The example of the college election i l l u s t r a t e s a dichotomy 
between the formal ( i n t h i s sense, trad i t i o n a l ) rules for the 
election of a Master, and the informal a c t i v i t y involved -
the personal p o l i t i c s ; the formal rules are not overthrown by 
personal p o l i t i c s , but used and augmented. Another example from 
Snow's work i s the situation of the Minister and the c i v i l 
servant. The Minister d i s l i k e s making decisions, while the 
c i v i l servant has a point of view, i n this case, as to the 
right decision to take. In theory, the c i v i l servant advises 
and infoims, while the decision i s the Minister's. In practice, 
the c i v i l servant i s successful i n having his view adopted. 
The catchphrase 'the corridors of power' indicates the significance 
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for Snow of the informal, or pre-foimal a c t i v i t i e s , 
There i s nothing e t h i c a l l y dubious about informality to 
begin with: friendships are natural phenomena and besides, 
informal information-gathering i s prudent a c t i v i t y , i f one wishes 
to succeed in any group project. To continue bur example. 
Brown, the college manager, does not want to put up a candidate 
who had no chance of winning'^. This would be wasted effort. 
He attempts to discover the opinions of some choice Fellows. 
Upon finding what he judges by experience to be a auffioient 
number to form the basis of a caucus'^, he proceeds to attempt 
to have the candidate elected. The process has an a i r of 
54 
co n f i d e n t i a l i t y about i t . People form al l i a n c e s for the sake 
of t h e i r mutual purpose. Alliances are the products of action, 
and thus, i n these cases, stronger than friendships. Alliances, 
i n group form especially, allow the individual to submerge 
himself healthily into the group for a project and escape the 
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dismal prospect of his own limitations , 
The a l l i a n c e s thus formed are also more effective than 
individual voices: i n closed p o l i t i c s the alliance i s a small 
army of persuaders, or a majority decision i n a committee. 
The formal stage of agreement generates publicity; the 
informal stages remain, to a greater or l e s s e r extent, for the 
purpose of making plans and discussing hopes, secret, A common 
assumption i s that i n these secret stages, meetings, confidential 
notes and whispers, people are conspiring. Brown's caucus, 
eschewing publicity, are c a b a l i s t i c . Lewis E l i o t , i n his 
readiness to accept the compromise solution, i s part of the 
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greater conspiracy 'the Establishment behind the Establishment.' 
Snow repudiates the conspiracy theory of p o l i t i c s . I t i s 
a theory upon which some men act, he believes, but not with 
general success. To adhere to i t i s to be "cynical and 
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unwordly" - a l e a s t favourite combination of attributes , 
furthest away from Snow's ideal character, the "worldling" 
with some sense of ethical purpose. He presents i t as a theory 
with no basis i n fa c t : generated by the absence of fact, an 
unworkable hypothesis: 
First,'.this work-will attempt to show below, the actions 
of individuals and groups are limited by other forces. 
Secondly, men of action - and men i n general. Snow suggests -
have c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n common. To suggest an individual 
i s conspiring i s to suggest that he has divided himself from 
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a c e r t a i n portion of society - i n fact from everyone who may 
be affected by the r e s u l t s , who i s not a co-conspirator. 
This places a s t r a i n on the individual who, i n a normal or 
healthy state, should maintain a balance between s o c i a l i t y 
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and i n d i v i d u a l i t y ^ . 'Men of Action' - men who are orientated 
towards socii^l action - do not r e l i s h t h i s proposition as a 
way of p o l i t i c s . 
Snow also maintains that the business of s o c i a l a f f a i r s 
would not work on the basis of general conspiracy, or e x p l i c i t -
ness. The large-scale conspiratorial theory i s rejected largely 
. on the basis of experience. 
"•Of course p o l i t i c s can be corrupt. But 
not corrupt i n that fashion. No one makes 
that kind of bargain. I t ' s not that we're 
s p e c i a l l y admirable. But we've got to make 
things work, and they couldn't work l i k e 
that, and they don't...It's only people who 
don't know how the world t i c k s who think 
i t t i c k s l i k e that.'" % 
P o l i t i c s are not corrupt i n th i s fashion, because i t i s -
not too secretive - but too blatant. Those who assume a 
conspiracy hypothesis make the world seem worse thai i t i s , 
they are too cynical, i f they believe that men w i l l admit the i r 
purely s e l f i s h interest i n advancement and use this as a basis 
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for negotiation . 
Men i n general, and ce r t a i n l y men of ambition, have too 
much desire to respect themselves and to maintain the respect 
of others, to conspire openly, to reveal th e i r flaws. 
The conspiracy theory, therefore, i s as much a simplification 
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of the situation of closed p o l i t i c s as an account of the 
l e g a l i s t i c procedure. Snow represents this theory as the product 
of those who have no understanding of the motives of others. 
Such people, attempting to conform with what they perceive to " 
be the normal procedure, try to practice i t without success. 
One must beware. Snow observes, of mistaking the s i g n i f i -
cance of the moves of personal p o l i t i c s . In the pre-formal 
precesses man i s a s o c i a l creature, who enjoys f l a t t e r y , 
comfort, displays of consideration. I t i s the nature of informal 
p o l i t i c a l action to use sensory, sociable comforts as lubrication. 
" ' I t was absurd to suppose that Rose could 
be bought by dinner and a ti c k e t to the opera. 
I t was absurd to suppose that Rose could be 
bought by any money under Heaven: i t would be 
l i k e t r y ing to s l i p Robespierre a five-pound 
note.'" 38 
" ' I t was equally absurd to suppose that...Lord 
L u f l i n could be bought by a dinner even by a 
l a v i s h dinner i n his honour. Lord Luffeln 
was f i n a n c i a l l y capable of paying for his 
own dinners, even l a v i s h ones.'" 39 
One has to see the relevance of the provision of such 
comforts i n perspective. Snow suggest. 
For conspiracy. Snow substitutes t a c i t agreements, 
personal manoeuvre and p a r t i a l l y shared interpretations of events. 
For example, the Establishment means broadly: "an agreement, 
e n t i r e l y unspoken, and very largely unconscious, to preserve 
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su b s t a n t i a l l y the present web of power-relations." Perhaps 
the best term to use for these characters i s 'fellow-travellers'. 
UniLike conspiracy, which Snow represents as an action involving 
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corruption or extra-legal a c t i v i t i e s , fellow-travellers, 
as a group, are inclined to remain within the accepted 
structures, and to have i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c aims i n addition to an 
e x p l i c i t general goal. 
The secrecy, which can mean t a c t f u l silence, or discretion, 
makes l i f e more comfortable. Snow suggests. I t avoids overt 
opposition and i l l - f e e l i n g , the constant clashing of w i l l s ^ ^ . 
Within the sub-group - or, i n our case, within Brown's caucus -
the process of persuasion continues u n t i l the election day, 
for the process of decision i s ongoing. From experience, 
Snow observes that i t i s often not possible to win over 
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enemies, but r e l a t i v e l y easy to lose friends . Nothing 
becomes cut and dried: the c o n f l i c t , the individuals them-
selves are i n a state of flux, as they struggle for power with 
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one another « 
Leaders 
The ones who win are called leaders. Leaders generally 
require certain natural c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , not least of which i s 
emotional strength. A large part of t h i s emotional strength 
i n Snow's thought r e s t s upon the interpretive business of p o l i t i c s . 
The leader figure, i n a personal situation, presents his theory 
of relevance, i n which he u t t e r l y and whole-heartedly agrees, 
and the fact of his t o t a l b e l i e f influences and commands those 
around him. On occasion. Snow indicates that an 'inner c h i l l ' , 
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an a i r of u n i n f l u e n c i b i l i t y marks a leader from his fellows . 
Leaders, however, are not r a d i c a l l y different from others. 
There arg/felements of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and communication between 
them, for leadership i n closed p o l i t i c s i s generally a matter 
of influence, and persuasion. To persuade effectively, they 
need to be outward looking. Snow also notes that a common 
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c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s an element of paranoia - what he c a l l s 
"nalcedness to l i f e " i . e . absence of s o c i a l props and pretences -
which, paradoxically, makes others f e e l protective. The 
nakedness to l i f e l e t s flow the emotional energy, too, of the 
individual, and makes him more forceful^^. 
Another type of leader may useftilly be distinguished: 
neither of these types are exclusive of the other, they d i f f e r 
mainly i n the s e l e c t i o n process involved i n becoming a leader. 
For the f i r s t i d e a l ( i . e . discrete) type, George Passant 
serves as a prime example. Through the force of his personality 
he gathers a groups around him of which - i n so far as they 
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divide into leaders and led - he i s the leader . For the 
second i d e a l type i t i s perhaps f i t t i n g to sel e c t ^^oger Quaife, 
the Minister, who has joined his 'group' after i t s creation, 
and whose position as leader has required more overt competition 
towards an established goal. 
Roger Quaife i s not without emotion, not without outward-
looking f a c u l t i e s . He i s not a charismatic leader, in the 
sense that i t i s h i s actions, his history, not just h is nature, 
which have led to h i s selection; yet without ah amitious drive, 
s i m i l a r i n essence to Passant's, he w i l l go no further, nor 
has he reached h i s present position on merit alone^^. 'Weight', 
suggests Snow, i s necessary to carry a man to the top, whatever 
his profession. Will-power, determination, emotional force are 
elements of 'weight'. 
The signi f i c a n t difference between the types ii the degree 
to which they have had to compete with others for their position. 
The Passant-type, the purely inter-personal leader, i s open to 
the world, incapable of r e a l i s i n g the need for, or the means of, 
disguise. His position as a natural leader may not even require 
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him to be i n close contact with experiential r e a l i t y . 
The Quaife-type leader has compromised himself, learned to 
contain his pride, learned something about himself thix)u^ 
comparison, learned through competition that he i s not superior 
to others, s a c r i f i c e d h i s dignity i n order to scramble after h i s 
ambitions. In doing so he has had to come to terms with his 
lim i t a t i o n s , and t h i s refines him into a self-controlled creature, 
more suitable for power than the Passant-type, whose depth of 
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character separates him from more ordinary mortals . 
Leaders pursue power. They pursue acclaim from others, 
and, i n a p o l i t i c a l - s o c i a l structure, the sense of power which 
comes from making decisions for others. Such,. positions have 
a dual aspect, i n that they are at the same time foci of 
acclaim and trust, and provide the power (or apparent power) 
to choose. 
The notion of r i t u a l i n Snow's work seems to be an extension 
of t h i s love for acclaim and power, where, perhaps, a man can 
s a t i s f y h is need for "the moment-by-moment sensation of power" 
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and "see and f e e l h i s power." 
I n groups of the powerful a climate i s generated, and the 
emanation of the 'charm of p o l i t i c s ' a t t r a c t s the ambitious: 
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" I t was one of t h e i r rewards. What others were there?" 
"Margeret was baiting me through the door, hilarious at 
the s t a t e l y r i t u a l downstairs. Did a l l men i n power behave l i k e 
t h i s ? Whj-? Because otherwise, I replied, they wouldn't reach 
power, enjoy i t , or keep it."^° 
The undignified scramble of men 'making their way in the 
world' may results i n "in-fighting, knifing, faction forming 
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and gang-warfare." 
Competition i s both fi e r c e and unethical. Snow seems to 
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give no clear l i n e to follow: i n his lectures and speeches, 
he holds up ideal examples of good w i l l , while at the same 
time, he accepts the pushing and shoving, even i n i t s more 
viol e n t aspects, of men competing for recognition. I f there 
i s a consistent l i n e on t h i s i t must begin with the acceptance 
of the r o u ^ and tumble as proceeding out of human nature, and 
an endorsement of ideals as also proceeding from a potential of 
that nature, neither excluding the p o s s i b i l i t y of the other. 
The struggle for position i s , i n a sense, necessary, i f one i s 
to obtain power to perform s o c i a l action. 
Where the l i n e i s drawn between acceptable and non-
acceptable careerism, seems to remaiJi a matter of preference, 
Lewis protests to his brother Martin bhen that l a t t e r , by 
careful manoeuvring, puts himself i n a potential position of 
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power at the expense of another; l a t e r Lewis witnesses Roger 
Quaife most deviously s e t t i n g into motion processes which w i l l 
make him a Minister at the expense of his superior, without 
portest^ ^ o This i s dangerous ground, for Martin and Lewis share 
a mu l t i - l e v e l l e d relationship. The grounds upon which Lewis 
protests are perhaps too personal to be generally applicable. 
While nothing clear emerges from t h i s point, a significant 
factor receives an extra emphasis: Quaife has more than a desire 
for personal power motivating his action. He has a cause, 
a s o c i a l task. This, i n f a c t , i s why E l i o t i s prepared to 
accept Quaife's manoeuvres. They are fellow-travellers. 
Leaders often have two sets of objectives: from the personal 
p o l i t i c a l basis of competition, ambition moves them to wish to 
be 
" f i r s t to receive recognition. Also they have 
s o c i a l objectives to reach, to see the s p e c i f i c 
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d e t a i l of their w i l l carried out for^the 
benefit - or at l e a s t not to the detriment -
of t h e i r group. 
"But she l_ Quaife's wifeJ knew t h i s game of 
h i ^ p o l i t i c s better than I did, perhaps 
better than Roger did himself. She knew i t 
as a game, i n which one won or l o s t j i t did 
not count whether Roger had to abandon a policy. 
Vfhat did count, was whether his chances of a 
high o f f i c e were going up or down." 54 
Martin and Quaife both attempt to balance t h e i r consciences 
with t h e i r actions, principles with advancement. Quaife finds 
t h i s e a s i e r because the fact of his s o c i a l objectives allows 
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him to maintain hi s s e l f - r e s p e c t and gives him purpose . 
How much of this i s i l l u s i o n ? might seem the natural question 
to apply at this point. But perhaps, i n a world of i l l u s i o n and 
mystery, where the commonest action of interpretation, the 
only reasonable answers to suggest concern the extent to which 
the leader believes i n what i s e f f e c t i v e l y h is j u s t i f i c a t i o n , 
and, perhaps, whether the objective thus set i s attainable. 
Who has the Power? 
The personal objective i s very much the scope of personal 
p o l i t i c s . Not so i n the case of issues and p o l i c i e s . The 
eleven books of the 'Strangers and Brothers' sequence follow 
Lewis from the classrooms of a provincial technical college 
to an office off the corridors of power to a (pre-formal) 
meeting with the Prime Minister and the offer of high o f f i c e . 
Lewis i a a man with a cause, progressing towards the centre of 
power, the charmed c i r c l e of p o l i t i c s at i t s highest. 
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Yet, reviewing The Corridors of Power. Edward S h i l s 
observed: "Here at the very centre of S i r Charles' world there 
i s an empty space."^^ 
He continued: 
"Power turns out to be not something massive 
and powerful, but rather a motley cluster of• 
unreflected preferences, vain aspirations, 
. t r i v i a l combinations, wooden adherence to 
archaic patterns of conduct, minor bits of 
self-protection and self-advancement," 57 
Within the novel. Snow does ask:: "V/ho had the power?"^® 
S h i l s has picked out the manoeuvres of personal p o l i t i c s , 
and on that l e v e l the power of the leaders i s evident. The 
Prime Minister, for example, i s a powerful man, because he 
a l l o c a t e s jobs, ranks and therefore status. His confidant, 
using h i s influence - i n an example of 'court p o l i t i e s ' - i s 
poiferful insofar as he has, presumably, some voice i n the same 
matter. As for actually performing s o c i a l objectives, however, 
the extent of the power - and where i t does l i e - i s a more 
taxing question, 
" I f you want to get anywhere i n p o l i t i c s you've got to be 
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good at pushing open doors," r e f l e c t s Quaife, The pushing 
a b i l i t y of the leader i s not i n question, the choice of door i s 
what matters i n terms of r e s u l t s , 
",,.the more you penetrated that world, the 
more you wondered who had the power, or whether 
anyone had, or whether we weren't giving to 
o f f i c e s a free w i l l that those who held them 
could never conceivably possess." 60 
" i t had made me Tolstoyan, or at l e a s t s c e p t i c a l 
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of the effect any man could have, not 
j u s t a junior Minister, but anyone who r e a l l y 
seemed to possess the power, by contrast 
to the t i d a l flow i n which he lived.'" 61 
The situation, i n these cases, i s representative democracy, 
a mixture of closed and open p o l i t i c s . Snow's idea i s that 
s o c i a l forces operate to l i m i t the freedom^of action of the 
people who " r e a l l y seem to possess the power" to such an extent 
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that decisions almost seem to be predetermined . 
S o c i a l forces are equated with climates of opinion. Opinion 
i s based on perception-interpretation of events, with the 
subsequent formation of attitudes. I r o n i c a l l y , general opinion 
may s e i z e upon what, to an experienced observer, would appear 
to be of l i t t l e relevance and thus ir r a t i o n e i l l y prevent action 
which would otherwise be feasible. For the effective leader 
t h i s e n t a i l s a consideration of not only what i s , i n physical 
terms, practicable, but what i s perceived as p r a c t i c a l also. I f 
a t t a i n i n g an objective i s perceived as p r a c t i c a l (and, by 
implication, desirable) then the door i s open, the tide i s 
not contrary 
Climates of opinion, of course, change. Normative 
bahavious, moral standards, p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s a l l change too, 
in t e r a c t i n g with events. The effective leader must test the 
climate carefully to discover i t s nature and the boundaries of 
power i t w i l l allow him. The climate of opinion projects, 
among theories of p o l i t i c a l processes, a theoretical range of 
possible action, also. 
Leaders must, and do, believe i n the i r individual free 
w i l l i n t h i s s i t uation, as an experientially v a l i d working 
hypothesis. Leaders are needed to notice when the doors are 
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unlocked, and to push them. I t i s possible for an individual 
to p o s i t i v e l y lead i n his group, but only with the acquiescence 
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of a vague general opinion , 
This interplay of theoretical and personal p o l i t i c s within 
an action-based system, explains i n part the pre-formal 
manoeuvres. Leaders, or more generally, men of action, of any 
order, managers of men, must constantly test both the physical 
r e a l i t y and th§(i)opular myths framing i t . As head of organi-
sations they must t r y to assess the opinion of t h e i r subordi-
nates. Within committees, the extreme ideas of individuals 
s l i d e towards the compromise, the meeting point of the theories 
of committee members. 
Such attention to the opinions of others weakens the w i l l 
of the leader, by causing him to doubt his ovm hopes and w i l l 
to f u l f i l them.: I n pursuing action, the leader may have to 
cut himself off p h y s i c a l l y from the f u l l current of reactions 
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i n order to exert his personality to the f u l l . 
Despite symptoms of climates of opinion, the forces them-
selves are vague and unarticulated to begin with. They are 
activated by external triggers and become more r e s t r i c t i v e as 
they c r y s t a l l i s e around an event, or s e r i e s of events. The 
external event i s a trigger. The resulting climate i s p a r t i a l l y 
pre-formed by the nature of the triggers which set i t i n motion. 
Climates of opinion may thus be generated, influenced and 
c r y s t a l l i s e d by the p o l i t i c a l actors, whose scope for freedom 
they constrain, within the l i m i t s of their potential. Mass, 
or group opinion, i s not the creation of, for example, an 
effective p o l i t i c a l actor, but by a r t i c u l a t i n g this or that 
aspect he may cultivate i t and influence i t s growth. 
Typical generators of climates of opinion are rumovir-
mongers - whose wide-spread theories are often represented as 
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sheer i l l u s i o n by Snow; also newspapers and demogogues^^. 
As Lewis passes t h r o u ^ the corridors he becomes increasingly 
aware of the power wielded lay the generators of climate. 
Brodzhinski i s the most dangerous man i n the world, a natural 
demogogue triggering the paranoia and zenophobia of mass 
opinion. Charles, Lewis's son, perceives where the power l i e s , 
and decides to become a j o u r n a l i s t . Outside the structure of 
government, Lewis finds himself free once more to r a i s e his 
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voice i n public protest o 
For guidance i n s o c i a l action. Snow indicates the exper-
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ienced observer . His theories of human nature and s o c i a l 
a c t i v i t y only provide a framework within which s p e c i f i c 
experience - fuelled of course by the r e f l e c t i v e intelligence -
works. Beneath the i l l u s o r y interpretations of events, the 
deceptions of appearance, there i s an underlying, p r a c t i c a l 
significance, with which men of experience are i n contact. As 
with other shared perceptions, t h i s f a c i l l i t a t e s communication. 
Unlike perceptions concerning issues the observation of the 
p r a c t i c a l significance, being concerned primarily with personal 
p o l i t i c s , studies the larocesses of s o c i a l a c t i v i t y , and gives 
a guide to results and action^^o 
As i t emerges i n more public or a r t i c u l a t e foims of group, 
personal p o l i t i c s appears as a cjrpher of formal a c t i v i t y . 
Experience reveals the unwritten rules and develops intu i t i o n 
of the meaning of the cypher. 
Group feeling, or climates, however, are not founded on 
t h i s experienced opinion. Besides lacking the detachment of 
an observer, and thus clouding the i r perception with emotion, 
group feelings are aggregates of individual opinions, cumber-
some and i n a r t i c u l a t e . The lonely individual does not find 
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complete consensus with others of his kind, but they agree 
on c e r t a i n things. The irreducible things, upon which the 
individual theories are based, are those which are apparent, 
even v e r i f i a b l e . 
For example, i n the case of a s c i e n t i s t of voluble l e f t -
wing persuasion: another s c i e n t i s t may notice the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
a b i l i t y of the man, deplore his manners and, personally, accept 
the p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s ; non-scientists,unable to appreciate 
or v e r i f y for themselves the academic quality of the man fuel 
t h e i r opinions on vhat i s apparent to them. People with no 
acquaintance of a man w i l l not take his personal manners into 
account, A process of abstraction ensues and continues u n t i l 
the human being i s nov more than a l a b e l : Communist, Jew, 
L i b e r a l , Conservative, A r t i s t , Landlord, P h i l i s t i n e . The 
dehumanisation process f a i l s to grasp the physical factors. 
Empty of a l l but a caricature of personality the individual i s 
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f i l l e d again with the presuppositions his l a b e l arouses . 
Obviously, t h i s i s not a beneficial process. The personal 
judgement, functional judgement and judgement-by-label are a l l , 
at one time or another, f i t to be considered, but the choice 
and blend of c r i t e r i a should not be arbitrary, and perhaps 
should be more conscious i n the mind of the individual. To 
generralise on the basis of one type - especially the l a b e l l i n g 
type - may lead to unv/anted actions and a departure from the 
p r a c t i c a l l y important factors of the situation. 
Judgement by lab e l evidently and l o g i c a l l y becomes more 
s i g n i f i c a n t i n open p o l i t i c s and i n areas, i n general, where 
large numbers of people are involved. The neglect or simpli-
f i c a t i o n of character i s more probable where personal character 
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cannot be perceived. Although the type of judgement leads to 
i l l u s i o n , i t i s an i l l u s i o n which may generate a climate of 
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opinion, a governing factor of the l i m i t s of possible action « 
S i m i l a r l y , personal judgement i s more evident i n closed 
or small-number p o l i t i c a l situations. As the process of 
assessing other human beings' characters, i t i s obviously the 
type of judgement which defines friends and enemies and types 
of temperament. Snow's suggestion i n t h i s area i s perhaps that 
attributed to Brown ftf The Masters, who "loved his friends and 
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knew they were only men...One took them as they were." Of 
personal judgement. Snow's theory i s that as external events 
trigger reactions from one's nature so there w i l l be under-
standable predispositions i n one's judgement of one's fellows,, 
dependent on the p a r t i c u l a r shape of one's own nature and the 
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idea l s of character to which this gives r i s e , 
As the processes of p o l i t i c s are a) predominantly ego-
based within b) a concern for the broad s o c i a l outlook and 
therefore c) with an emphasis toward action, the personal 
judgement i s not e n t i r e l y appropriate. Experienced professional 
p o l i t i c i a n s do not base t h e i r actions upon the personal judgment, 
with i t s mingling of affection, i t s regard for another individual 
i n favour of the s o c i a l benefit. Professional p o l i t i c i a n s 
are more concerned with the immediate relevance of character 
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which i s the nature of i t s expression i n action . Alliances 
are unions formed for or i n action: friendships are mor e private 
relationships, based on other factors not s t r i c t l y relevant to 
p o l i t i c s , or the s o c i a l , but correpsonding to the individual 
condition. 
As vras mentioned previously, the functional judgements 
may be tested. Functional judgements of what a man has done are 
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the province of experts, forming professsional opinion. 
The basis of professional, or o f f i c i a l , opinion i s thus not 
personal d i s l i k e or affection, but recognisable functional 
c r i t e r i a . An element of objectivity - or, at l e a s t , the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of a consensus opinion - i s present i n functional 
judgement as a r e s u l t , rendering i t a suitable tool for 
e f f e c t i v e and sensible p o l i t i c a l action. 
Label-based judgements, on the other hand, ignore the 
d e t a i l , the insight into either character o* s p e c i f i c rules, 
and generate massive i l l u s i o n s i n open p o l i t i c s which separate 
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informed, o f f i c i a l opinion from the climate of thought . 
I n large-scale p o l i t i c s , t h i s tendency to l a b e l l i n g may be 
unavoidable. In p r a c t i c a l terms, one may only hope to minimise 
the amount of i l l u s i o n generated by increasing the amount of 
information available. Of course. Snow's novels may be seen 
as works of public e d i f i c a t i o n concerning the processes of 
p o l i t i c s ; i n other v/orks he i a attempting to break doim the labels 
of ' s c i e n t i s t ' and 'humanist', and his a r t i c l e s on education 
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reinforce t h i s concern , 
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Chapter Five 
I 
1 
PERSONAL POLITICS 
Personal p o l i t i c s describes the microcosmic action of human 
beings pursuing the i r ends through opposition, a l l i a n c e and 
persuasion. I t i s the a c t i v i t y upon which the theories and 
i l l u s i o n s are projected. The s h i f t i n g processes of personal 
p o l i t i c s remain c r u c i a l l y important to the people involved i n 
them, and insofar as the scope for action i s only limited, not 
s p e c i f i c a l l y dictated, by the pressure of outside theoiy. A 
great deal of Snow's work i s i n the form of description after 
description of movements i n the f i e l d of personal p o l i t i c s . 
Perhaps, as Snow maintains, the process can be properly demon-
strated and discussed i n no satisfactory form other than the 
novel, with a scope for d e t a i l too part i c u l a r for any general 
theory. Snow i s surely right about the value of the novel form, 
that by producing theories through a process of induction, of 
abstracting s i m i l a r i t i e s and comparisons of experiential events, 
even the spurious experience of f i c t i o n , a weight i s given to them , 
ah extra dimension of c r e d i b i l i t y . 
Generalisations,however, can be made. Shedding no doubt 
valuable d e t a i l , they escape the inst i t u t i o n s , the formal rule 
structure, the pa r t i c u l a r climate which engendered them, eind r e s t 
ultimately upon human nature. The natural p o l i t i c i a n or manager 
of men i s aware of the general processes, and, unsurprisingly, 
the generalisations are another type of theoretigal p o l i t i c s 
which only the experienced may learn to apply \iith success. 
Perhaps, i f one were asked to distinguish, i n one sentence, 
between these notions of p o l i t i c a l action and other theories, the 
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simple reply would be that these are the notions which natural 
p o l i t i c i a n s apply and have found to work i n ^ p r a c t i c e ^ 
Limited Successes 
I n the preceding chapter reference was made to the metaphor 
of the door, the o i l e d hinge, and the role of the leader as 
pushing open doors. As discussed above, the v;ord "leader" i s 
used here i n a limited sense, primarily for the purpose of 
explaining the effect of climate upon personal p o l i t i c s . Returning 
to the a c t i v i t y of organising men, the idea of a "leader" as a 
man who, at the forefront of the project (or directing from a high 
place) may u s e f u l l y be replaced by the more embracing term of 
"manager" or, i n the i d e a l , the "natural p o l i t i c i a n . " 
A l l three types seek s a t i s f a c t i o n by means of personal 
p o l i t i c s , but insofar as the manager combines ambition with know-
ledge of p o l i t i c a l processes, he i s perhaps the best unit i n 
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which to approach the world of personal p o l i t i c s , 
For the sake of useful personal action, managers wozk within 
the climate of opinion i n i t s f l u i d , amorphous form. When the 
climate has c r y s t a l l i s e d the scope for action i s severely.limited 
by the group, or mass recognition of the situation i n simplified 
ideological forms, easy to grasp but cumbersome to manouevre. 
As the climate emerges, i t i s strengthened i n the individual by 
a consciousness of i t s extent. I n conflict-situations, where the 
opposing groups are gradually formed, the situatioii results i n 
a further separation of the groups u n t i l they become quite 
i n f l e x i b l e and intractable^. 
While climates of opinion are generated by reaction to 
events or articulated theories, the speed at which they c r y s t a l l i s e 
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seems to be affected by the emotional weight of the reaction. 
Snow's managers work by persuasion, attempting to quietly influence 
the position, l e t t i n g opinion c r y s t a l l i s e slowly without creating 
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an unpredictable emotional atmosphere . 
The main mode of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s persuasion. This 
i s evident at the committee table, and between equals; i f one 
accepts Snow's concept of individual p o l i t i c s , persuasion may be 
expected to be equally important i n the organisational framework, 
even v^hen the framevrork i s r i g i d . Much of the manager's v/ork i s 
pr a c t i s i n g the a r t of persuasion, and here, within Snow's world, 
there appears to be a s t a r t i n g point: we see man being instructed 
upon what he needs to see success i n an issue:^ 
"Obstinacy," "patience," "powers of persuasion," and "consider-
able command of t a c t i c s , " are the attributes mentioned. The f i r s t 
three categories only amplify the nature of persuasion: i f s o c i a l 
a c t i v i t y i s seen i n the clashing of v d l l s , then successful p o l i t i c s 
means v/inning these clashes by some fonn of persuasion. I f the 
clash of w i l l s i s the product of a desire to compare favourably 
vrith others, to enhance one's own power, then persuasion takes on 
a further meaning: i t must allow, and allow for, an impression 
of choice. 
Choice, even the i l l u s i o n of choice, allows an impression 
of free exercise of w i l l , the maintenance of self-respect, and 
opportunity to win the respect of others; choosing, deciding, i s 
also the measure of personal power. The persuader must therefore 
be patient, guiding the formation of opinion, l e t t i n g resolves 
form, i f he wishes to carry out a project over any length of 
time^. I f the capacity for persuasion i s absent, i f a man i s not 
w i l l i n g to be convinced, then a l l the dexterity of a manager v ; i l l 
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7 be watffced , As i n the case of climates of opinion, however, 
there i s a time before a decision has c r y s t a l l i s e d when persuasion 
may be e f f e c t i v e . 
Prom Snow's opinion of human nature i t follows that effective 
persuasion w i l l play upon the self-respect of the object of 
persuasion, and define the decision i n terms which w i l l lead 
that individual to the conclusion which i n terms of action w i l l 
be s i m i l a r to one's own. 
Necessary for persuasion i s strength of b e l i e f . I f persuasion 
i s a.struggle of egos, b e l i e f endows the individual with emotional 
force, and possibly i t i s useful to note that i n an argument our 
b e l i e f i s simultaneously a r e f l e c t i o n upon the v a l i d i t y of one's 
point of view, and one's i n s t i n c t i v e motive for continuing to 
argue. As an i n s t i n c t i v e motive. Snow would endorse i t s value, 
as he regards i n s t i n c t s as closer to operation of w i l l than 
8 
reason , 
Such conditions may create tension from thei r contradictory 
demands; he who believes the most for c e f u l l y i n his point of view 
i s he who i s blind to the viewpoints of others. The more intense 
his b e l i e f , the greater his i n s t i n c t i v e desire to exercise his 
w i l l , and the beliiever i s ftised monolithically i n his purpose. 
This, of course, detracts from h i s a b i l i t y to adapt to changing 
circumstances, and perhaps to react with others. 
I n The A f f a i r . Snow presents a character with such a belief, 
who, unable to adapt to the chsinging parameters of the boundaries 
of action, and incapable of accepting the limited power of 
managerial persuasion, was both more effective i n the issue i n 
question than experienced managers, and at a disproportionately 
greatijr potential damage to his career and his reputation: 
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"At l e a s t as often as not, i n a group l i k e the 
college, the shrewd moves cancelled each other out 
and the only way to win was through the inadmissible 
and the inexcusable." 
The character, Skeffington, has no hope i n the future of playing 
a part i n p o l i t i c s i n the group. His inadmissible and inexcusable 
action has been to threaten the group (with p u b l i c i t y ) . Snow's 
idea of a manager i s of one v7ho works to exercise his power within 
the group, not over i t , who i s compromising the desire to act with 
the desire to p e r s i s t ^ ^ , His belief i s tempered with other consi-
derations. He excludes them as much as he can, by compartmentalising 
his mind, but their d i v e r s i t y - and perliaps t h e i r resultant 
uncertainty - saps his b e l i e f . V/hile the course of argument s h i f t s , 
the persuaders both seek to define groimds for their own advantage, 
from which they can seize the "moral i n i t i a t i v e " - belief i n the 
j u s t i c e of th e i r case^^. Here the i n s t i n c t i v e believer i s 
l e s s tractable, stronger, while the l e s s committed move more 
nimbly to l e s s purpose. 
Genuine "responsible" persuasion, divorced from emotional 
issues, wants only to influence the forming of a decision. At 
some point a f t e r what Snow has c a l l e d the " f i r s t c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n " 
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of the resolve , the effective persuader seeks an indication, or 
expression of commitnent, strengthening his position by requiring 
a public a r t i c u l a t i o n , and further c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n of the decision^^. 
The general pattern of p o l i t i c a l processes i n the causes 
undertaken i n Snow's examples, begins with the pre-formal gathering 
oS opinion, designed to inform the manager of the potential, both 
physical and permissable, of a situation while arousing as l i t t l e 
reaction from the climate as possible. The pre-formalities lead 
to decisions and a l l i a n c e s and a recognition of opposition. The 
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nature of the pre-formal manouevres gradually stimulates conflict 
and the generation of shared b e l i e f s , and the climate c r y s t a l l i s e s . 
The opposing groups i n the c o n f l i c t are l e f t to work out an 
agreement between themselves, i n which there i s often a certain 
amount of compromise, which w i l l p a r t i a l l y s a t i s f y both of them 
and resolve t h e i r antagonisms. Formal occasions may provide 
structured opportunities for consultation, c o n f l i c t , or persuasion. 
Although formally they exist for the formation of group ^ resolutions, 
the nature of these resolutions i s strongly influenced by the 
desires of certain members within the group, so i t i s appropriate 
to think i n teims of managers within a formally democratic group^^, 
although not of leaders. 
I t should go without saying that the effective managers seek 
out the power li n e s i n groups of this sort. The chief source of 
influence over a group i s the man whom the manager needs to 
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persuade most of a l l . F a i l i n g that - which requires some consent 
from the man of influence himself - he can, on his own account, 
be aware of the moves made ga i n s t him. I n committee, or i n a 
group decision-making situation, the l:'jies of power emerge. Prior 
to t h i s formal group situation, the outsider i s limited to gathering 
what information he can through the imperfect source of gossip 
and rumo\ir. 
Skeffington, who represents i n Snow's mythology, the non-
managerial p o l i t i c a l actor of principle, would not succeed at 
effective persuasion. One could linger over the four qualities 
that he was told he would need and point out his lack of patience, 
h i s lack of t a c t i c a l knowledge,but i t seems more l i k e l y that the 
root of the matter i s his ignorance of the l i m i t s of "responsible 
action. "^^ Skeffington i s not presented as a man to measure up 
to, but rather to measure up against. Yet Skeffington i s always 
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capable of using outside power against the society of vAich he 
i s a part, and i s thus potentially effective i n action. His 
action i s irresponsible i n that i t gives no thought to wider-
ranging p r a c t i c a l and s o c i a l r e s u l t s . 
Skeffington, however, has a lesson for the manager. Skeffington 
has both goal and j u s t i f i c a t i o n , and i s capable of responding 
p o s i t i v e l y to situations v/hich confuse l e s s committed managers, 
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There i s an importance i n a goal vfhich c a l l s out determination 
and an increased chance of achievement - from a human being. 
While the goal i s important, however, the firm decision cr u c i a l , 
the general laode of p o l i t i c s i s movement by increment and goals 
are achieved gradually, i f at a l l . Perhaps t h i s i s the essence 
of the position of a meliorist. V/hat i s the position, beside 
Skeffington, of a manager? I n the long-term i t i s the manager 
who maintains the society, gains some collective t r u s t and with 
that some power, and place, i n the society. The manager has 
controlled his self-destructive desires, and has struck a balance 
between s a t i s f a c t i o n for himself and benefit to the community. 
What i f the Slceffington type has, i n fact, comradeship and 
trust; a group which supports and sustains him, an ideology which 
gives him strength? Perhaps t h i s , the charismatic leader of 
s o c i a l forces, i s what Snow designates'the "nevf type of leader" 
i n l a t e r books of the sequence. Perh^s i t i s a function of a 
changing climate and s o c i a l structure i n the 1950s. and early 
1960s^^, . 
The manager compromises, ^o an extent t h i s must be taken 
i n terms of o r i g i n a l nature; some people are naturally good at 
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t h i s , some useless and some w i l l improve with practice . Snow 
seems to believe that this i s perhaps the most vfe can expect. 
Fai l u r e to compromise results i n an imbalance dangerous to the 
76 
individual and - more importantly for Snow - potentially to the 
society as well. F a i l u r e to r e a l i s e the different nature of deci-
sions taken for society (functional judgements) and decisions 
taken for oneself (personal and functional) leads to a confusion 
of aims and c r i t e r i a . F a i l u r e , i n fact, to compartmentalise, 
draws the s o c i a l decisions into the personal i r r a t i o n a l sea of 
temperament^^. 
Before passing on to techniques of personal power, i t i s 
in t e r e s t i n g to note the element of inclusion i n persuasion. 
Persuasion brings people together, the domination aspect of pure 
w i l l entropies them into individuals. Cohesion of groups may 
r e l y upon the glue of affection, but also on the makeshift 
adhesive of compromise and persuasion. 
Techniques 
Two noteworthy techniques, connected with the art of 
persuasion, stand out i n Snow's work. One of them, which i s more 
of a t a c t i c than a technique, concerns the direction from which 
the manager persuades; one of them i s a definite technique, a 
«• manipulation of character. 
To continue with the theme of persuasion, the source of the 
persuasive argument i s regarded by men as perhaps more important 
than the argument i t s e l f . An argumant advanced by a technical 
expert c a r r i e s more weight than the same opinion advanced by a 
layman. Men of influence are those whose opinions are respected, 
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and naturally the effective manager t r i e s to u t i l i s e this status . 
Their role, so f a r as he i s concerned, i s to exert pressure 
i n h i s favour and to lend weight to his cause. By diversifying 
the sources of persuasion, the manager attempts to create a climate 
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of opinion focussing upon the object of his persuasion. 
This climate of opinion (Snow does not use any technical 
or common term to distinguish beti/een the general climate of 
opinion, from which the climate within any group originates, 
and the climate within a p a r t i c u l a r meeting), this climate of 
opinion i s within the manager's grasp. His effectiveness depends 
upon a climate at t h i s l e v e l of personal confrontation, and his 
wisest action i s to organise the choice and preponderance of 
favourable components» 
The second technique e n t a i l s selective control of one's 
temperament. Snow shows a number of subtle men pursuing personal 
p o l i t i c a l action, l a b i l e characters, and generally concludes that 
subtler men are under the i l l u s i o n that they delude others, and 
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the f i n a l misapprehension i s t h e i r owii . Manipulation of character 
i s not so rapid and extreme i n the Snovian manager. 
The technique i s one which u t i l i z e s a natural reaction or 
drive for a r a t i o n a l purpose. The drives of the natural p o l i t i c i a n 
may be more balanced than those of other men, but they are charged 
with a djmamism which can be released - in the case^of anger or 
spontaneity - freeing part of strong elemental w i l l . Control 
i s as mucli a part of the technique as release, while release i s 
int e r a c t i v e ; the other s k i l f u l part of the technique i s to know 
when to control and when to release - when to appear spontaneous, 
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when to reserve oneself . 
Power re l a t i o n s 
I t i s intended only to look b r i e f l y at some instances of 
•rules of thumb' regarding the relation and intent of individuals 
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engaged i n personal p o l i t i c s . Part of the subject has already 
been noted under the section 'Leaders' above. Natural inadequacies 
may make the individual desirous of increasing his self-respect 
through the respect of others; he becomes deteimined and ambitious, 
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intent on functional competition , ^Vhile never digging deeply 
into individual character, Snow does provide working theories, 
sharp enough to deal with h i s topic, which are of limited use i n 
exploring the deeper recesses of psychology. 
Another element of personal povrer i s discussed i n relation 
to persuasion, above: the advantage of arguing from belief - and 
hence the t a c t i c of redefining the argument to take advantage 
of different ground. 
The structure of a relationship denotes the primary dis-
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trib u t i o n of personal pov/er i s based on a se r i e s of needs . 
A needs something which i t i s i n B's power to give, then A i s i n 
B's power. This basic situation may be altered by subsequent or 
concument factors: i t may be that B has l i t t l e choice, r e a l i s t i c a l l y , 
i n giving A what he needs, for other reasons. Kevertheless, t h i s 
i s not j u s t an abstract or l o g i c a l idea, but a relationsship which 
i s emotionally recognised. The giver enjoys h i s power, and 
s a t i s f i e s himself by giving, and by having h i s position of power 
recognised. While there are limitations on his secondary power, 
i . e . over the needing individual, t h i s i s the power relationship 
i n which men find most s a t i s f a c t i o n . 
A s t r i k i n g example of Snow's view i n this area relates to 
space exploration. After suggesting rationalisations, ouch as 
mil i t a r y and s c i e n t i f i c gains. Snow noted: "There i s something 
truer than r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . " Because i t i s technologically 
possible to send up rockets, people do i t , and the "adventurous 27 a t h l e t i c aspect of spa e a c t i v i t i e s " i s not the motivati g ea on. 
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Of course, at the other end of the personal relationship, 
men d i s l i k e the thought of t h e i r own powerlessness, and transfer 
t h i s f e e l i n g of animosity to the source of the s a t i s f a c t i o n of 
t h e i r needs. I s gratitude a true emotion? Probably not, i n 
Snow's ivorld: quite probably i t i s an expected r i t u a l i n certain 
circumstances, vdiich contradicts and usefully covers over the 
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deeply-felt envy and s e l f - d i s l i k e . Paradoxically, gratitude 
i s the price which those with power expect from those who have 
not. 
The extemalisation of objects of blame ( i . e . attribution 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ) i s a self-protection device, which does not 
apply only in power relations. By externalising blame an 
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emotional release, beneficial to the individual, i s obtained , 
This i s more c l e a r l y shoTO away from the tangle of a pure power 
relationship, i n the cases of transmission of bad news. To s t r i p 
these instances to the s k e l e t a l pattern, the situation i s of one 
individual modifying the views, status and position of a receiver 
of information, i n the receiver's eyes. The action i s significant 
to the receiver: on an individual-perception basis, the messenger 
has modified the receiver's position by presenting h i s message 
as much as i f he had the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for physically bringing 
about t h i s transformation. The change may be, i n the f i r s t place, 
blamed upon the messenger. Whether he i s associated with, or taken 
as representative of, the information i s not p r a c t i c a l l y relevant. 
This blaming action i s neither f a i r nor rational, but i s i s 
common, self-protective, sensible i n a limited area. 
By externalising objects of praise, too, the individual 
strengthens hig^elf-respect. Admiring, or finding affection for, 
those who are similar to himself, the individual e f f e c t i v e l y 
80 
loves himself, priaes h i s own q u a l i t i e s . Even extemalisation of 
relationships takes place: the individual talks about himself 
while h i s words r e f e r to another i n a position he interprets 
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as s i m i l a r to h i s own , 
These t r a i t s are described and indicated by Snow. He 
appreciates the benefit of them (for the individual) i n places, 
although generally they are value-free. Power i t s e l f i s an 
exception. Although men are attracted to i t , power i s dangerous, 
blinding the individual to the importance of h i s s o c i a l s e l f , 
severing neariingful connections with others - while, of course, 
of immediate danger to other i n d i v i d u a l s ^ ^ Power also d i s t r a c t s 
attention from more s o c i a l considerations; i n a world view i s 
i t the key to the "weird i n e v i t a b i l i t y " surrounding the question 
of nuclear armaments? As an unspoken assumption, a factor to 
which reference i s never made, the power-desire may permeate 
a l l aspects of s o c i a l l i f e . Perhaps one of Snow's most s i g n i -
f i c a n t achievements i s the r e l a t i o n of t h i s concept to different 
settings and manifestations of common l i f e i n a didactive, dynamic 
form. 
Group behaviour 
Another area of personal p o l i t i c s readily identifiable i n 
Snow's work i s h i s description of group situations. I t has been 
noted above that group decisions are influenced, accoirding to 
Snow, by i d e n t i f i a b l e individual actors, no matter what their form -
democratic or othen^ise. Where a hierarchical form exists, and 
one member i s placed i n a superior position of authority, then the 
power l i n e s may tend to be draim i n his direction, but i n 
committee p o l i t i c s , the situation i s a genuine decision-making 
body and not merely an advisory form, force of personality becomes 
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c r u c i a l l y important. 
The means by which one may exert influence i n a group have 
been discussed i n part above, where no attemT:t was made to 
dis t i n g u i s h between personal p o l i t i c s i n relation to a collection 
of individuals as against a coherent group. The form of a c t i v i t y 
i s the same: one persuades rather than threatens, one influences 
rather than attempts to command. But groups are different i n kind 
to the sum of t h e i r parts: 
"Groups of men, even small groups, act strangely 
d i f f e r e n t l y from individuals. They have l e s s 
hiimour and simpler humour, are more easy to 
frighten, more d i f f i c u l t to charm, distrust the 
mysterious more, and enjoy firm, f l a t , competent 
expositions vrhich man Isy hismelf would find 
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inexcusably d u l l . " 
Group identity i s emotionally reinforced by the emergence 
of climate and tension: "a tension that / s p r i n g s J from man to man 
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l i k e an e l e c t r i c charge." Through i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the 
emotional atmosphere i n the small group c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of closed 
p o l i t i c s , the scope for rational decisions would seem to be limited. 
Perhaps here, as noted above, the pre-formal a c t i v i t i e s during 
which individuals may come to some decision, or reach conclusions 
regarding the r e a l i s t i c scope of action, r e a l i s e t h e i r benefits 
by resolving the parameters of contention outside the influence 
34 
of an i r r a t i o n a l group setting . 
In t h i s sense, the pre-formal i s necessary but not s u f f i c i e n t . 
Of top c i v i l servants i n cominittee. Snow writes: "They were too 
capable to have brought up t h i s scheme in the committee room, 
35 
unless they had found support outside." But once inside a 
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committee, decisions remain to be taken and the manager must 
u t i l i s e h i s persuasive power or influence: 
"Perhaps f o r influence i n the a f f a i r s of s o l i d 
men, one had to be able to send...the 'old 
f a m i l i a r phrases reverberating around.' Neither 
/of two in d i v i d u a l l y gifted and exceptional menJ 
could do that ifithout laughing. To be an influence 
i n any society, i n fact , one can be a l i t t l e 
d ifferent, but only a l i t t l e ; a l i t t l e above one's 
neighbours, but not too much,...neither /of these two 
menJ vras humble enough to leam the language of 
mere ordinary men." 
Here, as elsewhere, one must beware the distinction between 
being "an influence i n any society", with i t s implication of 
continuation, and being ef f e c t i v e i n an issue. The caveat for the 
manager s p e c i f i c a l l y i n r e l a t i o n to groups, i s to observe the i r 
sluggishness, th e i r tendency to the mediocre - and t h i s i s surely 
a function of the limited nature of the ground they hold common, 
which may be passed over without a l e r t i n g controversy - and to 
avoid e i t h e r talking over t h e i r heads ( i n which case one w i l l be 
ignored) or precipitating a preinature, r i g i d formation of opposing 
divisi o n s , thus l i m i t i n g the scope for manouevre and unifying 
compromise. 
The significance of personal p o l i t i c s 
Snow saw that the B r i t i s h system of parliamentary democracy 
"has almost every possible disadvantage, except that a l l other 
37 
systems are s l i g h t l y worse." The, one " r e a l l y drastic disad-
vantage.. . / i s ^ . . . t h a t i t i s almost impossible to get anything 
done i n i t , "with the result that there are " f a r more secret 
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decisions made than when our society was l e s s articulate."^® 
Decisions formulated in closed p o l i t i c s situations thus, at some 
l a t e r stage, become endorsed publicly, rathout decision-making 
power residing i n the public appearance. One important aspect of 
personal p o l i t i c s i s i t s position i n the a f f a i r s of national 
p o l i t i c s . A second aspect i s that personal p o l i t i c s within 
formal decision-making structures i s a function of individual 
int e r a c t i o n and therefore takes place i n a l l such situations. 
Managers and leaders are found i n the smallest organisations 
as well as the l a r g e s t , and the s h i f t s , the manouevres, the 
amibitions are, i n t h e i r essence, common to a l l . 
I n the f i r s t aspect, i n national p o l i t i c s , Snow's attitude 
may seem ambivalent: 
"The r e a l hope was open p o l i t i 3 s . I t must be," 39 
Perhaps because, i n closed p o l i t i c s : "we are much nearer 
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than i n ordinaiy government to personal power and personal choice," 
and the secrecy which distinguishes closed p o l i t i c s leads to 
disconnections with the world outside the closure and the 
appearance of conspiracy, and the danger of alienating the 
"responsible public" from the p o l i t i c a l community, a dichotomy 
vrhich Snow f e l t would be injurious to the community: 
"unless responsible persons feel at one with 
decision-makers, we are going to have a l e s s 
homogeneous and healthy country than we a l l wish 
to see." 
On the one hand, open p o l i t i c s allows adequate representation 
for affected parties, opportunities to equal out extremes of 
character and personal quirks of temperament, but on the other 
hand, at l e a s t in the area of s c i e n t i f i c decisions, for reasons 
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of national security, some decisions must be taken i n secret, 
and of these Snow noted op t i m i s t i c a l l y : 
" F i r s t , you can abolish some, though probably 
not a l l , secret choices / i n t h i s a r e a J as soon 
A O 
as you abolish nation states," 
S i m i l a r l y , to conduct decision-making i n the open a i r , as -
i t were, should on the grounds of Snow's theories, generate a 
climate of opinion based, not upon the collected vasdom of 
responsible men of goodwill and insight (which i s the positive 
gain from open p o l i t i c s , together with the inclusion of such people 
as part of p o l i t i c a l processes) but upon a degenerated l a b e l -
based perception of issues. In certaii/circumstances, (the occasion 
was a debate upon values) i t i s wise not to prod the climate 
by open debate in front of a country or a world, V7hich i s engaged 
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i n judgement. 
Open or closed p o l i t i c s ? Contradictions are found i n 
Snovf's work. Remembering the technique of balancing opposing 
tensions, V7e may t r y to apply t h i s to the situation. I f we take 
the normal c r i t e r i o n of long-term effectiveness as given, perhaps 
the i d e a l guide to decision hinges on the question of v/hether, 
i n a p a r t i c u l a r case, the gains of open p o l i t i c s (the inclusion 
of the opinion and commitment of responsible people) outweigh 
the r i s k s (breach of security, delay, fomentation of an emotional 
atmosphere). To an extent the i n s t i t u t i o n of Royal Commissions, 
Departmental Committees, and Committees of Inquiry may be seen 
as an attempt to maximise the benefits, although Snow does not 
r e f e r to them in forming his theories. As devices for consul-
tation and accumulation of information, they lack any immediate 
power, and the l i m i t s of the i r inquiry are sot, without opon 
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debate, i n advance. 
Closed p o l i t i c s , too, has merits. I t permits a quicker 
response, generally, to a situation, and more immediately 
ef f e c t i v e action - which are evidently two good reasons (possibly 
causes) for i t s development within representative democracy. 
In i t s second aspect, i t s universality, the importance of 
personal p o l i t i c s i s simply that i t i s the normal practice. To 
understand s o c i a l action, one must come to grips with personal 
p o l i t i c s : 
" I mean my description of p o l i t i c s to be taken 
as neutral statements. So f a r as I have been 
able to observe any thing, this i s how the world 
t i c k s . . . I t seems to me important that men of good 
w i l l should make an e f f o r t to understand how the 
world t i c k s , i t i s the only way to make i t t i c k 
better." 
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Chapter S i x 
• .1 -
HOPES AND REFLECTIONS 
Through h i s work Snow has been making an attempt to influence 
both the climate of opinion i n regard to the causes of international 
co-operation, education, governmental reorganisation and peoples' 
regard of the processes of p o l i t i c s . In this chapter i t i s i n -
tended to examine what Snow has provided and how e f f e c t i v e l y this 
has been presented i n terms of an education i n p o l i t i c s . 
Hopes 
" F i r s t , any s o c i a l hope that i s going 
to be any use against the darkness iahead 
w i l l have to be based on a knowledge of 
the worst." ('The State of Siege') 
Snow has a l l i e d himself with the men of action. He sees men 
as flawed creatures no na t u r a l l y ruled by reason, nor necessarily 
motivated to do good, even to themselves; of limited perception, 
whose gatherings are marked by the clash of w i l l s land i n t e i v 
ferences of personal p o l i t i c s , personal imperialism and s a c r i f i c e s 
of i n d i v i d u a l i t y . Men's communal decisions are spiced vrith a 
mixture of the e v i l s of closed p o l i t i c a l processes, where the 
force of the i r r a t i o n a l personality i s strong, and open p o l i t i c s , 
where only gross simplifications are considered relevant. With 
this i n t e l l e c t u a l pessimism comes the man of action's optimism, 
vjhich can see the p o s s i b i l i t y of a Utopian future. 
Snow's main causes i n h i s lectures and periodical a:rticles 
have been with aid for the underdeveloped nations, the management 
of national resources and the introduction of s c i e n t i s t s to 
government. His f i r s t cause i s within the context of becoming 
self-conscious of the species mankind; I n the i d e a l case he 
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would want a l i t e r a l coming-together of Soviet and Western states, 
to organise material aid for the underdeveloped countries, 
apparently with the behaviourally sound idea i n mind that by 
subordinating the i r energies to a common goal which none of them 
can achieve alone, relationships between states w i l l improve^ 
The motivation, or reason, for t h i s action he has described as 
a d e s i r e for self-respect and enlightened s e l f - i n t e r e s t . The 
alternative i s for the in d u s t r i a l i s e d countries to become a 
privileged enclave surrounded by the poor; perhaps t h i s i s 
a r t i s t i c licence, perhaps Snow i s ceilling to mind £in ultimate 
tragedy i n order to induce favour for the ultimate action of co-
operation between those who were formerly enemies. The ultimate 
tragedy can be averted, by states working alone, and although the 
re s u l t s may f a l l short bf Snow's optimistic target they stand the 
2 
chance of avoiding the worst . 
Part of.Snow's hope has come from the prospect of the 
entrance into Government of the s c i e n t i f i c statesman. I t i s his 
thesis that human perceptions are influenced by the cul t u r a l 
atmosphere of their profession, and that the s c i e n t i s t i s pro-
f e s s i o n a l l y orientated towards both an objective vieifpoint, and 
the concept of change i n physical and s o c i a l senses;the s c i e n t i s t 
i s predisposed towards both action and the future, and h i s 
d i s c i p l i n e recognises mankind as one i n i t s common properties. 
The s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e , therefore, has a clear potential for 
moral action, which i s action for human beings, while being, 
simultaneously, a cominunicable s o c i a l pursuit^. 
There i s a l i ^ t glossing over i n Snow's early work here on 
d i s t i n c t i o n between potential and actual. Granted that the 
tendency of the s c i e n t i s t i s nominally to favour tlie s o c i a l there 
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i s no necessary motivation towards moral action. Science and 
technology have transformed the material basis of l i f e , but 
individual products of t h i s transformation may be immoral, or 
harmful, or useless. The claim of s c i e n t i s t s to moral neutrality, 
dedication to knowledge or csireer, does not necessarily void their 
right to advise on technical matters important to governments and 
so c i e t i e s , but i t i s an indication that their influence i n policy-
malcing may conceivably be l e s s than Snow believes. Partly, 
perhaps, because of the mass climate of the times: here Snow's 
concern i s with an educational introduction to s c i e n t i f i c thought, 
to the status of s c i e n t i f i c truths. General ignorance of this 
status i s the cause of the f a i l u r e of understanding between 
4 
s c i e n t i s t s and non-scientists , 
Snow*s ideas on education tend to regard intelligence as a 
resource to be developed, through s c i e n t i f i c education and through 
the s p e c i a l i s e d t r a i n i n g of the e l i t e from an early age^. I n 
addition to the strong national bias, i t i s natural, i n view of 
Snow's biography, that he should take this point of view. His 
Utopian v i s i o n i s achieved on a foundation of the social and 
material, the subject-matter of science and s o c i a l science - his 
th i r d culture^. While h is f i c t i t i o u s characters chase worldly 
success, there i s also something more - getting the power i s the 
f i r s t step, the second i s using i t . 
"Earning a l i v i n g i s a means to an end and 
not an end i n itself...The end i s to make a decent 
society; the end i s to make us l i v e better as 
individuals and i n ovr society. I t i s to give 
worth and. value to our individual and s o c i a l 
lives...and I do not believe they can be disjointed 
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-that we go through these d i f f i c u l t and 
sometimes f r u s t r a t i n g enterprises. By this 
any course of action or any kind of p o l i t i c a l 
or administrative steps must ultimately be 
judged..."*^ 
The minimum i s to ease material and physical discomfort. 
Ifhile the individioal and the s o c i a l cannot be disjointed, the 
enrichment of the individual l i f e comes through subordinating i t s 
cause to that of the s o c i a l . The goal of th i s humanist religion 
i s to a c t fo r others i n a way not harmful to oneself. And i t 
seems that the individual l i f e i s given only undeniable worth and 
value i n a subjective sense i n terms of actions well performed, 
and that only through compartmentalising thoughts and feelings by 
means of the roles he plays does the individual cope with inner 
problems and decisions r e l a t i n g to his environment. The perceptive 
man may le a r n more about himself through competition and action 
than by pure introspection and more us e f u l l y too, since the measure 
of h i s nature i s relevesnt primarily i n i t s r e l a t i o n to others, 
from whom a l l s a t i s f a c t i o n s eventually flow. 
Snow argues that only by r e s t r i c t i n g the focus of their 
concentration - by s e l e c t i v e l y forgetting, i . e . assuming defined 
roles - individuals control t h e i r temperament. I n the f i r s t place 
t h i s must lead to an admission of the inner duality of the 
i r r a t i o n a l and r a t i o n a l i t y , and the ideal place of reason as 
arbiter of desires. I n the second place, the individual assumes 
public roles and through role-playing r e s t r i c t s the c r i t e r i a for 
decision and action to manageable proportions. Roles also provide 
s a t i s f a c t i o n by structuring the individual l i f e , making a niche 
g 
into vjhich the inner s e l f may be rested . 
Snow both accepts'^ and recommends compartmentalisation. 
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Perhaps the attraction of roles i s that they contain the promise 
of s t a b i l i t y s i m i l a r to tradition and habit, vfhich are half-way 
houses between reason and unreason. The successful, i n Snow's 
world, are those with control over the i r m u l t i p l i c i t y of personae: 
the mentally i l l are so by predisposition; the "subtle" men are 
driven by a. f l u i d c o n f l i c t of motives, causing them to s h i f t 
i d e n t i t y and opinion with a frequency and rapidity which i s 
ultimately self-destructive? the self-defeating are those who do 
not know, can barely .control, and arj/constantly deceiving, 
themselves. 
Slelf-deceit i s obviously no rare occurrence, and by 
compartmentalising themselves. Snow's successful men may evidence 
a kind of schizoid behaviour. There are obvious functional 
advantages: one aets aside one's judge's cap to become a candidate -
one acknowledges, l i k e Pooh-Bah, the different grounds on which 
decisions must be taken. Perhaps the advantages for the individual 
of the public persona are offset to an extent by the constraints 
and roles he i s , through i t , c a l l e d upon to play. This compart-
mentalisation can, more seriously however, cut off one's actions 
from r e f l e c t i o n s upon morality. 
9 
Snow accepts the danger of t h i s - and i t s usefulness . 
Sel f - d e c e i t w i l l always play a part, and men may have to persevere 
i n situations of moral ambiguity. Whether they are "hoping for 
the best", however, or merely l i v i n g with t h e i r eyes on the 
ground i s another matter^^. Managers need a complex moral code, 
and Snow has demonstrated this point, but his arguments seem to 
r e l y upon an underlying notion of decency, a concession to 
conscience, b u i l t into the fibre of individuals. Managers may 
be without a moral code at a l l ; and i t i s these managers \iho seem 
to appear at the 'next impulse' i n p o l i t i c s . While we may accept 
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Snow's picture of the 'second rate man' as c i v i l servant or 
p o l i t i c i a n of the 1960s, i t i s useful to note that, even within 
h i s f i c t i t i o u s world, men are not a l l taken care of by Security, 
are not a l l disbarred by the c r i t e r i o n of i l l e g a l p o l i t i c a l action. 
A l l , i n fact, that Snow offers to solve the schizoid perceptual 
problems, and the new power p o l i t i c s , i s respectively an injunction 
to r e f l e c t from time to time upon morality, and to meet the power-
p o l i t i c i a n with an equal td.ll^^o 
A s i m i l a r ambiguity e x i s t s i n his attitudes towards closed 
and open p o l i t i c s . I n Government the tendency towards closed 
p o l i t i c s i s for the sake of increasing the amomit of room to 
manouevre, and the amount of power accrued. To understand 
p o l i t i c s , i n Snow's view, the precondition, t g ^ t e l l i g e n t p o l i t i c a l 
action, i t i s not enough to be aware only of p o l i t i c a l ideologies 
nor i s i t enough to know the interaction of the personalities 
involved, for the actual process of p o l i t i c s l i e s i n neither 
personal nor theoretical but i n such a melange of both that 
only i n t h e i r different natures are they identified. 
I t i s arguable that, although ^now may have wanted to reach 
a conclusion that open p o l i t i c s are preferable to closed, his 
attitude i s b a s i c a l l y more complex and too pragmatic to do so. 
The dangers of open p o l i t i c s may outweigh the i r benefits, so that 
i n a p a r t i c u l a r case the effect of layman's l a b e l l i n g may be more 
deleterious to sensible p o l i t i c a l action than the advantage of 
having informed opinion. Open p o l i t i c s does not necessarily mean 
p o l i t i c s opent.to the entire electorate, however. In the sense 
that p o l i t i c a l decisions should involve more opinions rather than 
l e s s - e s p e c i a l l y expert opinion - his i n c l i n a t i o n tovrards open 
p o l i t i c s i s more consistent. Also, insofar as he expect con-
su l t a t i o n and diflsussion to create s o l i d a r i t y beti/een governors 
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and governed, he i s drav.Ti tovmrds pleading the open p o l i t i c s 
12 
case . 
On the other hand, i t i s evident that closed p o l i t i c s may 
not only be quick and more effective, especially i n c r i s e s and 
i n issues of adninistration, or necessary in cases or technology 
or defence, but that only i n certain closed p o l i t i c a l situations, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n pre-formal discussion, a s l i g h t l y greater element of 
r a t i o n a l i t y may be brought to bear on the matter. To say that certain 
examples of closed p o l i t i c s w i l l cease - in the s c i e n t i f i c and 
m i l i t a r y areas - v^hen nation-states are abolislied i s looking a 
13 
long way ahead, perhaps too f a r for relevance . 
Perhaps this dichotomy i s explicable only i n terms of vievj-
point. Those i;ho have the power w i l l have to trade off t h e i r 
preference for qualified secrecy with t h e i r desire to maintain 
contact s u f f i c i e n t for adequate opinion and respect to be expressed. 
Those who have a cause should approach and educate the larger 
climate of opinion. Although Snow does not make this clear, 
perhaps the education of the climate of opinion i s only a necessary 
strategy i n issues which l i e on the boundaries of vdiat i t w i l l 
accept, and vdthin the boundaries newly-defined new forms of 
personal p o l i t i c s w i l l f l o u r i s h and act. 
Snow i s undoubtedly in favour of the manipulation of the 
14 
climate, he recognises the power of propaganda , and his attitude 
seems to be on the side of society against the individual. Either 
he r e l i e s on i n s t i n c t i v e decency, or nore checks and balances 
in the democratic tradition, or he i s prepared to condene the 
t o t a l i t a r i a n state for the sake of the good which may come out 
of i t ^ ^ . 
I n order to educate his public i n the processes of p o l i t i c s 
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Snow attacks the "great man," and the "conspiratorial" images of 
p o l i t i c s . The "great man" i s too close to r a t i o n a l i t y , even 
omniscience, to figure i n the mixture of chance, limited a l t e r -
natives and persuasion typifying p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ^ ^ , The 
"conspiratorial" groups argument i s tenuous to the^-point that 
one suspects i t i s the result of regarding conspiracy as an 
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"impermissible term" , and defining s t r i c t l y to r e s t r i c t the 
debate to terms of reference of Snow's choosing. 
The t a c i t agreement which E l i o t enters i n Corridors of Povrer. 
the pre-formal a c t i v i t i e s of discussion and preparation before 
formal decision-making, the "largely unspoken" agreement by the 
establishment, are s i g n i f i c a n t l y domesticated, are not given a 
l a b e l l i n g term. As Snow seems to take i t , conspiracy refers to 
an i l l e g a l agreement v;hich, i s both e x p l i c i t and self-interested, 
and i n breach of formal r u l e s . The cruder pictures which., 
ideologists, i n thei r wilder moments, paint of conspiracies are 
obviously behaviourally excluded, yet in outline and effect, the 
ideologist succeeds i n presenting a rough interpretation of p o l i t i c s . 
In a sense, yes, there are conspiracies; only they are unspoken, 
or only p a r t i a l l y made clear. There i s pure self-seekingness, 
only i t goes on without words. 
Two points may clear t h i s ground a l i t t l e : one concema the 
a c t i v i t i e s seen as conspiratorial and one the term i t s e l f . F i r s t , 
i f a conspiracy involves i l l e g a l i t y , then the devolution into 
private groups of men engaged i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s not 
conspiratorial - othen^ise one i s led into the' f a l l a c y that 
completely open discussion i s the only alternative to conspiracy. 
This alternative has so many functional disadvantages that i t i s 
unlikely ever to become popular. The reasonable course.is to 
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discuss and i n q u i r e , and formulate agreements prior to the formal 
occasions. 
Secondly, i t i s arri^uably the case that the interpretation 
of a groups as " i n agreement" or " i n conspiracy" depends upon 
emotional emphasis. One agrees to do something, one conspires 
against someone. Snow seems to be associating the r i s e of con-
spracy theories with paranoia, the state i n which one loses one's 
sense of f a c t , or forgets one's experience, or f a i l s to see 
events i n perspective. He implies that mores governing the mode 
of p o l i t i c a l action do distinguish between conscious plot and 
t a c i t agreement. When he uses the concept 'conspiracy' he 
presents i t as an inaccurate product of ignorance which believes 
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that by such means p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s maintained • 
I t i s necessary for Snow to refute conspiratorial p o l i t i c s , 
because otherv/ise h i s own ideas could be, without-great care-
lessness, taken as such. The sophisticated morel code of his 
manager f i t s events into none of the categories by which simpler, 
purer or more e v i l people judge t h e i r actions. I t i s necessary 
at once for him to demonstrate the potential for good and wickedness 
i n p o l i t i c s unhindered by doctrinal and disapproved conceptual 
frameworkso 
The d i f f i c u l t i e s of associating Snow'si^utopiah v i s i o n 
with a r e a l i s t i c goal i n the l i g h t of his analysis of p:esent 
p o l i t i c s are considerable. As Stephen Toulmin observed "Snow's 
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sense of the r e a l i t i e s of power seems to me to have f a i l e d him," 
The ideas malce more sense seen as the product of emotional 
optimism, and as a goal Tjhich may inspire progress a l i t t l e way 
towards i t s achievement. 
Points i n Snow's theories concerning the merits of closed 
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and open p o l i t i c s , and compartmentalisation - concerning, i n 
fact, secrecy and the basis of decisipns, approach c r u c i a l areas 
of p o l i t i c s without coming to clear resolutions. 
Snow has not claimed to provide any easy answers, although 
20 
Le Carre's caricature of a "philosophy of bewilderment" seems 
extreme. Snow has defined the grounds, and given some exanples, 
of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . I n addition to the mechanics of personal 
p o l i t i c s , and the interplay of theoretical and expected a c t i v i t y 
with personal p o l i t i c s , he has provided a moral framework to which 
i t i s inherently within human capacity and i n t e r e s t to aspire. 
He accepts, and i n the maaner of acceptance promotes, compromise 
both i n man's r e l a t i o n to h i s fellowmen and i n h i s relation to 
his sense of morality. His emphasis i n p o l i t i c a l and individual 
a c t i v i t y upon decisions and persuasion underlines the care vath 
which men should approach decision-making, the frequency of the 
challenges to human aims, definitions of the environmental 
situation, and individual identity. He accepts, and confirms, 
the benefits of the ego, the screen of self-eoncem through vrhich 
the suffering of the world i a muted, and includes the vanity which 
leads to ambition among the virtues of character. He provides a 
behavioural c r i t e r i o n for normal and healthy human beings. 
He has put forward demonstrations of his view that the 
individual must manage, organise, attempt to control his l i f e , 
and i n the coiarse of so demonstrating, he has drawn together 
strands from various d i s c i p l i n e s , including those from the manage-
ment science movement of the 1950s, behavioiural science or s o c i a l 
psychology, individual psychology and p o l i t i c s . Management 
s c i e n t i s t s are close to Snow i n that they, too, are preoccupied 
22 
with how men work together i n i n s t i t u t i o n s , but they g-enerally 
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spare themselves the task 'of erecting moral frameworks or detailed 
theories of the individual and h i s need for the role and the 
i n s t i t u t i o n . 
Didacticism 
"The relevant question i s whether the means 
he has chosen are suited to what he has to 
say and whether he says i t well with these 
means." 23 
There was patently a d i a c t i c intent on CP. Snow's part 
i n w riting his novels. Througja f i c t i o n he has presented a way 
i n which the individual may regard and act i n s o c i a l processes, 
to the mutual advantage of himself and others, i n a fonn wherein 
the p i l l of advice and warning i s sugared with entertainment and 
an opportunity to become involved i n a vicarious manner i n p o l i t i c s . 
Dwight Waldo writes: 
" I f a student of organisations were looking, then, not 
j u s t for a r t i s t i c , i f f i c t i t i o u s 'examples', but 
for sources of insig^it, even for hypotheses, perhaps 
he could with profit turn to the novelist." 24 
He continues to express a set of views not dis s i m i l a r to Snow's 
own: on the necessity of distinguishing between the individual's 
" b i o l o g i c a l l y given nature" and the r e s u l t s "of the s p e c i f i c 
c u l t u r a l impact" - the "problem of the nature of human nature, of 
25 
what i s given and i t s possible and desireable p l a s t i c i t y " : on 
the approach of the meliorist, "that, on balance, the contemporary 
human s i t u a t i o n (at l e a s t i n the West), for a l l i t s problems and 
dangers, i s preferable to any previous situation", or that i t i s 
impossible to turn back the clock to a simpler age, while supposing 
that human beings " s t i l l have some sig n i f i c a n t control of th e i r destinies. 
.,26 
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This i s close to a rationale for Snow's type of writing, 
which, though broader i n scope than Waldo's idea of an "organisation 
novel" subscribes to the view that "novelists could give 
tremendously valuable aid i n helping vis find our way through the 
27 
incredibly thick and organisational jungle" , and also t h r o u ^ 
other modem complexities of individual and s o c i a l existence. 
Using t h i s form. Snow has considerably extended the c i r c l e of his 
audience beyond that which would receive or peruse more academic 
or t h e o r e t i c a l works. Far t of the price of this broadened 
readership i s his neglect by serious, academic p o l i t i c a l theorists. 
One relevant query which a r i s e s at t h i s point i s to the extent 
to which Snow's s o c i a l purpose has been compromised by h i s evident 
a r t i s t i c ambition. 
Thei commentators, for example, why do they a l l tend to see 
something different i n Snow's work? V/hat i s the reaction upon a 
reader v7ho, v/ithout previous experience of Snow, reads one novel 
of the s e r i e s ? Would he not exclaim with confusion as paranoid 
suspicions are proved correct, and the predictions of "sensible 
men" palpably proved wrong? Would he not necessarily overlook 
the factor of the narrator's development, errors and s h i f t s ? 
In extrapolating what seem to be the general theories under-
l y i n g the novels i t has been necessary to r e l y upon several sources 
for the simple reason that what i s treated with ambiguity i n one 
28 
work may be made clear i n another, vrhat i s approved in passing 
i n one novel may be analysed i n another, the fragmented s t r a i n may 
i n another place reveal i t s e l f more clearly as a theme; the almost-
unspoken s o c i a l hope of the novels i s only c l a r i f i e d in the 
lectures and a r t i c l e s . Use of the general theories as a framework 
leads to a greater awareness and understanding of the source 
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material i t s e l f . 
For Snow, one could r e a l i s t i c a l l y voice the reply that the 
provision of pre-novel structure would not be appreciated by the 
general public. On the other hand i t i s arguable that Snow i s 
a r t i s t i c a l l y obscure i n a l l but the simplest points he makes, and 
th i s as a r e s u l t of his desire to present h i s theoretical ideas 
i n a form which demonstrates them i n action and retains contact 
with in d i v i d u a l experiences, so that characters are used, not 
caricatures. I n New Lives for Old we have an exarayle of a work 
which i s vnritten i n a simpler s t y l e , l e s s intent on an accurate 
simulation, where the actors are obvious mouthpieces and the ideas 
c l e a r l y and d i d a c t i c a l l y a r t i c u l a t e d . 
While interesting to the p o l i t i c a l and behavioursl student 
New Lives for Old i s not good f i c t i o n . I t reached no wide 
audience, and was therefore an unsuitable form through which to 
take the meliorist's viewpoint into the l i t e r a r y camp. On the 
other hand. Snow's b e l i e f s are nowhere so c l e a r l y articulated i n 
29 
any one place - indeed, completely opposite views nay be aired 
on the basis of a passing acquaintance with Snow's other work. 
The lesson to be dram from t h i s i s that the novels w i l l have no 
far-reaching effects on the casual. For the serious reader, who 
i s l i k e l y i n future to read the ser i e s as a wliole i n i t s three-
volume form, part of t h i s misunderstanding w i l l not occur. 
Perhaps one could argue that the novels are enough, that 
they demonstrate, beyond the c ^ a c i t y of any theoiy, the processes 
of personal p o l i t i c s and how the individual can go about deciding 
i n h i s life^°, but whtile conceding the advantages of the form, 
considering the m u l t i p l i c i t y of examples presenter;!, the solutions, 
supposing they are found, to the human and s o c i a l condition lack 
99 
order and c l a r i t y , as one gropes for types by which to ascribe 
meaning to all-too-individual events. Although Snow has claimed 
that h i s novels are reducible, the resolutions reached i n any 
work are incomplete, ar« notes of continuity rather than summary, 
and must be treated xfith caution. Any return to ultimate themes 
does not provide what i t may appear to - an e ^ l a n a t i o n of the 
i n t r i c a t e manouevres vrhich have gone before. The themes which, 
i n interaction, may be noted as a general explanation of these 
manouevres, appear i n a kind of spurious chronology v;hich d i s -
regards a l l notions of summaries and conclusions. Because the 
"objective" observer - the narrator - eges and changes his view-* 
point even his best intentioned and most l u c i d conclusions must 
be seen i n context and thus qualified. 
Snow's i s predominantly a behaviouralist approach to p o l i t i c s , 
of perceptions l i m i t i n g and defining actions, of r a t i o n a l i t y 
which aspires to but never reaches Weberian strength, of how the 
a c t i v i t y of p o l i t i c s i s pursued i rather than why. So i t seems 
vulnerable to Bernard Crick's c r i t i c i s m that a l l models of p o l i t i c a l 
behaviour assume of beg questions of p o l i t i c a l philosophy^^, 
This i s arguably true so f a r as the novels are concerned. 
Snow the novelist i s not a philosopher and to the extent that 
philosophy i s apparent i n h i s novels i t i s demonstrated in intei^-
action with p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . Oriented towards action, Snow i s 
i n the position of advancing the ' a s - i f argument, of the validation 
of practice, i n response to philosophical questions. Ideologies 
are presented through various individual characters, primarily as 
phenomena, and they are tested i n action - demonstrated rather 
than argued. The points on which Snow presses - conscience and 
innate goodness, for example - he does in conditions closely related 
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to experiences, not abstraict thought. His method indicates a 
b e l i e f that moral c r i s e s emerge from within everyday experience 
and that 'philosophy' i s consequently fonned by r e f l e c t i o n upon 
the a l l u v i a of daily decisions and a c t i v i t i e s , (although, 
paradoxically, E l i o t sets off with h i s aims and devices intact) 
In the lectures. Snow's viewpoint i s made r-ore apparent, though 
the d e t a i l s are scattered, 
A reasonable second c r i t i c i s m of the behaviouralist study, i s 
that without a complementary study of i n s t i t u t i o n s , i t produces an 
unbalanced picture. To an extent, inst i t u t i o n s are the backdrop 
to Snow's presentations. They are acknowledged i n action and i n 
interaction with individuals, and Snow has not attempted a com-
prehensive analysis of B r i t i s h i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure. He 
presents key points of the p o l i t i c a l processes, i n Whitehall and 
V^estminster, i n terms of the atmosphere and personal p o l i t i c s , 
within the i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework. 
Michael Oakeshott has expressed the view that p o l i t i c s i s 
only understood as a self-moved or complete a c t i v i t y when the 
c 
empirical business of attending to the general arrangements of a 
set of people, together with the scheme of ends to be pursued,which 
i s the product of systems of ideas abstracted from experience, are 
recognised as being dependent upon a traditional manner of 
33 
behaviour . 
Snow has produced a simulation of empirical a c t i v i t y , the 
34 
process of ideologies forming, and t h e i r constraining effects . 
To a (lertain extent he presents an h i s t o r i c a l study, too, as his 
books span f i f t y years of the twentieth century. While the 
h i s t o i r i c a l periods are often acknowledged, or even shut out, of 
Snow's novels, and there are few period pieces - of .nevfs or of 
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fashion, f o r example - the signs of time's v;ork on i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d 
35 
relationships and social feeling are exemplified , and Passant, 
Calvert, March, Martin E l i o t , Quaife, Charles and the Malcontents, 
are children of t h e i r time, symbolic of th e i r age, and faced by 
the decisions of t h e i r age. Although almost bald of sensory 
d e t a i l , Snow's v/ritings produce one picture of "what people have 
thought and said about what happened: the history, not of p o l i t i c a l 
ideas, but of the manner of our p o l i t i c a l thinking."^^ 
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35 "CP. Snow Times I:arch 13th, 1971, p. 17. 
36 ^Challenge to the I n t e l l e c t s ' op.cit, p , i i i , 
37 Fison: Twentieth..Cent-urv 167 (June I960) p. 570, 
38 Greacen: The World of CP.Snow (l962) p f l l . 
39 Karl op.cit, p. 3. 
40 Cooper 'C,P. Snow' Longmans (l959). p.30. 
41 Last Things cf. ch.14 'End of a Line' p.121 f f . c f . 
Homecomings p.158. 
Notes to Chapter Three 
1 For example, Irene ejid George in The Sleep of Reason p.231 
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and also ch.30, and liark i n The Malcontents ch.27. Even 
understanding does not necessarily e n t a i l control: Karl, 
CP. Snow; the P o l i t i c s of Conscience p.62. The Light and the 
Dark Eacaiillan (196I) London pp.108, 163. 
2 As an everyday measure: the sick and the well: 
" I f e l t some.of that zest - disgraceful and yet not to be 
denied - which came from being well in the presence of someone 
v;ho-.-couldn't be well again." Last Things, p. 140 
3 e.g. The Affaiyp.185. The Sleep of Reason p.299. The "Adamic 
f a c t " of Auschwitz. 
4 e.g. The A f f a i r p.233 - G e t l i f f e i s "trapped" by the interplay 
c f forces, of vjhich h is conscience i s one. For the general 
view, Hansard 18th Jiine I968, p. 540. 
5 The Two Cultures and, a Second Look op. c i t . pp.76-77. 
6 K a r l : The P o l i t i c s of Conscience op.cit. p.4. 
7 Decision-making requires the individual to define his identity 
i n terms of desires and values. The self-defeating are so 
because they do not know what their unconscious wants are, 
e.g. Hankins, The Hew' Nen p.221. R.S. Robinson in Homecomings 
p.42, and therefore cannot guard against those which are 
self-destructive. 
8 The loss of humanity i s evident in The Sleep of Reason. 
9 Hansard vol. 275: (1966-67) pp.66-7. 
10 A humanistic solution to a concept s i ' i i l a r to Original Sin: 
cf. The Sleep of Reason p.299, 'On Magnanimity' (l962) p.7: 
"Virtue ex i s t s i n action." 
11 lilxamples include Howard, i n The A f f a i r , who i s cleared of 
frMUd, but I'ound guilty of p.rofe.'.;jional irresponuibiJ.ity, 
and Geor^-je Pas^^ant in the novel o f the same nauie, cleared of 
corrupting youthful morals on the .rounds of being a child of 
I l l 
h i s time; ch. 41 'Getliffe's Speech.' 
12 Snow distinguishes them, at, e.g. The Sleep of Reason p.367 
and Last Things ch.23 'Lying Awake' p.197: "Judgement? Well, 
thinlcing with displeasure on what I had done was a kind of 
judgement." 
13 The Kalcontents p.251: "A common sense of danger or purpose, 
and you vfere l i v i n g alongside those whom fate had given you." 
14 The personal story of Lewis E l i o t i s one of mental readjust-
ment to f u l l y include the healthier external orientation which 
Snow sees as necessary for normal hunan beings. The turning 
point i s shovm in Homecomings, cf.. ch. 54 'Come with Me' and 
p.154, ib i d . The p o s s i b i l i t y of some form of adjustment or 
control through an exercise of '.vill i s the cr i t e r i o n of mental 
health, but i t i s limited, cf. The Sleep of Reason p.328, 
7he analogy of training i s the closest: e.g. The Af f a i r p.39: 
Lewis has had to " t r a i n and di s c i p l i n e " himself out of being 
suggestible, 
15 "One looks outside to other lives...each of those other l i v e s 
has the same irremediable components as one's own; but there 
are also components th^t one can help. I t i s i n this tiny 
extension of the personality, i t i s this seizing on the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of hope, that we become f u l l y human: i t i s a 
way to improve the quality of one's l i f e : i t i s for oneself the 
beginning of the s o c i a l condition." (emphasis added). The 
Two Cultures and a Second Look op.cit. pp.76-77.. 
16 'On Ilagnanimity' (1962) p. 17. 
17 i b i d . The difference betvjeen the "vanities" i s c r u c i a l to 
an understanding of self-respecto 
1.8 i b i d , (A quotation froK The Masters p.5l) 'On Magnanimity' 
continues; "V/e have to for^jive ourselves; v/e have to f i i i d out 
what good there i s i n us, vre have to try to be better than we are." 
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19 The Masters, op.cit. p.286. 
20 e.g. The toasters pp.86-87 ( l a s t paragraph of ch.1l). 
The New lien p. 131 ("once 6he f e l t ICartin'.s love...", e t c . ) 
An exairdnation of Snow's theme of love could usefully begin 
at t h i s point, but t h i s work must leave i t there and continue 
to follow p o l i t i c s . Snow's ideal picture of a love-relationship 
i s one in which there are no secrets between the partners, 
who enjoy a f u l l sensual, sexual relationship with one 
another. i 
As Goreham Davis (l965 op.cit.) notes, the motivational force 
for inan;>'' Snovian characters i s "the need for vroraen and the 
need for success" ( p . l 4 ) . Aside from the power-relations 
i m p l i c i t i n sex, and tlie type of judgenent a love-relationship 
brings, sex serves as a legitimate outvvard-directed form of 
transcendence of individuality. 
Snow recognises, therefore, the important depth of experience 
sex provides; e.g. The New aen p. 163. Yet i t i s a distraction 
from one's potential for moral s o c i a l action to concentrate 
upon eroticism; e.g. Homecomings, p.206, Corridors of Power, 
pp.204-205, and on p.150, where a man of action's marriage 
i s not"all-excluding; but strong, a comfort, an a l l i a n c e . " 
21 c f . ch.IV, below, on Persuasion. 
22 K a r l : The P o l i t i c s of Conscience, pp.28-29. 
Typical examples are Quaife's choice between defending his 
brother-in-law and preserving his own safety. Corridors of 
Power pp.57-59. 
Martin E l i o t ' s choice - The New Men, ch.27 'An Uneffaceable 
Af terrnoon.' 
Lewis E l i o t : Homecomings ch.33 'Pathology of Spectators', 
fiimilar to The Ilalcontents chs. 22-28. 
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23 Actions pursued for the sake of conscience can be equally 
" s e l f i s h " - i . e . not geared to action so much as gestures to 
salve self-respect, e.g. The Malcontents p,203. VJhile Charles 
Ilarch's conscience (The Conscience of the Rich) i s a side 
conscience. 
24 cf. The Masters p.90; 
The A f f a i r , p.167: "Ke had been manipulating the college 
for a generation. He was cunning, he knew a l l the ropes, he 
did not invent dilemmas of conscience for himself. He 
wanted the mastership, and he would, do anything within the 
ru l e s to get i t . But i t had to be^  vdthin the rules; and that 
was why men trusted him. Those rules.were set, not by 
conscience, but by a code of behaviour.,," 
The implication i s that conscience, a natural drive, i s not 
reason-based, and that a code of behaviour i s more useful i n 
s o c i a l situations, Show's p o l i t i c s are more the p o l i t i c s of 
decency than of conscience, 
25 K a r l : The P o l i t i c s of Conscience pp.29, 40. 
26 The Light aJid the Dark ch.36 'The end of a Reproach.' 
The forces in men are triggered by external a c t i v i t y , ao 
that parts^ of their nature are accentuated by fortuitous 
circui;:stance: e.j> The Masters p,47. Snow uses .a'memory-
trigger as a technique of writing, thus emphasising the point: 
eig. The New I'!en p. 184. The Sleep of Reason p.403. 
27 "Free choice. Who had free choice? Did any of us? We f e l t 
c e r t a i n that we did. Vfe had to l i v e as i f vre did,,.V/e had to 
believe that we could choose. L i f e was too ridiculous unless 
we believed that...¥e had to act as i f i t were true...That 
was an old ansvxer. Perhaps i t was the best we could find." 
The Sleep of Reason ch.36 'Let Down or Frustration.' p.387. 
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cf. ch.IV, below, note 62. 
28 Sheila does not have the capacity for i t , Homecomings p.44. 
Irene "did not possess i n the sli g h t e s t the g i f t , so desire-
able i n the l i f e of a f f a i r s , of being able to keep the right 
hand from knowing what the l e f t i s doing." (The Aff a i r p.48). 
Calvert also: The Light and the Dark (MacBillan) p.71. 
29 c f . Karl, op.cit. pp.50, 57. 
Nightingale cannot find "detachment from the pain" of h i s 
envy and frus t r a t i o n , and "suffered meanly, strugjyling l i k e 
a r a t , determined to wound as well as be vraunded." (The 
Masters, p. 136). 
30 cf. The A f f a i r , p.167; 
The New Men, p.96, on emotion; 
Last Things, p. 121 on"corrupt humanity." 
Corridors of Power, p.117, on pride. 
31 The s t r i k i n g example i n Homecomings ch.10. 'No Letter i n the 
Roam' of the value of egotism. Also the Masters ch.29 'A 
Vacancy i n the Office of Master' and The Malcontents chs. 15 & 16. 
32 e.g. Fateman: who'"won't believe i t whatever happens. I t ' s 
j u s t as well. He couldn't face i t i f he did.'" The Sleep of 
Reason p.250. I n ib i d , p.403 Lewis wonders "Was anyone tough 
enough to look at himself, as he r e a l l y was, without sentiment-
a l i t y or mercy, a l l the time?" 
33 The New Hen, p.183. 
The A f f a i r , p.131. 
Homecomings p. 118. 
34 The Masters p.38: ' " I f one always stopped supporting people 
Vfhose election vrould bring one the slight e s t advantage, i t 
would be remarkably s i l l y . ' " 
35 Corridors of Power p.320: ' " I f we vrorried about that sort of 
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consideration, Lewis, we should never do anythin/j, should 
we?"' 
36 e,g. Passant; Strangers.; and'Brothers Kacjnillan (l966) p.300. 
cf. K a r l op.cit. pp,2S-30. Ronald Person: "Do you.realise.,. 
that I'm only sixty-ttro?" Corridors of Power p.72. 
37 A conscious e f f o r t of w i l l , rather than the rationalisation 
for succumbing to temption i s very rare, or even i l l u s o r y -
Last Thing;;, p. 136. 
38 In New Lives for Old, for example, Vanden and Pilgrim see no 
p r a c t i c a l choice as to which side i n the revolutionary c i v i l 
war they must j o i n ; philosophical questions of right are 
considered not relevant, p.333. cf. also Corridors of Power 
p.268, for p o l i t i c s as purely the art of the possible and safe. 
39 The Malcontents, pp.194-196. . 
40 i b i d , pp.198-199. This process i s s t r i k i n g l y similar to 
Snow's idea of the formation of a climate of opinion, ch.IV, 
below, 'Vrtio has the Pov^er?' 
41 Mew Lives f or Old p.321 - part of the delay may be due to the 
individual wishing to savour his situation of choice. Also 
Last Things p.104. 
42 The Malcontents, p.198. 
43 ib i d , p.203. 
44 'Insight" i s a fixed perceptual property e.g. T'he A f f a i r p. 186 
The New Men, p.191. 
Insight into oneself i s necessary to control i r r a t i o n a l 
impulses; The Sleep of Reason, p.231. 
Compartmentalisation, however, indicates a continuous process 
of s e l e c t i v e amnesia, or perhaps peripheral vision, i n order 
to at once take note of baser motives and aspire to bettering 
oneself, ibid, ch.37-'Forgetting.' 
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45 i b i d , p.387 "Morality existed only i n action..." 
46 'Personal P o l i t i c s i n the Novels of CP. Snow' Critique vol.2, 
(1958) pp.16-28. 
47 The New Men ch.25 'Standard Roses i n the Sunshine.' 
48 Stanford, op.cit. p.23. 
49 i b i d , p.20. He notes that the c r u c i a l decision i s made purely 
on ideological grounds - The Masters ch.33. 'That which dies 
Last . • 
50 Stanford op.cit. p.22. 
51 i b i d , l o c . c i t . 
52 The Sleep of Reason pp.82-83. 
53 A p a r a l l e l i s drawn i n the second election. G.S. Clark 
represents the growing Conservative element in the 1950s. 
Ince s e l e c t s him as an "independent" while Orbell, on a 
personal basis, protests "he's a ridiculous monster." 
(The A f f a i r , p.259). Clark wins the election, The Sleep of 
Reason, p.85. 
54 i b i d , p.299. 
55 i b i d , p.193. 
56 Corridors of Power, p.203. 
57 I n some cases, at l e a s t . Functional judgements appear 
throughout Snov/'s work, ususally as r e l a t i v e l y undisputed 
observations, preliminary, and i n a sense separate from, 
hypotheses as to character. Usually functional judgements 
summarise personal h i s t o r i e s of professional success and 
f a i l u r e , wealth and status of the indiividual. 
e.g. The A f f a i r , pp.10, 190-191. 
The Conscience of the Rich, p.14. 
Homecomings p. 17. 
58 The Sleep of Rea^ion. pp. 389-390. 
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59 Corridors of Power, p.81, and p. 62 on the "optimism which 
makes a g i l f betv/een men of action and purely r e f l e c t i v e men, 
which makes a man in s e n s i t i v e to defeat u n t i l i t has r e a l l y 
happened." 
60 " I n t e l l e c t u a l l y , I am deeply pesriiriisticj on the other hand... 
I f i n d a sort of emotional optimism com.ing though." Hansard 
vol. 315 (1971) p.234. 
61 e.g. "^'orriders of Pov/er p. 170. 
62 David Rubin i s an example of a contemplative, vrho trusts his 
analysis, not his feeling. The Sleep of Reason, p.151. Also 
at Corridors of Power ch.35 'A Choice.' 
63 "Like most devoted p o l i t i c i a n s , he was r e a l i s t i c about 
everything i n / p o l i t i c s / - except his ov/n chances." 
Corridors of Power p.218. 
64 This i s not unavoidably the case. Conscience' alone may te 
devoid of human affection. The extension of personality i s 
then minimal, but perhaps i n action-oriented terms the deed 
i s more important than the intent to a l l but the doer: The 
A f f a i r ch.7. 'The Component of Contempt.' 
Notes to Chapter Four 
1 Last Things, p.97. 
2 i b i d , p.130. Also The New Men p.212. 
3 Science and Government. Oxford University Press, (196I) 
London p.56. 
4 i b i d , l o c . c i t . 
5 i b i d , p.57. 
6 i b i d , p.60, 
7 i b i d . p,63. 
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8 Last Things p.130. 
9 The Masters pp.78 and 175 for the formal rules. 
10 Appendix to The Masters , p.302. 
11 i b i d . p.184 "...we enjoyed... the chance of asserting ourselves 
against our candidate." , and pp.95, 188-9. 
12 cf. Victor F e r k i s s , 'The L i t e r a r y Approach to P o l i t i c s . ' 
Thought 31 (Autumn 1956) p,350, 
13 For 'vote,'' one may substitute any public decision, cf. The 
A f f a i r pp.42-3, and ch. 28 'The Sound of F a l s i t y . ' for an 
example of neglect of the persuasion aspect of decision-making. 
14 T}ie Masters ch. 33 'That Which Dies Last.' i . e . a man's image 
of himself; cf. New Lives for Old pp. 66, 76. 
15 The A f f a i r p.99: "Hypocrites who saw the naked truth and acted 
quite contrary...were a romantic conception. Those whom we c a l l 
hypocrites simply had a g i f t for denying to themselves what 
the truth was." ^ 
16 E.W. Mandel, 'CP. Snow's Fantasy of P o l i t i c s . ' .Queen's 
Quarterly vol.69, No.1 (Spring 1962) p.35. 
17 Corridors of Power p.234. 
18 i b i d . ch. 33 'A Kan Called Honteith.' 
19 Introduction to The Jew i n a Gentile World Arnold Rogow, 
Macmillan ( l 9 6 l ) London, p . x v i i . 
20 ib i d , l o c . c i t . 
21 Raney Stanford, 'Personal P o l i t i c s i n the Novels of CP. Snow,' 
(1958) op.cit. 
22 The Sleep of Reason p.43. The episode takes up ch,3, 'A Meeting,' 
23 E l i o t wanted to "domesticate the whole business" -The Sleep of 
Reason p.39, and cf. ch.27, 'An Impermissible Term.' 
24 ib i d , p.47. 
25 Introduction to Rogow op.cit..above n.19, l o c . c i t . 
26 Corridors of Power p.120 
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27 e.g. Hansard vol.276 (l966) p.1096. 
28 c f . 'The Atomic Pioneers.' New Republic 139 (Oct.1958) pp. 18-9, 
and Hansard vol.275 (1966) pp.1133-4. 
29 Corridors of Power p.193. 
30 The Masters p.38. 
31 ibid,p.59. 
32 cf, the group fe e l i n g i n The Malcontents pp, 39, 58; The Masters 
ch, 12, 'Jago Walks Round the Court.' 
33 The A f f a i r pp. 314-5; for innocence and cynicism i b i d , pp, 177-8, 
The Masters pp,46. 104, Hansard vol,287 (196?) p,1177, 
34 Science and Government ( l 9 6 l ) p,60, 
35 The spy i n The New Ken i s broken down by his oxim loneliness; pp, 199-200, 
36 Corridors of Power p,142, 
37 ibid,p,143, so the innocent make the world seem worse than i t i s , 
38 ibid,p.104. 
39 i b i d , l o c , c i t . 
40 'The Irregular Right,' Nation 182 (March 1956) p,238, 
41 I n The Masters t h i s appears as the interpretation of actions 
as c i v i l i s e d discretion versus "bear-.garden" or cabals and 
conspiracy versus having things out i n the open, (p,79). 
Brown favours the pre-formal as an opportune method of getting 
r a t i o n a l discussion, as opposed to -ftie emotional escalation 
resulting from open c o n f l i c t . 
42 i , e , through one's own action; The Masters p* 174, 
43 ibid,p.275; Corridors of Power p,309. True of a l l group actions. 
44 The Sleep of Reason p.43 ( u n i n f l u e n c i b i l i t y ) , p.353 (inner c h i l l ) . 
45 The Malcontents pp.103-4; Corridors o f Power p.263. 
46 Passant has the qua l i t i e s of a natural leader, Brown those of 
a natural p o l i t i c i a n . The Masters ch.8, 'Three Kinds of Power.' 
presents examples of the desires for different combinations 
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of status and power, cf. aiso The Light and the Dark pp. 52-3. 
47 Character i s formed in action; "There i s great dignity in 
being a spectator and i f you do i t for long enough you are 
dead inside." The A f f a i r p.98; Homecomings p.184 on the 
i s o l a t i o n of diffidence. Also The Malcontents p.176 on the 
f e e l i n g of superiority resulting from lack of competition, 
obviously related to 'The case of Leavis and the serious case.' 
TLS (July 1970) vol.69, pp. 737-40. 
48 The Masters pp.61-2. 
49 Corridors of Power p.204. 
50 ibid,p,176, and s i m i l a r l y pp. 141, 259. 
51 Hansard vol. 261 (l964) p.1119. 
52 The New Hen ch. 38, *V/ords i n the Open.' 
53 Corridors of Power p.45. 
54 ibid.p.125. and also p.270. 
55 ibid.pp. 38, 342, and 47. E l i o t lacks that j u s t i f i c a t i o n when 
his chance comes: Last Things p.127. liost e x p l i c i t l y , The 
A f f a i r ch.9, 'A Treat for a Worldly Man.' The 'Treat' i s a 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
56 'Charismatic Centre' Spectator 213 p. 606. 
57 ibid, l o c . c i t . 
58 Corridors of Power pp. 60, 102. One aspect of t h i s book i s i t s 
alternation between two possible groups of candidates - the 
Higher C i v i l Service and the p o l i t i c a l s o c i a l i t e s , 
59 ibid.p.267. 
60 Last Things p.107 
61 . i b i d . p.105. 
62 Corridors of Power ch.27, 'Promenade Beneath the Chandeliers ' 
contains a discussion of t h i s point vfhich inclines towards the 
"Tolstoyan view" of history and p o l i t i c s (p.207) and the a s - i f 
solution noted above (Chapter I I I , n. 27). 
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63 The "doop" metaphoi;' perhaps expresses the position.of the 
leader more e f f e c t i v e l y : personalities only "count" vrhen 
"the hinge i s oiled, but the door ;:ay swing or not." Corridors 
of Power p. 341. The undirected climate does not act on 
i t s own account, but i s permissive of action. Similarly, 
persuasion implies some consent - The Masters p.255 - or 
confusion on the part of he who i s persuaded - Corridors of 
Povrer p. 178. 
The "tide" - ibid.pp.268-9: Last Things p. 105. For a 
contemporary application cf. Hansard vol.293 (1968) pp.539-48, 
on Southern Rhodesia, and New Statesman 65 (May 1963) p,748. 
64 The effective leader leads by only a l i t t l e way: 
Corridors of Power pp.179, 209; The Hew Men p, 128, 
65 e,g. The A f f a i r p,272. 
66 Rumours: Nightingale in The Masters. Robinson in Part I of 
Homecomings, about Passant in George Passant. i'Tei^spapers 
are constantly present in Corridors of Power, 
67 Last Things ch,41, 'A Bearer of Bad News' ( in the context of 
the conversation i n ch.14, 'End of a Line', pp,132-3,) 
68 T. L. Ashton sees E l i o t as "the experienced observer" through 
whose services "Snow counsels us" and v/elcomes us to the 
"community". op.cit.p.5l9. 
69 Examples of experienced p o l i t i c a l observers include Hector 
Rose, e.g. in Corridors of Povrer ch.39. ' P o l i t i c a l Arithmetic.', 
Thomas B e v i l l (Homecomings and The New Men) and the minaraed 
expert in The Malcontents pp. 173-4. Science, as a di s c i p l i n e , 
of course, r e l i e s upon accrual of experience and expert opinion. 
70 The A f f a i r i s ripe with examples, e.g. pp.37, 80, 179, 308; 
The Masters p. 274, The Malcontents (on abstraction) pp. 25-6, 
103 and 227, v;here the labels are (iemonstrated as boiiig t o t a l l y 
detfiched from the f a c t s . 
71 Corridors of Power p.201 - Quaife cannot afford Opposition support. 
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72 The Masters p.281; also The Light and the Dark p.140, 
73 e.g. The A f f a i r p. 45. 
74 Corridors of Power p.101, and pp.140-1; being taken for granted 
i s better, pp. 37-8. 
75 Snow saw the dangers i n the separation of Government from the 
responsible members of the community (Hansard vol.287 (1967) 
pp.1176-79) which would come about through Governmental secrecy. 
76 'The case of Leavis and the serious case' TI5 69 pp.738-9. 
'Education and S a c r i f i c e . ' (An abbreviation of the Richmond 
Lecture of 1st May, 1963) New Statesman 65 (Hay 1963) pp.746-50. 
Notes to Chapter Five 
1 c f . A. Burgess 'Pov/ers that Be.' Encounter vol,24 No.1 
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2 As above, cf. The Masters ch,8. The use of the.term "manager" 
i s j u s t i f i e d by reference to the f i r s t 'Corridors of Power.' -
The Listener vol.57 No.1464 (April 1957) pp. 619-20. 
3 Thus the importance of timing: The Masters ch.11, 'View from 
Roy Calvert's Window ' i l l u s t r a t e s the wrong way to work uithin 
the climate, i . e . auto: a t i c a l l y trying to c r y s t a l l i s e the 
position. Contrast The A f f a i r pp.76, 80-1, Martin's secrecy. 
4 Contrast Nightingale in The A f f a i r ch, 31, 'The Sight of a 
Blanlc Space.' 
5 In The Malcontents p.83 the precondition for revolution of a 
Marxian character i s seen as persuasion. The advice i s given 
by Martin E l i o t to Skeffington, with the asstjmption of a 
purpose formed, The A f f a i r pp.84-5. 
6 The Masters p.53; The A f f a i r pp.133-4, 308; Corridors of 
Power p.149: "He...let the decisions form." 
7 The Masters p.255. 
0 The A.rfuir p..?73: "'Ho believes that, lie means what he nays. 
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The Malcontents p.155: "...that moral certainty...was his 
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Last Things p. 135. " 
9 The A f f a i r p. 178. 
10 ibid.p.228. 
11 e.g. The Sleep of Reason p.143; The New Men pp.1.52-3. 
12 The Malcontents p.198. 
13 e.g. The Masters pp.92-3; The A f f a i r ch.40, 'Walking out of 
the Lodge.' 
14 e.g. The A f f a i r p.211 on who " c a r r i e s v/eight." 
15 Corridors of Povrer p. 105. 
16 The A f f a i r p.177. 
17 Science and Government (196I) p.73 : " . . . i t i s cardinal that 
you should be positive." The Two Cultures (I969 ed.) p.44: 
"...jam tomorrow, and one often sees /men_/ at their noblest." 
18 "The kind of l e a d e r . w h o i s J the next impulse i n p o l i t i c s . " 
Last Things p.132. The emergence of t h i s type progresses from 
The New Ken p. 228: "You were l i v i n g i n a power equilibrium, and 
you must not pretend; the r e l i c s of l i b e r a l humanism had no 
place there," Neil of The Malcontents i s a good example, 
19 Hansard vol.261 (1964) p.595. (His maiden speech.) 
20 As i n Chrystal of The Masters e.g. pp. 272-3, and Orbell of 
The A f f a i r p, 54. 
21 c f . The A f f a i r pp. 125-7, 232, 284. The Light and the Dark p.65. 
Corridors of Power pp.193-7, 258. 
22 This type of subtelty does not inspire trust. Generally i t 
appears to a r i s e from an unstable fluctuation of individual 
drives, combined with egocentricity, e.g. The A f f a i r p.165; 
Corridors of Povrer p.40; Homecomings pp.22-3. 
23 The Lifcht and the Dark p.226; Corridors of Power p.234 (public 
face, private nature) ibid,p.208 (calculated use of genuine 
anger); The Masters p.35; The A f f a i r p.11. 
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24 The A f f a i r p. 156: I-lanagers vrould be useless i f they were 
"passionless", "...what made them effective was that they 
were capable of being infuriated on the one hand.and 
managerial on the other." 
25 Lufkin i s the parafl,igm: Corridors of Power p. 107. 
26 Homecomings p. 13 
27 Hansard vol. 269 (1965) pp.85l-2. 
28 The A f f a i r pp.24-5, 294:"Most of us were disposed to deny our 
gratitude." ; Homecomings pp.24-5. 
29 The Malcontents p.125; Corridors of Power pp.98, 112, 230-1. 
30 e.g. Corridors of Power ch . 21 . 'Breakfast.' 
31 ibid.p.249; The Malcontents pp. 174-6, 
32 The Masters p. 94. 
33 ibid.p. 78.Also The Malcontents ch.14, where "nood" and 
" c o l l e c t i v e mood" replace the "climate" of the .'Strangers and 
Brothers' sequence. 
34 e.g. The A f f a i r ch.26, 'Definitions by a V/indow '.Also ch .23, 
•Bargains at a Small Dinner Party ', and at p.301 E l i o t 
mentions that his Fellowship v;as arranged pre-formally. Cf. 
The Light and the Dark chs. 5, 6 and 8 for a complete p o l i t i c a l 
manouevre. 
35 The New Men p.213. 
35 The Masters p. 94. 
37 Hansard vol. 287 (l967) p.1176. 
38 ib i d , l o c . c i t . cf. Last Things p. 130. 
39 Last Things p.131. 
40 Science and Government ( l 9 6 l ) p.55. 
41 Hansard vol.287 (l967) l o c . c i t . 
42 Science and Government p.55. 
43 Hansard vol. 293 (196B) pp. 539-46. 
44 c f , the second of Snow's c r i t e r i a for effective committees in 
Science and Government p ,74, (He declined to j o i n the Robbins 
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Committee because he did not think that "any Committee of 
th i s type could possibly be r a d i c a l enough" - Hansard vol,270 
(1965) p. 1294.) . 
45 Science and Government p.66. 
Notes to Chapter Six 
1 . 'The Two Cultures', Part IV, 'The Rich and the Poor', at 
Public Aff a i r s pp. 38-44; 'The State of Siege', at Public 
A f f a i r s pp. 214-7. 
2 Perhaps events i n world p o l i t i c s have overtaken s p e c i f i c points 
of Snow's argument - e.g. the 1973 raw material economy 
watershed, and the 1973-74 emergence of the Arabian o i l -
producing states. 
3 'The Two Cultures'* at Public Affairs pp.16-17. 21; 
'A Second Look', at ib i d . pp.53-4j 
'The serious case', at ibid, pp.94-7? 
'Science and Government', at ibid, pp.145-7; 
'Appendix to Science and Government', at ibid; pp.184-5; 
Hansard vol.289 (1968) pp.856-63; ib i d , vol.328 (1972) pp.859-65. 
cf. Bentley Glass, Science and E t h i c a l Values Oxford University 
Press (1966) London pp. 76-84. 
4 This i s the point on which Leavis's argument f e l l down: 
Spectator 208 (March 1962) pp. 297-303, and l a t e r Henry Par.rlie, 
ibid.211 (Nov.1963) p.211; as Stephen Toulmin noted (Spectator 
208 (March 1962) p.332) such arguments do "not seem to know 
the difference betv/een the tradition of s c i e n t i f i c ideas 
(or 'natural philosophy') on the one hand and 'technology or 
s c i e n t i f i c hygiene.'" c f . The Sleep of Reason pp.142-4 for 
an example. 
1 ?fi 
5 Hansard vol, 269 (1965) p. 853; 
vol. 270 (1965) pp.1296, 1299; 
vol. 302 (1969) pp. 159-165. 
'The serious case', at Public Affairs pp.90-2, 
The Guardian 8th. September 1970, p.7, 
6 The Tv/o Cultures and A Second Look ( l959) p.70. 
7 Hansard v o l . 261 (1964) pp.597-8j Time of Hope p.404: 
" I should never be able to comfort myself that I had grown up, 
that I had gone beyond the vu l g a r i t i e s of success." ; Last Things 
p,131: "People i n the Vfest were crying out for something more." 
8 e,g. The Light and the Dark pp. 332-3. 
9 'Reflections on Mrftean's Report.' Spectator 167 (March 1954) 
p.283. 
10 Homecomings p.202: "People of my sort have only two,.,." 
11 'Reflections on Mr Dean's Report.', l o c . c i t . The Hew Men p.228, 
12 This section s i m p l i f i e s the argument somevfhat by treating closed 
and open p o l i t i c s as discreet categories, vrhereas most p o l i t i c a l 
processes are a mixture of the two, and one i s r e a l l y putting 
the question of the degree to v;hich a process should be open 
or closed. See Chapter V, above, 'The significance of 
personal p o l i t i c s '. 
13 'Science and Government' at Public A f f a i r s p.131. 
14 'Appendix to Science and Government', ibid, p.154 and cf, p,142. 
-i=7 The Light and the Dark p.255. 
15 e.g. Corridors of Power p.250; The New Hea p. 164. 
16 'London i;iary. • aew. atatesman 53 (March 1957) p.267; 'The 
Atomic Pioneers.« New Republic 139 (Oct,1958) p.19. 
17 cf. The Sleep of Reason ch. 27. 
18 The A f f a i r p.277; Corridors of Power pp. 101, 131, 142, 
19 op.cit.p.105. 
20 Sundav Times 25th. Oct, 1970, p.27. 
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id. Herbert Simon's focus upon the decision-making process, 
which the individual approaches with 'bounded . rationality', 
as the central process of an organisation i s not at a l l 
d i s s i m i l a r to Snow's attitude to individual l i f e . (Two 
characters i n The Conscience of the Rich, published i n 1958, 
are called March and Simon). 
Si m i l a r l y , although one would not l i k e to place undue stress 
or reliance upon the comparison, Silverman's Action Theory i s 
based upon competitive individuals of unique perception, and 
interpretation of events. 
J»G. March and H.A. Simon, Organisations Wiley (1958) New York. 
D. Silverman, The Theory of Organisations Heinemann (l970). 
23 Jerome Thale, C P. Snow (1964) op.cit.p. 60. 
24 Dwight Waldo, The Novelist on Organisation and Administration 
I n s t i t u t e of Governmental Studies (I968) University of 
Califo r n i a , Berkeley, p.41. 
25 ibid.pp. 47-8. 
26 i b i d , pp.57-8. 
27 i b i d . .'P. 58. 
28 R.A.V/. Rhodes implies a s i m i l a r point in relation to Trollope, 
^Wilting i n Limbo: Anthony Trollope and the Nineteenth 
Century C i v i l Service.' Public Administration 51 (Summer 1973) 
pp.207, 210, 217. 
29 vath the possible exception of Corridors of Pov?er. 
30 Decision-making i s , for Snow, the opportunity for men to control 
t h e i r destiny, and t h i s opportunity must be taken to he r e a l . 
31, P o l i t i c a l Theory and Practice Allen Lane The Penguin Press 
(1971) London, p. 8l-
32 Time of Hope pp.115-116. 
33 ' P o l i t i c a l Education' Bowes and Bowes (1951) Cambridge, pp.19, 
10-11, 14; Crick, op.cit. p.7: "...the behavioural approach 
has cut i t s e l f off...from the most obvious range of explanations 
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of how...pattemings / of behaviourJ ...occur: history." 
For Snow's, agreement c f . Kermode, 'House of F i c t i o n ' Partisan 
Review 30 (Spring 1973) p .75 , 
34 Ashton sees a psychological study suppressed beneath the s t y l e : 
'Realism and the Chronicle' op.cit.pp,520-2, 
35 For example, the s h i f t from a r i s t o c r a t to bureaucrat as the 
' c l a s s ' moat concerned with Government policy: The Conscience 
of the Rich through The Light and the Dark to Corridors of 
Power: and science, academia and the role of women : 
The Masters and The A f f a i r . 
36 Oakeshott, op,cit.p,25. For a f u l l p o l i t i c a l education he 
would require comparative studies and philosophy. Snow compares 
cultures and groups bound by diffej-ent traditions and values, 
but he does not present international comparisons to effect, 
axcept i n discussing education i t s e l f . Of course. Snow has not 
claimed to be giving a f u l l p o l i t i c a l education, and perhaps 
a more appropriate evaluation, suitable for his novels, 
would be Waldo's test of whether his vfork adds the concrete, 
sensual, emotional, subjective and valuational, to other 
descriptions of administration and p o l i t i c s (op.cit,pp . 4 - 5 , 
used by Rhodes for Trollope, above, n,28). This i s a test of 
the value of an administrative novel, however, while an attempt 
has been made throughout t h i s vrork to treat Snow's writings as: 
a whole, and his novels as providing theories of p o l i t i c s , 
widely defined, providing more than i l l u s t r a t i o n s of administ-
r a t i v e s i t u a t i o n s . 
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